Intelligence and Security Oversight

An Annotated Bibliography and Comparative Analysis

Sophie Richardson, Nicholas Gilmour

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9783319302515
• eBook ISBN: 9783319302522
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Comparative Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Thisbook presents a comprehensive source document on intelligence and securityoversight and review. It compares the oversight arrangements found in ninecountries—New Zealand, Australia, Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and South Africa. This is done through an analysisof a wide range of areas including statutory basis, agencies overseen, membership, tenure, appointment/dismissal, mandate, powers, access toclassified information, complaints function, reporting and, in the case ofparliamentary committees, the frequency of meetings. Within an annotatedbibliography section Richardson and Gilmour also provide detailed summaries ofother relevant research and commentary aligned with oversight and reviewpractices.

Intelligence andSecurity Oversight: An Annotated Bibliography and Comparative Analysis comprehensivelydemonstrates the powers and limitations placed with, and on, oversight bodies, appealing to academics, researchers and practitioners in the intelligence andsecurity environment.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Sophie Richardson and Nicholas GilmourIntelligence and Security Oversight 10.1007/978-3-319-30252-2_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Sophie Richardson¹  and Nicholas Gilmour²

(1)

Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Wellington, New Zealand

(2)

Centre for Defence & Security Studies, Massey University, Wellington, New Zealand

 

Abstract

In this chapter Richardson and Gilmour introduce a comprehensive source document which systematically collates research and commentary on intelligence and security oversight and review and comparatively analyses oversight practices in nine countries. The authors acknowledge the growing interest in the area of intelligence and security and the intensified focus on oversight and review post-Snowden disclosures. This chapter also briefly discusses the similarities of and differences between the terms ‘oversight’ and ‘review’ and how they shape the role and function of various oversight/review bodies. Furthermore, this chapter details how the authors chose the nine countries discussed in this book and compiled the various research books and commentary pieces, and gives a brief outline of each section.

End Abstract

This book serves as a comprehensive source document on intelligence and security oversight and review. To our knowledge there has not, prior to this, been a piece of work that systematically collated what is a growing body of specialised research and commentary on intelligence and security oversight and review. Furthermore, commentary on intelligence and security oversight generally focuses on one particular aspect of oversight, for example, parliamentary committees, rather than the entire oversight regime. Where there is discussion about the various bodies that make up intelligence and security oversight, this is often not country specific but rather discusses best practice considerations generally. This document instead provides a comprehensive overview of intelligence and security oversight, with details specific to each country, while also providing detailed summaries of relevant pieces of work within the book’s annotated bibliography section.

An independent review of the legislation that governs New Zealand’s two intelligence and security agencies, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Sevice and the Government Communications Security Bureau has recently been completed. ¹ The New Zealand government is currently considering its response to the review and any amendment Bill will likely be introduced in late 2016. The legislative review also examined the legislation that governs the bodies tasked with oversight and review of these agencies, making this book particularly timely. Canada and the USA have recently reviewed parts of the legislation governing their intelligence and security agencies. This has sparked much debate regarding existing powers of intelligence and security agencies and questioned whether there is a case for expansion and/or reform.

It seems unlikely the same level of international public interest, submission, and rigour of debate would have occurred had it not been for the Edward Snowden (and other) revelations. Some two and a half years after Snowden first leaked classified documents revealing the extent of the US National Security Agency (NSA) and its cohort’s interception powers and capabilities, several Western democracies, particularly within the Five Eyes, ² are still dealing with the ramifications of the disclosures.

These reform debates together with Snowden’s revelations have resulted in a greater public awareness and intensified focus on ‘spy agencies’ and their activities. Naturally, this has led to questions being raised about the legality and propriety of some of the agencies’ actions and activities. Governments, including New Zealand’s, have since (post-Snowden), strengthened both the powers and capabilities of their intelligence and security oversight and review bodies. ³

These oversight and review bodies are not only essential to improving and maintaining public trust and confidence in these inherently secretive agencies but also crucial to encourage intelligence and security agencies to be more transparent and ensure their actions are legal and proper and to scrutinise policies and procedures to ensure an adequate compliance regime. Control and accountability are central to democracy:

Placing the institutions of government under democratic control and making them accountable is one of the most important tasks of democracy—S. Farson ⁴

However, it is important to note that increased or enhanced oversight of intelligence and security activities and the agencies that conduct them is not the great panacea. Intelligence and security agencies must want to act lawfully, with propriety and with due respect for human rights, and have sufficiently clear and prescriptive legislation in order to do this.

In a democracy governed by the rule of law, […] responsibilities cannot be permanently shifted onto [oversight] bodies and courts. After all, isn’t preserving democracy and the rule of law the fundamental purpose of the security services?[…]Democracy and the rule of law must not be restricted to protect […] against [threats to national security]. Far from it, they must be deployed to the full—H.D. Tjeenk Willink ⁵

This book through its descriptions of various oversight regimes will demonstrate the powers and limitations placed with/on oversight bodies. Through these descriptions it is hoped that the public, academia, commentators, policy analysts, politicians, and non-governmental organisations are better informed about nations’ oversight regimes, and from this form their own opinions on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the regimes in their own nations.

Notes

1.

Report of the first Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in New Zealand, ‘Intelligence and Security in a Free Society’ by Hon Sir Michael Cullen an Dame Patsy Reddy, DNZM publically released on 9 March 2016.

 

2.

The Five Eyes (aka UKUSA) is an intelligence alliance consisting of New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the UK, and the USA.

 

3.

See Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill 2013 (no. 109–1).

 

4.

Stuart Farson, “Establishing Effective Oversight Systems”, in Overseeing Intelligence Services: A toolkit 2012, ed. Hans Born (The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2012), 25.

 

5.

Tjeenk Willink, H.D. “To What Extent May in a Constitutional Democracy the Rule of Law Be Limited in Order to Protect It against Terrorism?” Lecture, International Symposium on Accountability of Intelligence and Security Agencies and Human Rights, Ridderzaal, The Hague , June 7, 2007.

 

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Sophie Richardson and Nicholas GilmourIntelligence and Security Oversight 10.1007/978-3-319-30252-2_2

Begin Abstract

2. Method

Sophie Richardson¹ and Nicholas Gilmour²

(1)

Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Wellington, New Zealand

(2)

Centre for Defence & Security Studies, Massey University, Wellington, New Zealand

Abstract

In this chapter Richardson and Gilmour describe the method used to collate the annotated bibliography. Furthermore, this chapter details how the authors chose the nine countries discussed in this book and compiled the various research articles and commentary pieces, and gives a brief outline of each section. Collating oversight and review practices in the selected states and compiling a comprehensive bibliography of research and commentary relative to these oversight and review practices, is the primary focus of this book. Oversight and review practices vary across countries, even between those who follow similar governance models. The authors have endeavoured to select geographically dispersed countries and countries with both parliamentary and presidential-based political systems.

End Abstract

Those chosen are long-standing democracies with one exception (South Africa).

The countries are:

• UK
• USA
• Canada
• Australia
• New Zealand
• Germany
• Norway
• The Netherlands
• South Africa

To support the research for the book, an extensive literature search was undertaken between March 2015 and November 2015. Online search engines and the Massey University library were extensively utilised to conduct only English language searches. Existing reference lists were also employed as a method of gathering literature.

Due to the lack of consensus on the definition of ‘oversight’ and ‘review’ (see below), both search terms were employed in conjunction with ‘intelligence’ and ‘security’ in order to capture the widest range of articles.

Before undertaking this project, the authors were unaware of the debate in the intelligence and security community surrounding the use of certain terminology. Academics, intelligence, and security commentators have expressed varied interpretations on what differentiates intelligence oversight from intelligence review:

Oversight as exercised by the legislative branch involves a lesser degree of day-to-day management of the intelligence services, but requires an equally important amount of scrutiny. ¹

‘Review’ and ‘Oversight’ are often confused. Oversight is a real-time (or close to real time) operational command and control strategy. Review is a retrospective performance audit, examining past security service activity and gauging it against specific criteria (e.g. Compliance with law and policy). ²

Oversight is in actuality an ex-post-facto process, as it is more concerned with reviewing the activities of the intelligence bodies. ³

Oversight refers to the review or scrutiny of intelligence activities so that those directing them can be held accountable. ⁴

It seems clear that an agreed definition of these respective terms remains a matter for debate. For the purposes of this book, intelligence oversight and review are considered interchangeable terms that describe a function/ body that is independent of the agency it oversees. While commentators often draw the definitional difference of these terms, by reference to oversight as an internal day-to-day management function and review as a post-event external audit, often the distinction in the actual practice of oversight and review is not so clear-cut. Oversight and review of intelligence agencies must be dynamic to be effective. As Farson ⁵ articulates in relation to the responsibilities of parliaments in oversight and review:

All...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Frontmatter
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Method
• 3. Discussion
• 4. Table
• 5. Annotated Bibliography
• 6. Comparative International Oversight Arrangements
• Backmatter