Decision-making in Humanitarian Operations

Strategy, Behavior and Dynamics

Sebastián Villa, Gloria Urrea, Jaime Andrés Castañeda, Erik R. Larsen, Sebastián Villa, Gloria Urrea, Jaime Andrés Castañeda, Erik R. Larsen

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9783319915098
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Operations
• Index: Business

This book brings together research in humanitarian operations, behavioral operations and dynamic simulation. Part I outlines the main characteristics and strategic challenges of humanitarian organizations in preparedness, knowledge management, climate change and issues related to refugees and social inclusion. Part II gives an introduction to behavioral operations and experiments in single- and multi-agent settings, followed by discussions on quantal theory, framing effect and possible applications in the humanitarian sector. Part III introduces system dynamics and agent-based modeling and discusses how these techniques can be used to study dynamics and decision-making in humanitarian operations. This book is unique in providing a holistic view of the decision-making process and challenges in the humanitarian sector.

Part IStrategy

© The Author(s) 2019

Sebastián Villa, Gloria Urrea, Jaime Andrés Castañeda and Erik R. Larsen (eds.)Decision-making in Humanitarian Operationshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91509-8_1

Begin Abstract

1. Logistics Preparedness and Response: A Case of Strategic Change

Marianne Jahre¹ and Martine Jahre²

(1)

BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, Norway

(2)

Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

Marianne Jahre (Corresponding author)

Martine Jahre

Keywords

Logistics preparednessHumanitarian supply networkFundingNeeds assessmentCoordinationPerformance evaluation

End Abstract

1.1 Introduction

At 08:50 on the morning of the 9th of October, 2005, an earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale struck Pakistan. The affected area was almost 30,000 square kilometers, nearly was the size of Belgium, with tremors felt from Kabul to Delhi. In Pakistan, 73,000 people were killed, and more than 120,000 people injured. Approximately 3.5 million people were left homeless.

When a disaster occurs, it is up to the country’s government to decide if international assistance is needed. In order for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to step in, the country’s government and its Red Cross / Red Crescent National Society (NS) must ask for assistance. Following the 2005 earthquake, it was immediately clear that the Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) would require both regional and international assistance. The situation was complicated because half the affected population was in the disputed territory of Kashmir and the other half in the North West Frontier Province. By their mandate, the response had to be conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), respectively, for each of these areas.

PRCS staff responded immediately, providing rescue and first aid support. Within 24 hours an IFRC logistician was on the ground, later joined by other specialists (water sanitation, health, relief, etc.) to form a Field Assessment Coordination Team (FACT). The ICRC and the IFRC jointly deployed a four-man logistics Emergency Response Unit (ERU) from the Danish and British NS. The ERU team and the IFRC logistics coordinator worked with PRCS members to set up and assess main supply routes into the country, the logistics infrastructure, and available suppliers of transport and warehousing services. The findings of this assessment were combined with assessments of initial relief needs, mainly shelter and medical assistance. The logistics team then published a list of initial needs (called a mobilization table) for NS and other donors to pledge against. It was agreed at this point that one main supply route would be set up for all entities, with IFRC responsible for all goods received in Islamabad, and ICRC responsible for transport and storage to a break-bulk point at Mansehra, from which goods moved to their respective operational areas.

With the logistics personnel in the Geneva Headquarters (GVA HQ) managing pledges and procurement, the logistics team in Pakistan started receiving, storing, and forwarding the items for distribution to the affected population from day three after the event. This was done in coordination with the other major players on the ground. At the same time, IFRC mobilized a number of regional logisticians to complete the logistics team and identified the number of support resources such as vehicles and generators that would be required.

In spite of the immense effort by all involved, the operation had a number of challenges. First, there were multiple rounds of distribution. The procurement process for some items that were not pre-positioned, and were not on the original purchase order, did not allow for a compete package of items to be distributed at once and therefore slowed down the process. The costs of extra rounds of distribution were high, particularly since the distribution was in remote areas lacking infrastructure and transportation. Beneficiaries had to wait a very long time for some items. The process was further delayed by a lack of detailed specifications regarding needs. There was a lack of emergency procurement procedures locally and few existing local supplier relationships were in place. Pre-positioned stocks were located far away, which meant that the total distance traveled by goods in some instances was very high.

A second challenge was that communication with donors was difficult, partly due to the time difference between Pakistan, Geneva, and donor countries. This caused delays in activating the supply chain even after the mobilization table had been compiled, resulting in an average of 10 days between mobilization and purchasing an order. Only 38 percent of the goods were delivered within two months. One particular problem was the complexity of getting donors to allow the transfer of excess stock from the 2004 tsunami operation to the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.

Third, delivery costs were difficult to calculate due to a lack of systematic information on transport costs for purchased items as well as in-kind donations. However, the multiple rounds of distribution, high transport distances, lack of information on exact needs, and poor communication between GVA HQ and the field suggest that the delivery cost per family was too high and could have been improved.

The experience from this operation and from the response to the 2004 Asia-Pacific tsunami led IFRC logistics personnel to embark on a major strategic change project to improve their logistics preparedness (Jahre & Heigh, 2008):

After the Indonesian tsunami in December 2004, it was an eye-opener. We realized we were using ocean shipping to move items from Asia to Europe and North America—and then flying them back to Indonesia. It was a 13,000 kilometer supply chain. (Stalder-Olsen, 2011)

This chapter discusses the strategic change project with the purpose of providing a better understanding of the concept of logistics preparedness and its effect on response. Based on Marianne Jahre’s research in humanitarian operations over a decade, this chapter combines results from literature reviews with secondary data (Jahre, 2017; Jahre, Pazirandeh, & Van Wassenhove, 2016) and three case studies of IFRC logistics preparedness and response (Jahre, 2008, 2015; Jahre & Fabbe-Costes, 2015; Jahre & Heigh, 2008). Details regarding the research design are provided in the appendix.

Starting with an overview of the humanitarian supply network, the chapter continues by defining logistics preparedness and discussing some core challenges, followed by how IFRC tried to solve these challenges through their strategic change project. The chapter concludes with a discussion of future challenges, suggesting further research topics on logistics preparedness.

1.2 The Humanitarian Supply Network

The humanitarian sector has been through many major changes since businessman Henry Dunant founded the Red Cross in 1863 after he saw injured soldiers left on the ground to die after a bloody battle in Solferino, Italy. Several humanitarian organizations were established after World War II, but it was not until the 1990s, with an increasing number of complicated crises and people wanting to help, that the need to professionalize the industry was recognized. Especially after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the establishment of a refugee camp in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) where tens of thousands of people died every day due to poor sanitation, standards and principles for better and equally distributed help were established. The Sphere standards came into place in 1997 to ensure that everyone has the right to help if they need it, and to ensure the quality of assistance and the accountability of organizations. Standards were established for what is required by organizations involved in a disaster response, such as how much food or water a person should receive per day (Sphere Project, 2016).

1.2.1 Key Actors

Humanitarian organizations are but one group of actors involved in assistance (GHA, 2015; Kovács & Spens, 2007). Others are the affected themselves; donors, including governments, philanthropists, businesses, and individuals; national and international militaries; the affected countries’ own governments and the departments within them tasked with providing assistance; the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement ; NGOs at the local, national, and international levels; the United Nations (UN) system; civil society institutions, such as police and fire departments; and private companies providing goods and services. Together these groups form a complex and varied supply network of funding, materials, information, and service flows (Jahre, Pazirandeh, et al., 2016).

1.2.2 Key Activities and Resources

Figure 1.1 depicts key logistics activities using the IFRC supply chain as an example (Jahre, 2008).

Fig. 1.1

Key logistics activities in a humanitarian supply chain

When a disaster has occurred and IFRC re...