A spectre has haunted the history of theoretical criminology. As Wikström (2006) notes, this ‘spectre’ has been ‘… that criminological theory, by and large, has not been able to fully address the problems of causation and explanation’ (p. 61). Causality is an integral part of the social sciences (Hollis 1994) and should be accorded a high priority because it stands as the bedrock for the ‘understanding of social phenomena and the building of an explanatory science’ (Marini and Singer 1988: 347). Criminology, as a discourse has fundamentally a threefold aim, which is to: (1) define the nature of crime; (2) uncover the root causes of crime; and (3) resolve what it is that we ought to do about the issue of crime. However, there is something of an aetiological crisis in criminology as the discourse has failed to provide reliable causal accounts (Young 1986). Weisburd and Piquero (2008) further extend this point when they note in their study that the explanatory power of even the most sophisticated criminological theories, employing the most robust and advanced statistical models/tests, put forward in the last century and a half is very low.
As a consequence, one of the core challenges of criminology, establishing how and why crime is caused, has not been adequately met. We are, to a degree, failing in our own discipline. This of course poses problems in an industry where the double curses (obsessions?) of impact and research excellence hover above us like an academic sword of Damocles. It is my contention that we need to address this problem head on by opening up to discussion, from novice undergraduate student through to seasoned criminological theoretician, the issues and complexities of the problem of causation.
If we are to open up this discussion more widely to the field, then we must start somewhere. This is what this book is for – to begin the discussion. There are, fundamentally, two problems associated with causation and causal explanations within theoretical criminology. Firstly, as in the wider context of the natural and social sciences, there is a poor understanding of causal mechanisms. Secondly, the implicit adoption of an overly simplistic causal model leads, inevitably, to inadequate integration of levels of explanation and the failure of causal explanations. This book is an introduction to these issues and as such is concerned with exploring not only the issues and problems raised by causation for theorising but also the consequences of these issues and problems on the history, present and future of criminological discourse.
So, who is this book for? Essentially, I have attempted to make what is a horrendously complex set of issues accessible to all with some understanding of the nature of social science. Therefore, this book is for both the criminology undergraduate interested in the history and development of their chosen subject, the research student who is beginning their project and needs to consider these issues when drafting their methods chapter and the seasoned practitioner, who is engaged in advanced aetiological theorising who may need a (unfortunately not so) simple reference guide on the problems of causation. This book, being an introduction, is by no means exhaustive in its exploration of the complexities of causal reasoning but is intended to give all readers an understanding of the problems, how this impacts on the field of criminology and what we need to think about when constructing/deconstructing criminological theory.
Before beginning in earnest, it must be noted that this book is not intended as a critique of particular criminological theories or of particular theorists. All theories have problems and all theories have merit – whether that be in explanatory power, utilisation or impact. However, such considerations are beyond the scope of this particular book. Instead, what this book is concerned with is the apparent shift in aetiological thinking that has accompanied the progress of criminological thought. Here I am interested in charting the apparent drift from one form of aetiological thinking to another in the modern history of our field. I am not particularly interested in what particular theorists have to say on crime and its causation, rather how they construct their argumentation in terms of explicating causal explanations of crime. There are no value judgements placed on the works being analysed – all have played a part in the development and progress of the field to which I am an adherent and which I seek here to examine. As such, I am more interested in the mechanics of their argumentation, their navigation of ontology and epistemology, their dissatisfaction with method and their conclusions than the content, if you will. This is a historical and technical overview of the field. In that regard, though this book is firmly designed for criminologists and social scientists it has its roots in the abstract aetiological discourses to be found in the philosophy of the natural and social sciences. It is also why this book is not an exhaustive examination of criminological theory in the period under discussion but is instead an examination of representative forms of causal explanations in criminological thinking in this period.
However, before explicating these arguments it is important to note that the problem of causation is not restricted to criminology. Cause-and-effect-type constructions in language, general conversation and scientific/non-scientific practice are both pervasive and, in some regards, structurally necessary for human endeavours (Gerring 2005). Hume (1999, 2003), writing in the eighteenth century, notes that we all, from childhood onwards, have an inherent concept of causation which underpins both our learning and navigation of the world. Much of our quotidian rituals and behaviours are predicated on this conception, from preparing breakfast to getting to the office where I type up this manuscript. We come to understand, through direct experience or teaching, that one element or factor can have a direct causal impact on some other element or factor: for instance, we learn that a heat source will make a pan hot and that if we touch the rim of the pan with our bare hands, it will cause us to experience both a burning pain and burning injury. This is, seemingly, not that complicated.
Nevertheless, as Ehring (1997) highlights, when you attempt to analyse and communicate to others the exact nature of that cause and effect relationship and how it works we soon run into problems. Is it the transference of heat that causes the sensation and injury or the length of time contact is maintained? Is it the length of time or the amount of respective surface areas of hand and pan that are in contact? Is it the absence of mitigating factors? Is it that you decided to put the pan on a heat source or turned on the heat source? Is it that the gas/electric of the heat source is working? Was it that your favourite song came on the radio and you got distracted? Is it a conjunction of all these elements? If so, where do we draw the boundaries or how do we exclude elements that are not causal? Are any elements not causal? Is the fact that you were born at all relevant to the fact that you got burnt whilst cooking? If so, how and in what way? Once we begin to unpick the nature of the cause/effect relationship it becomes exponentially complex. The reason for that is because causation is, rather than being seemingly simplistic, brain-achingly complex (Clark 1998). The author and philosopher Douglas Adams, in his book Dirk Gently’s Holistic Detective Agency (1987), even noted that the complexities of causal relations ‘defy analysis’. Thankfully, this is not quite true.
Causality and its attendant problems have then been the subject of philosophical and scientific discourse for centuries (Marini and Singer 1988). In fact, causatives and causal explanations are, to a degree, tied inherently to the very construction of language and as such are a significant source of research and debate not only in the field of linguistics but in most empirical sciences and endeavours (Song 2013). If you think about it modern technology, medicine, entertainment, engineering, everything that makes the modern world what it is would not exist if someone had not made a causal link between two phenomena. Therefore, causation, its construction, the manner in which it shapes theoretical thinking and thus shapes theory development is a problem that besieges the sciences as a whole (Davidson 1994). This is even more true in human sciences where those elements, factors or phenomena which may be causal are much more complex or fluid than the rigidity of natural laws found in some other fields of study (Mele 2007). Much of the philosophy of the natural, as well as the social, sciences have thus been concerned with addressing this specific problem (Mackie 1974). What follows draws heavily upon this literature and inter-contextualises it with regard to the history of criminological thought.
The book itself is divided into three broad sections. The first section will explore three central themes: the first of these is concerned with explicating why a poor understanding of causal mechanisms is a problem for criminological theorising. This will involve the discussion of how an inadequate understanding of causal mechanisms may cause theories to fail as causal explanations, how the adoption of a simplistic causal framework renders a theory open to damaging criticism, how confusion arises between causes and correlates and how all these can adversely affect the manner in which criminologists approach specific explananda. The second theme identifies the implicit causal mechanism employed in much of the history of criminology as the Humean regularity/chain model (as based upon the critique of human knowledge by David Hume (1999, 2003)) and shows why this is an inadequate model of causation. Lastly, a number of examples, from the history of criminology, Classicism, Biological Positivism, Strain theory and Labelling theory, will be explored highlighting both the manner in which the Humean model has shaped these theories and the impact upon the validity of those theories by adopting this inadequate causal mechanism.
The second section will focus upon the apparent ‘paradigm drift’, as exampled by such theories as Routine Activity/Rational Choice, Life Course and other integrated explanations, which has occurred within the theoretical discourse. I will argue that the reason for this ‘drift’ is an inherent rejection of the simplistic and inadequate Humean chain mechanism implicitly employed in previous criminological theorising. I will argue that the manner in which these advanced criminological theories formulate their argumentation and construct their causal explanations is a distinct rejection of the problems that beset their forebears and which are identified in this book. I will also argue that though this rejection has occurred, and that explanations mentioned in this context have achieved a more profound level of integration, and thus causal explanation, there has still neither been any identification nor adoption of an explicit or adequate model of aetiological explanation.
The third and final section is divided into two parts: the first is concerned with identifying an adequate mechanism of causation. I will argue that the suggested mechanism, an adaptation of Mackie’s (1965) INUS model, is an adequate causal model for criminology theorising. I will show that this particular model works by explicitly defining not only that which can be counted as causal but also how it must fit into the structure of the mechanism. Also, I will explicate not only how this model is more suited to contemporary integrated forms of theorising but also how the INUS conditions solve many of the problems, such as the confusion between correlates and causes, that besets extant theorising. I will also explore some of the criticisms and problems that this causal explanation may face. Secondly, I will explore some of the potential consequences of explicitly adopting the INUS model of causation. I will highlight the impact that such an adoption would have upon the depth of integration, and the scope of argumentation, needed in order to satisfy the internal strictures of the model.
Lastly, it must be noted that this book does draw on some logical symbols in order to highlight the nature of theory construction under discussion. This can often put readers off (it often does me) and thus can detract from the reader’s enjoyment of the text. All I can say here is that I have simplified this as much as is possible and kept this symbolising to a minimum and only where it is necessary. I have also explicated what the symbols mean every time they are used. I am therefore hoping that this does not get in the way and detract fro...