The purpose of this study is twofold. First, it aims to explain why China, after having launched a crash programme in the mid-1950s to develop a nuclear deterrent, did not formulate a clear operational doctrine with respect to the targeting and employment of nuclear weapons until the mid-1980s. Second, it aims to contribute to the development of a neoclassical realist approach to the study of international relations by demonstrating its utility in explaining the formation of a state’s military doctrine . I will employ neoclassical realism to shed some light on the puzzling development of China’s nuclear doctrine .
1.1 The Underdevelopment of China’s Nuclear Doctrine
China tested an atomic bomb in 1964, and three years later tested a thermonuclear bomb; meanwhile, it also developed a small arsenal of ballistic missiles with nuclear capacity. These rapid developments notwithstanding, Beijing did not devise a nuclear doctrine on targeting and employment for several decades. There is a general consensus on this point among scholars.
China’s present political leaders have inherited a realpolitik world view […] A realpolitik world view and a confidence in the status and military value of nuclear weapons ought logically to lead to a more or less coherent nuclear doctrine that stresses the operational utility of nuclear weapons. One of the puzzles in the Chinese case is that for about 30 years after China exploded its first nuclear weapon, there was no coherent, publicly articulated nuclear doctrine. (Johnston 1996b: 549, 552)
[…] the first three decades of China’s approach to nuclear modernization and doctrinal development raises several important questions […]. First, why did China maintain such a small and vulnerable nuclear force structure for so long, given that it undermined China’s ability to deter nuclear aggression? Second, why did China not develop a detailed operational nuclear doctrine? Why, in particular, did China not pursue nuclear war-fighting concepts (and associated force structures) as a response to its nuclear and conventional inferiority? (Fravel and Medeiros 2010: 48–49)
One can see general trends in Chinese thinking about nuclear weapons, particularly a pervasive belief that nuclear weapons are primarily instruments of political coercion, as well as the related view that small numbers of weapons would suffice to neutralise larger arsenals used in this manner. However, China would not develop a formal nuclear strategy and operational plans until after Mao’s death in 1976 and the deployment of the first ICBM in the early 1980s. (Lewis 2014: 14–15)
Chinese political and military leaders did not begin to debate these thorny issues and to develop a more nuanced doctrine until the mid-1980s, in a completely changed domestic environment. This late development is a puzzling issue to address. The usual explanations for the underdevelopment of China’s nuclear doctrine are not completely satisfying. They shed light on some aspects of the problem but are wanting on other important dimensions of the issue.
Arguments based on the “infant” nature of the Chinese deterrent in the 1960s do not take into account that in the US, the debate on nuclear weapons and their use was immediately articulated. After an initial hesitation, when the radical nature of nuclear weapons was not understood and they were considered as simply more powerful conventional bombs, the debate developed in a very sophisticated manner.
In 1957, Henry Kissinger analysed the possibility of waging a limited nuclear war. He attacked Eisenhower’s strategy of massive retaliation that confined the strategic arsenal to the role of deterrence, with a divorce between military force and diplomacy. The only way, according to Kissinger, to get out of this deadlock was to bring nuclear weapons back into American policy as an active tool, and not only as an instrument of deterrence. Their use should be limited so that the survival of the nation was not jeopardized by the risk of an atomic holocaust.
In 1958, Albert Wohlstetter examined the false assumptions in the American policy of deterrence. The problem, according to Wohlstetter, was that the so-called balance of terror was far from automatic: it was not assured by the mere possession of nuclear weapons. Two states were effectively discouraged from attacking each other only if they had a “second strike” capability such that their nuclear weapons could survive a surprise attack by the enemy and launch a devastating blow against its territory. If a state did not have a survivable arsenal, it may have an incentive to (or induce enemies to) strike first to destroy the nuclear capability of counterpart.
In the early 1960s, Herman Kahn elaborated on the “unthinkable”. He devised a ladder of nuclear escalation with forty-four steps that was divided into six thresholds. The third threshold was the most important because it marked the transition from an armed confrontation in which nuclear weapons were not used to one in which they began to be used, even if only against limited military targets. According to Kahn, the ability to fight at all levels of violence by using nuclear weapons in a selective way could strengthen the credibility of deterrence (Kahn 1965).
All of these studies and research were not classified and were well known to Chinese policymakers.1 Moreover, Chinese leaders were well acquainted with the subtleties of the Soviet Union’s (USSR) strategy. The USSR had a different approach to nuclear strategy vis-à-vis the US (Snyder 1977; Holloway 1984; Rice 1986), and had developed its own doctrine about targeting and employment. Marshal Sokolvskii’s classic textbook elaborated on war in the nuclear age and the use of atomic weapons as a deterrent or tactically on the battlefield. As Sokolovskii put it:
A future war in which the basic instrument of violence is the nuclear weapon – a weapon of mass destruction – would lead to immeasurably more casualties and devastation. With the rapid development of productive forces, science, and technology, the instruments of war have become so powerful that the chances of attaining the most decisive political goals in armed combat are enormously improved. […] In the study of the nature of these wars, Soviet military strategy assumes the theoretical possibility of the following fundamental types of war in the recent epoch. World War […] Small imperialist wars […] national liberation wars, civil wars, and other popular wars […] The distinguishing feature of weapon development under current conditions is the appearance of qualitatively new types of weapons and military equipment and their rapid and massive introduction into the armed forces. This has led to a pronounced improvement in the latter’s combat capabilities, a radical break in the organizational forms of armed forces and the methods of conducting military operations on every scale. Military strategy and the art of war as a whole have undergone a revolution. […] In modern warfare, nuclear weapons can be employed for various missions: strategic, operational, and tactical. (Sokolovskii 1963: 274, 282–283, 295, 297)
In the case of France, whose deterrent (Force de frappe) arose in the same period as the Chinese arsenal,2 and whose programme’s evolution was in many respects very similar to that of China’s,3 it is possible to see the timely development of a nuclear doctrine. Due to the small size of its stockpile, Paris immediately adopted an articulated nuclear doctrine: the “dissuasion du faible au fort” (weak-to-strong deterrence) (Yost 1985). It was based on the choice of a countervalue strategy (the main targets of French weapons were civilian targets)4 and specific operational policies: the deterrent was based on a triad of nuclear weapons delivered by bomber, ground-launched missiles, and submarine-launched missiles. At least one of the four strategic submarines should always be on patrol to guarantee a second strike capability and devastating damage to the possible attacker.5
To sum up, when China tested its first atomic bomb and entered the exclusive club of nuclear states, it could learn from the other countries about the complex debate on nuclear doctrine: deterrence stability versus instability; counterforce strategy versus countervalue strategy ; general war versus limited nuclear war; strategic employment versus tactical use; etc. All of these cases notwithstanding, Beijing chose not to elaborate on the development of a military doctrine about targeting and employment. The main explanations offered for this decision can be assembled into three loosely defined groups. They present partial explanat...