Between the late 1940s and mid-1960s, Kwame Nkrumah’s political thought became one of the prominent African home-grown ideologies, widely influencing the decolonization process in Africa and beyond. The Ghanaian leader envisaged the political and economic liberation of the continent from colonialism and neo-colonialism and its unification under the flag of a socialist continental government. Such a project became an integral and fundamental part of Ghana’s foreign policy during his rule (1957–1966). As Nkrumah maintained in March 1957, the independence of Ghana “is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa”.1 This was not a mere rhetorical statement but instead became—in the words of Nkrumah—the “cornerstone of [Ghana’s] foreign policy”.2 Ghana itself became one of the most important African players in the international stage, openly challenging Cold War powers over the ideological basis and political order of post-colonial Africa. The achievement of African liberation and unity overshadowed any other ambition that Ghana could have had as a small West African state. As Nkrumah confirmed to the Ghanaian parliament in 1958: “It is in Africa that Ghana’s foreign policy really lies.”3
From 1957 onwards, Nkrumah’s Ghana became extremely active in Africa, by creating and maintaining bridges between the continent and the rest of the global South, by organizing or taking part in conferences, by establishing a short-lived union with Mali and Guinea (1958–1963), by creating or participating in the creation of continental organizations, and by sending troops to the ex-Belgian Congo . Furthermore, Ghana supported the liberation process in the rest of the continent by backing financially and politically a large number of liberation movements and by hosting and training hundreds of African activists, freedom fighters and political refugees in its territory.
Nkrumah—aided and strongly influenced until 1959 by the Trinidadian Pan-Africanist George Padmore—conceived and crafted an ideology which included elements of African nationalism, non-alignment, socialism, Pan-Africanism and non-violence. This would eventually evolve into Nkrumaism.4 After successfully establishing and guiding a mass nationalist movement, the Convention People’s Party (CPP), to win the first elections in the colony (1951), he—again aided by Padmore—began to set up the basis of the foreign policy of the future independent country. This consisted primarily in spreading the gospel of the “Gold Coast Revolution” to the rest of the continent, including a highly idealized narration of Nkrumah’s successes as an ideologue and political leader, hoping to create a following which could reinforce the Pan-Africanist ranks when the time of fighting for a political union would be ripe. Once Ghana became independent (1957), Nkrumah and Padmore realized that in order to achieve the targets of Ghana’s Pan-African policy, the foreign service inherited from the British was far from being adequate to fulfil their needs. For this reason, they laid the basis—with the help of other anti-colonial and radical activists—for two separate Pan-African institutions outside the “orthodox” foreign service: the Bureau of African Affairs (BAA) and the African Affairs Centre (AAC). After Padmore’s death (September 1959), these would eventually be followed by a third one, the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (KNII).5 By making Accra a hub for African liberation movements, the Ghanaians worked through the three Pan-African institutions to spread Nkrumaism in Africa and push the liberation movements to follow Ghana’s political and ideological guide.
Nkrumaism and African Nationalism describes Ghana’s Pan-African foreign policy during Nkrumah’s rule, and particularly the way in which the Ghanaians sought to influence African liberation movements ideologically through the support given by the Pan-African institutions. I argue that Nkrumah not only spread and promoted the idea of Pan-Africanism on the continent, but he also planned to coordinate ideologically aligned liberation movements in order to gain a critical mass for creating a real political union. To his mind, only a continent-wide network of African nationalist parties which recognized themselves, in one form or another, in the basic principles of Nkrumaism could unite the continent and defend it from the threats of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and the rapacity of Cold War powers. In a period where African liberation movements were seeking ideological and organization models to follow, Nkrumah offered a “third way”; an African ideology presented as an alternative to what the Cold War powers could offer.6 This did not consist only in a vague call for non-alignment but rather in a political project aimed at defending the political and economic independence of the newly born nations and ultimately the entire continent. Studying the relationship between Nkrumah’s Ghana and African nationalism can unveil important elements for understanding the history of the Cold War, national liberation and nation-building in Africa.
In Ghana, Jeffrey Ahlman has argued, Nkrumaism was “negotiated, and constantly reinterpreted”, to the point of generating through time “multiple Nkrumaisms”.7 In its external projection, however, the Ghanaians simplified the Nkrumaist message, reducing it to its core elements. To African freedom fighters, Nkrumah’s thought was presented as a coherent and effective ideological guide. It was portrayed as a truly African solution to African problems and the only one capable of guiding the newly born nations to independence and unity. Similarly, the Pan-African institutions promoted Ghana’s ruling party and the various Nkrumaist organizations and institutions as models for other nationalist parties to follow. Even though Nkrumah’s ambitious objectives of a continental government proved beyond his reach, as I argue, he played a crucial role in the development of African nationalism. Although virtually no liberation movement followed to the letter the precepts of Nkrumaism, many adapted the principles and organizational methods learnt in Ghana to their own struggles. Nkrumah’s Ghana also allowed them to connect through a transnational network that inevitably affected their relationship with one another and allowed exchanges of ideas and strategies. One of the key objectives of the Bureau, the AAC and the KNII was to eliminate prejudices between people from different parts of Africa and to create instead a common sense of purpose, friendship and connection. In the words of an ex-member of Zambia’s United National Independence Party (UNIP) and guest of the Bureau in 1961: “By bringing people together they wanted to integrate, knowing that these would be the future leaders in the various countries, [The Bureau wanted them] to network […] Why those freedom fighters were there? It was for them to interact. […] To know each other well.”8
For decades, Nkrumah’s foreign policy has been described as a “failure”, as the leader did not apparently achieve any of his objectives.9 Besides being an oversimplification, this has also drastically limited the historical debate on the ways in which Nkrumah’s Pan-African foreign policy was imagined and executed. As Jean Allman has pointed out, for too long:
Even more problematic is the fact that Nkrumah’s plan for a continental political union was often represented as a failed project only ex post facto, when the territorial dimension of nationalism prevailed over any other alternative projects. Nevertheless, Nkrumah tried and to some extent succeeded in diverting the general trend of African nationalism in the early independence period, offering continental political unity as an attractive alternative or, better, a further objective of the nationalist struggle. This must be considered part of a trend of early post-colonial Africa characterized by “possibility and constraints”, and in which Pan-Africanism was considered by many as far from being a hollow dream.11 Such was Nkrumah’s commitment to his objectives that—in the words of Omari—he “sacrificed Ghana on the altar of Pan-Africanism”.12many scholars of African nation and nationalism have been immobilized by what has been widely deemed the failure of the nationalist and Pan-Africanist project in Africa. […] Yet these are stories we need to remember […] ‘nation-time’, liberation times, times when Pan-Africanism recognized no boundaries and a United States of Africa was considered not a pipe dream, but a plan just shy of a blueprint.10
This book responds to Allman’s call cited above. It describes Nkrumah’s Pan-African foreign policy while trying to elude the one-dimensional analysis of “failure”, instead examining its complexities and the overall influence of Nkrumah’s Ghana on African nationalism. The book provides a detailed investigation into the practical work of the Ghanaian Pan-African institutions. A significant set of primary sources has been retrieved and analysed. At the same time, a vast body of literature has been critically examined, filling numerous gaps and exposing politically biased narratives which flourished during the Cold War years. Voices of Ghanaian civil servants, politicians and diplomats linked in one way or another to the BAA, AAC or KNII have been collected. Similarly, voices of African freedom fighters hosted in Accra or those in contact in one way or another with the BAA have also been collected. For the first time, the testimonies of both Ghanaians and non-Ghanaians are considered and analysed.
The book considers two different perspectives. Firstly, it examines Nkrumah’s Pan-African policy and particularly how Ghana directly or indirectly influenced the development of African nationalist movements hosted in the country. At the time, Accra became a “transnational node” for African nationalist parties, which were offered a platform with which to extend the radius of their struggles to a wider international audience.13...