In 1976, while visiting San Antonio, TX, Gerald Ford bit into an unhusked tamal(e). Did his food faux pas help him or hurt him among Latinos? Was G.W. Bushâs Spanish good enough? Were his efforts to reform immigration genuine? Were Bush and Karl Rove successful at courting Latinos? Was Marco Rubioâs bilingual response to Obamaâs 2013 State of the Union Address relevant? Or, was Harry Reid ultimately right in 2010 when he said: âI donât know how anyone of Hispanic heritage can be a Republican?â 1 Each electoral cycle revives Republican demographic cognizance that highlights the reality that Latinos will increasingly play a relevant role in electing this countryâs leaders for many years to come.
Come election time, pundits and students of politics wonder about the growing importance of Latinos. On election night 2012, Latinosâthe largest minority group in the USAâwere once again credited with helping Obama win the presidency. Conservative Bill OâReilly, lamenting the impending Republican loss, said during the 2012 election coverage on Fox News: âThe demographics are changing. Itâs not a traditional America anymore. [âŠ] The White establishment is now the minority. You are going to see a tremendous Hispanic vote for President Obama.â
Latinos continue to increase in numbers through both immigration and high fertility rates. Of about 40 million foreign-born people living in America, roughly 50% of them are of Hispanic origin. A majority of Latino immigrants are documented (72%), and of those with âlegal status,â a majority are now naturalized citizens (Passel 2007; Passel and Cohn 2011). In 2014, even as Republicans took over the Senate and gained congressional seats after the midterm elections, there were voices within the party cautioning about the possible alienation of Latino voters (Calmes 2014; Cohn 2014).
Latinos have increased their electoral presence by expanding numbers of eligible voters and growing turnout. While most of the traditional Latino population was of Mexican origin in the twentieth century, new waves of migrants from all regions of the American continent(s) 2 have generated a new definition of Latino, rooted in the Spanish language and colonial heritage. Being Latino involves the syncretism of cultures, ethnicities, histories, religions, ideologies, and social classes. This complex mix of collective identities is at the center of understanding how immigrant-based groups will shape the future of American politics.
Despite consistently voting Democratic, Latinos (and Asians in America) often have their political allegiance questioned. Was Obamaâs race responsible for winning over 70 % of the Latino and Asian votes in 2008 and 2012? Did Bush nearly topple the minority-Democratic connection with his appeals to Latinos? Can Marco Rubio, through his Spanish and immigration stories, bring Latinos to vote for him and the Republican Party? Despite assurances in the media and political commentaries that argue Latinos are swing voters, willing to be courted by both parties, Latinosâas culturally heterogeneous as they areâvote for Democrats. Latinos, overall, continue to identify more with the Democrats than they do with the Republicans at a three-to-one ratio, while Latinos of Cuban origin continue to be strong Republican supporters. It is well known that President Bush tried to reach out to Latinos during his campaigns and presidency. In 2000, and more prominently in 2004, Latinos slightly shifted their vote in support of President G.W. Bush, closing the gap between Democratic and Republican presidential support. This shift led political commentators to wonder if the long-presaged shift of Latinos to the Republican Party had begun. Unfortunately for Republicans, Bush was ineffective at generating a large shift in electoral and partisan preferences among most Latinos. While Latinos supported Bush more than previous Republican presidential candidates, this Bush Effect was short-lived (de la Garza and Cortina 2007). The 2008 and 2012 elections saw Latinos overwhelmingly vote for Obama over McCain and Romney. The Republican Party appears to push away Latinos with anti-immigration, anti-voting rights, and anti-welfare legislation and rhetoric being championed by prominent Republican politicians. All these have the ability to alienate this large and diverse group, highlighting that social groups matter in US politics.
Why does the Republican Party continue to be so unappealing to Latinos? Bush did quite well with Latino voters in 2004 and Latinos have occupied prominent roles in the Republican Party. From Al Gonzalezâ role as attorney general, to the election of Susana MartĂnez in New Mexico, to the candidacy of two prominent Cuban Americans for the 2016 Republican Presidential nomination, Latinos now feature in the Republican Party. Traditional values, social conservatism, and religion also tie Latinos to Republicans. Latinos, more than any other demographic group, believe the American creed that one can âget aheadâ if they work hard enough (de la Garza et al. 1996). Over 90 % of the Latino population identifies with some Christian religion and over 40 % feels part of a charismatic or born-again Christian movement. A few hours after news networks called the electoral vote in favor of Obama for the second time, Karl Rove again told his conservative audience on Fox News that Latinos are an important and obviously crucial demographic that should, by all measures, identify as Republican. Latinos (and many minority and immigrant groups) are cross-pressured by their religiosity and social conservatism on the one hand, and their historical allegiance to the party of minorities on the other.
Partisanship is one of the strongest predictors of turnout and voting. It is also capable of shaping how political information is processed by the public (Bartels 2002); yet, Latinos and other immigrant-based groups continue to appear to not have a fixed partisanship (Hajnal and Lee 2011).This project proposes a theory of immigrant partisanship that can be used to explain the micro-foundations of partisanship for Latinos. I rely on two large political science areas of research: ethnic politics and partisanship. I develop and test a theory to explain why Latinosâincluding those born abroadâhave not become more Republican despite the conventional wisdom that social issues will drive Latinos toward the political right. Recent studies of Latino politics place social issues at the forefront (Alvarez and GarcĂa Bedolla 2003; Bowler, Nicholson and Segura 2006; Nicholson et al. 2006). This view of Latino partisanship presents a likely tension between a demographic that is economically liberal and socially conservative. Because of this dilemma, it is possible that a third issue areaâimmigrationâcan help define Latino partisanship. While this has not featured in existing studies of Latino partisanship (but see Bowler et al. 2006), it appears to be conventional wisdom that Republicans alienate Latinos through their anti-immigration rhetoric and legislative actions. As a cross-cutting issue that is strongly linked to Latinos in American politics, I test the possibility that Latinos will be driven toward their partisan preferences through the issue of immigration.
I extend previous narratives of Latino partisanship by arguing that specific policy issues matter in conjunction with group identities. The theory I advance in this book argues that these issue considerations are less important than the underlying identities responsible for the views. I propose that while issues matter, group identities are the crucial component for Latino partisanship. A group or social identity is the part of the self, which is tied to a particular group in society (Tajfel 1981). Furthermore, âeach of us has a range of different, cross-cutting [and sometimes overlapping], social identitiesâ (Ellemers et al. 2002, p. 164). Using Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and the concept of dual and multiple identities (GonzĂĄlez and Brown 2003, see also, Simon and Klandermans 2001; Klandermans 2013; Roccas and Brewer 2002), I argue that Latinos are driven to political behavior through their social identities. I specifically propose that Latino identityâa feeling of being part of the same group as millions of people who come from south of the bordersâis crucial to Latinosâ attachment to the Democratic Party. Following this logic, I also empirically ask whether religious identities pull Latinos away from Democrats.
To limit the application of the theory derived here to Latinos in the USA would be a mistake. In recent years, Asian immigration has either matched or surpassed that of Latin Americans. The population of Asian Americans is expected to double in the next 30 years. Asians, as a collective, are poised to become an important force in American politics, despite not sharing a common language, as is the case with Latinos (Espiritu 1992; Lien 1994). The concentration of Latinos and Asians in states with many electoral votes makes explaining the partisan and electoral dynamics crucial to our understanding of the future of American politics. In California, a state with 55 Electoral College votes, Latinos make up 38 % of the population while Asians add another 14 %. These two groups alone will soon be capable of controlling the electoral outcomes of the state. New York and Florida, each with 29 Electoral College votes, will be majority-minority states by the 2020s (Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Florida, retrieved January 2014). In Texas (38 electoral votes), Latinos are expected to surpass the number of non-Hispanic whites, also by 2020. The role of minorities, and specifically Latinos, also continues to increase in crucial swing states such as Nevada and Colorado, where Latinos already make up 20 % of the ...