The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency

James Johnson

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9783319758374
• eBook ISBN:
  9783319758381
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book offers a timely and compelling explanation for the deterioration of U.S.-China security relations during the Obama Presidency. The U.S.-China relationship has become one of (if not the most) vital features of contemporary world politics, and with arrival the Donald Trump to the White House in 2017, this vital geopolitical relationship sits at a precarious and dangerous crossroads. This book assesses a wide array of sources to systematically unpack the policy rhythms, drivers, and dynamics that defined the course of Sino-American security relations during the Obama-era. It fills several gaps in the literature on international security and conflict and offers a nuanced and innovative comparative approach to examine individual military domains. The case study chapters draw on recent Chinese and English sources - on military doctrine, capabilities, and defense strategy - to build a clear understanding the main sources of U.S.-China misperceptions, and highlight the problems theseassessments can create for the conduct of statecraft across strategically competitive geopolitical dyads. The book builds a sobering picture of U.S.-China relations that will appeal to specialists and generalists alike with an interest in future warfare, emerging military-technologies, military studies, arms control, and foreign policy issues in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly.

© The Author(s) 2018

James JohnsonThe US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama PresidencyNew Security Challengeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75838-1_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction: Obama’s ‘Pivot’ to Asia and Air–Sea Battle

James Johnson¹

(1)

University of Leicester, Leicester, UK

Keywords

‘Pivot’ to AsiaAir–Sea Battle conceptUnited States–China relations

End Abstract

This book applies the security dilemma concept to elucidate the deterioration in United States–China military and defense relations in the Asia-Pacific region during Barack Obama’s presidency. It builds upon the existing International Relations (IR) empirical literature that has used this concept to understand United States–China security relations and, in particular, the impact of this condition upon Washington’s strategic thinking and military policy responses vis-à-vis China in Asia.¹ The book constructs a robust theoretical framework of analysis to validate the existence of a genuine United States–China ‘security dilemma’.² Next, it applies this framework to the empirical research to highlight incidences of Washington’s misunderstandings of Beijing’s strategic intentions caused by misinterpretations and misperceptions, to explain the deterioration of Sino–American security relations. Chapter 2 addresses several conceptual and analytical gaps in the existing literature, in particular, the under-theorized discourse that relates to the security dilemma and the United States–China asymmetric military balance of power in Asia. While the overriding objective of this book is to build upon the existing discourse, it also generates important theoretical conclusions and implications for security dilemma theorizing itself.

A key finding of this book is that under the Obama administration U.S. military strategy, policies, and postures in the Asia-Pacific were in important ways influenced by the presence of a United States–China security dilemma. The empirical research elicits clear evidence of action–reaction policies , and spirals of mistrust and arms racing, which are closely associated with intense security dilemmas, conflict, and war. A central theme that runs through the case study chapters of this book is Washington’s tendency to underutilize (or cherry-pick) Chinese empirical sources; and, instead, overemphasize preexisting and familiar frameworks of analyses to assess Chinese military capabilities, to determine Beijing’s strategic intentions. This analytical approach often overlooked and neglected important (or new) information, and conflated an operational military capability as explicit proof of the existence of malign Chinese intentions vis-à-vis the United States.

Background and Context: The ‘Pivot’ (or ‘Rebalance’) to Asia

In late 2011, the Obama administration, through the promulgation of a series of official announcements, laid out a plan for the long-term realignment of the center of gravity of U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic interests toward Asia—and away from Afghanistan and Iraq .³ The central objective underlying this ‘rebalance’ was to devote an increasing American political capital, resources (especially military), and strategic interest toward the Asia-Pacific. Specifically, this shift was designed to increase U.S. credibility and influence upon the regions’ alliances, rules, and norms as China emerges as a regional (and potentially revisionist ) power.⁴ President Obama stated in 2011 that the ‘United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region [the Asia-Pacific] and its future’.⁵ Similarly, then U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton reiterated that the ‘Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics’, and Clinton asserted that the purpose of the ‘pivot’ was to ‘sustain our [U.S.] leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values across the region’.⁶

Four key developments drove the Obama administration to intensify its focus on the Asia-Pacific⁷:

• First, the increasing economic importance of the region (especially China) to the United States.⁸ Between 1973 and 2010, Asia’s share of the global trade doubled to just over 30 percent, and by 2010, China overtook the United States to become the world’s largest exporter. The extent of this meteoric rise took on greater prominence in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crisis.
• Second, China’s rapidly expanding military capabilities (especially associated with the anti-access/area denial [A2/AD ] strategy) and assertive foreign policy, and, in particular, the implications for U.S. military power projection and freedom of navigation in the Western Pacific.⁹
• Third, the reduction of U.S. military operations and presence in the Middle East .¹⁰
• Fourth, to counter the perception among U.S. Asia allies’ and partners’ effort that domestic-political pressures to cut the U.S. federal budget (especially the Department of Defense [DoD]) could undermine America’s security commitments to the region.

Then U.S. National Security Adviser Tom Donilon stated that the ‘pivot ’ policy was built around five key pillars: (1) closer coordination with U.S. treaty allies in Asia (Japan , South Korea , Australia , Thailand , and the Philippines ); (2) deepening cooperation and building capacity with the region’s ‘emerging powers’ (India , Indonesia , Vietnam , and Myanmar ); (3) forming a ‘constructive relationship’ with China; (4) increasing levels of engagement with Asia’s multilateral institutions (especially the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN ] and the East Asia Summit [EAS]); and (5) concluding negotiations on new trade and investments, most notably, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP ) agreement.¹¹ Since the proclamation of the ‘pivot’ (or rebalance), the Obama administration took several significant steps to implement each of these pillars¹²:

• In its relations with Japan , the United States convened its first ‘two-plus-two’ dialogue to revise the Guidelines for the United States–Japan Defense Cooperation, and reaffirmed that the mutual defense treaty covered the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands , which China also claims as a ‘core’ sovereign interest.
• In its relations with India , the United States outlined a series of streamlined defense industrial cooperation guidelines, and expanded arms sales and technology transfer arrangements.
• With Vietnam , it announced major expansions of U.S. defense contracts, new logistical access arrangements, and closer maritime relations, especially in the South China Seas.
• In Myanmar , the United States commenced the process of limited opening and diplomatic engagement; for example, Hilary Clinton’s state visit in 2011, followed by Obama’s in 2013 and 2014.
• In the economic arena, the United States encouraged Japan to join the TPP discussions in 2013; ratified a Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) with South Korea in 2011; and committed the United States to fully joining the EAS .
• In the military sphere, the United States announced new troop deployments to Australia , naval deployments and a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) with Singapore , and expanded rotational access to military facilities in the Philippines .
• In its relations with China, Washington increased the level of contact and engagement with Beijing. For example, an expanded role for the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED ) ; the establishment of a Strategic Security Dialogue to discuss cyber, space, and nuclear concerns; increased military-to-military contact; and during the 2013 Obama–Xi ‘shirtsleeves ’ summit in California, a joint commitment was made toward achieving stable bilateral relations.

The ‘First Pacific President’? Areas of Continuity and Change in U.S. Asian Policy

Many aspects of the ‘pivot’ described earlier represented continuity with America’s long-standing Asia strategy and policies, as opposed to a radical departure from previous administrations. Since the end of World War II, the United States has sought to underwrite stability and security in Asia, by combining a large forward military presence with a pivotal diplomatic role.¹³ Several observers argued that the Obama administration exaggerated the transformative nature of the ‘pivot’.¹⁴ In the military arena, for example, many of the administration’s policies merely built on those undertaken by the Bush administration, which incre...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction: Obama’s ‘Pivot’ to Asia and Air–Sea Battle
• 2. Conceptualizing the United States–China Security Dilemma
• 3. Washington’s Perceptions and Misperceptions of China’s Anti-access Area Denial ‘Strategy’
• 4. China’s Vision of the Future Networked Battlefield: Emerging Military-Technological Challenges to the United States
• 5. ‘Guam Express’ and ‘Carrier Killers’: China’s Asymmetric Missile Threat to the United States in the Pacific
• 6. Chinese Evolving Approaches to Nuclear ‘War-Fighting’: An Emerging Security Dilemma?
• 7. Concluding Remarks
• Back Matter