Pakistan and India have a long and troubled history of outstanding disputes that have led to a number of wars and military crises between the two countries. Both nuclear weapon states continue to build their conventional and nuclear capabilities to deal with their respective insecurities. More recently, the shift in Indiaâs security orientation and its desire to be reckoned as a potential global power has provided impetus to the ongoing nuclear competition between the two South Asian nuclear powers that continue to remain outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) based global nonproliferation regime .
The two South Asian nuclear states never signed the NPT and had built their nuclear capabilities without violating the existing structures of the international nonproliferation regime . Both have indicated their willingness to join the nuclear nonproliferation regime, but without giving up their nuclear status. Unless these two states are offered a tangible quid pro quo, it would be unrealistic to expect that either of the two would unilaterally agree to accept treaty-based international nonproliferation and disarmament obligations.
One possible way to bring the two non-NPT states into the mainstream regime and help universalize the nonproliferation norms could be to encourage both India and Pakistan to negotiate a regional nonproliferation framework, in line with the principles of the existing NPT based regime , but without making unrealistic demand of a unilateral disarmament. The proposed regional nonproliferation regime (RNR ) skirts NPTâs limitation which makes it diffilcult to formally recognize the status of a nuclear weapon state (NWS) for countries that tested nuclear weapons after 1 January 1967.
This study follows both normative and empirical approaches to identify the underlying causes that led towards the nuclearization of India and Pakistan and discusses their relationship with the international arms control treaties and other nonproliferation measures. This background would be helpful in suggesting an RNR which is derived from the Regional Security Complex (RSC) theory provided by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. The RNR is based on a premise that since IndiaâPakistan have inter-dependent securitization priorities, therefore, there could be an incentive for them to work jointly toward a regional nonproliferation framework. Such an arrangement would not only help address each otherâs sensitivities but could pave the way for normalizing their relationship with the NPT based international nonproliferation regime .
1.1 Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation?
States develop nuclear weapons when they are faced with a military threat that cannot be addressed through any other means, and if they do not face a serious threat to their national security , they may not pursue a nuclear weapons program. 1 Security nevertheless, is not the only guiding factor that drives statesâ nuclear weapons program, and there could be several other considerations or a combination of factors that may lead towards the nuclearization process. And once a state acquires nuclear weapons, it would be reluctant to give up nuclear weapons even if it no longer faces an existential threat to its national security . This is because the process of nuclearization creates various interest groups, including the political leadership, the scientific community, civil and military bureaucracies; who benefit from the continued expansion and modernization of the nuclear arsenal.
The proponents of the realists school of thought are of the view that, âstates are unitary actors that seek nuclear weapons because their security, precarious in an anarchic world, demands it,â 2 and for them, nuclear weapons remain the gold standard for deterring existential threats . 3 Within the realists, there are some who argue that âstates obtain nuclear weapons because they learn to stop worrying and love the bomb,â 4 while others consider proliferation as a necessity to meet national security demands. For them:
All states can go nuclear, should go nuclear, and sooner, the better. If they have not done so yet, it is simply a matter of time before they do. The core realist prediction about proliferation is that some event will inevitably come along, sooner rather than later, that finally causes the dam to break and the world to go nuclear. 5
Neorealists, on the other hand, view the structure of the international system as the primary reason for nuclear proliferation. They believe that: âregime type, domestic politics, and personalities are of no consequence, and all that really matters is an understanding of the balancing dynamic in which one stateâs pursuit of nuclear weapons begets another.â 6 These perspectives are useful to understand the causes of nuclear proliferation, but since no single theory has been able to explain the proliferation puzzle thoroughly, therefore, several analysts tend to create unsubstantiated alarm by arguing that the opacity in national nuclear programs of many states has led to unchecked proliferation, which eventually could end up in a nuclear domino effectâa phenomenon best described by Arkin as the âsky is falling profession.â 7
One possible way of studying the problem of nuclear proliferation is through the levels of analysis approach that Waltz has categorized as âimages.â 8 Some states pursue nuclear weapons to be recognized as a credible military power or possibly as a consequence of a regional or global security competition. The process of nuclearization itself has the potential to alter stateâs security orientation; therefore, it is more likely that these images would also evolve with the advancement of nuclear capabilities, which could further complicate the study of proliferation puzzle . Understanding and the transformation of these self-images by a state could be useful in developing a responsive and a credible nonproliferation framework.
Most existing theories dealing nuclear proliferation are limited in scope as the focus is confined to finding solutions to the proliferation puzzle by negotiating treaties or conventions and limit further growth or reduce the nuclear weapons, but the fundamental question that remains unaddressed is, what would constitute knowledge in the area of proliferation? 9 Ogilvie-White believes that lack of empirical evidence about the nuclear weapons programs of almost all states has led to an abstract debate over the nuclear proliferation causes, which makes it doubtful whether a positivist 10 approach towards the study of nuclear proliferation is possible due to criticism on epistemological and ontological grounds. 11
One major problem while studying the causes of nuclear proliferation is that the lessons learned from relatively more transparent nuclear programs are generalized and applied universally. This has the potential to misinterpret cause and effect relationship since preventive policies that are effective for a particular environment, or a region may not be applicable for others.
1.2 From Globalism to Regionalism
Traditionally nuclear proliferation has been dealt with by developing and enforcing global solutions through internationally negotiated treaties on the pattern of cultural, transnational and international political economy approaches. Since the end of the Cold War the regionalist approach, however, has become more autonomous and prominent in the international politics, and is seen as the most viable level of analysis to understand patterns of amity and enmity within a region, and could also provide a useful mean to find regional nonproliferation solutions.
A region, according to Fawcett âis a contested and ambiguous concept. Like states, regions could be of varying composition, capabilities and aspirations. They may also be fluid and changing in their make-up.â 12 Payne defines regionalism as a âstate-led, or states-led project designed to recognize a particular regional space along defined economic and political lines.â 13 It could be further divided into âold or classicalâ regionalism and the ânewâ regionalism. Old regionalism, which is a Cold War era phenomenon was imposed from the above and collaboration focused on aligning regional interests with either of the two global powers. New regionalism, which is a post-Cold War phenomenon is more comprehensive and open and includes non-state actors, such as the NGOs and the think tanks who play an important role in enforcing nonproliferation norms.