The early twenty-first century saw a growth in national security concerns surrounding non-state actors. Events such as 9/11 and the discovery of the AQ Khan nuclear black market supply network saw the international community respond by developing a series of new tools. This included the adoption of United Nations sanctions resolutions, the establishment of new plurilateral initiatives, and the development of new unilateral measures, some with extraterritorial aspects. This new toolset sought to address a variety of challenges and plug existing holes in the non-proliferation regime and efforts to counter WMD terrorism . It was in this context that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 1540 on 28 April 2004. The resolution was intended to prevent the development, acquisition or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by non-state actorsâdefined by the resolution as an âindividual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any Stateâ.1
In a statement to mark the 10th Anniversary of the adoption of the resolution, the President of the Security Council called upon states to fully implement the resolutionâs requirements by 2021, when the mandate of the 1540 Committee, a subsidiary body of the Security Council set up to oversee the implementation of the resolution, will expire unless renewed by the adoption of a further Security Council resolution.2 This statement naturally raises a number of questions: what does âfull implementationâ entail? Are the trends in implementation of the resolution on track to ensure that this potentially ambitious target is achieved? This edited volume considers these and other points. Before doing so, it is helpful first to revisit the origins and purpose of the resolution and to consider the resolutionâs place among the range of tools used to further the cause of international peace and security.
First and foremost, resolution 1540 was adopted as a counter-proliferation toolâone of many tools that have been developed to address the proliferation threat. In this sense, it complements many treaty-based and other elements of the non-proliferation regime, such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Around the time that the resolution was adopted, other tools were also being developed to this end, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which allows goods to be interdicted in transit at sea. However, amongst these measures, UNSCR 1540 has a uniqueness that merits special attention. Its passage under Chapter VII of the UN Charter means that it is universally applicable amongst UN member states and, crucially, its obligations are legally binding on all states.
The first decade since UNSCR 1540 was passed saw most states respond to the requirements of 1540 through the adoption of legislation, the creation of appropriate governmental structures and the day-to-day implementation of export controls. As such, it is clear that UNSCR 1540 is a powerful, albeit perhaps underappreciated, tool and that it offers an important contribution to international security. This initial chapter sets out to introduce the resolution, identify where it sits in relation to related initiatives, and provide an overview of the rationale for and structure of this study.
UNSCR 1540: Responding to the Threat
The origins of resolution 1540 provide interesting insights as to the resolutionâs intended purpose (these origins will be explored by Tobey in greater detail in Chap. 2). Certainly there were greatly increased concerns surrounding international terrorism in the early 2000sâespecially following the events of 9/11 . The primaryâand most immediateâdriver for the resolutionâs adoption, however, was as a response to the AQ Khan black-market proliferation network, which saw individuals and private companies systematically assist the nuclear weapons programme of at least three states: Iran , Libya and North Korea .
As such, resolution 1540 requires states to take measures to address a broad spectrum of threats surrounding WMD and non-state actorsâand in doing so has plugged several holes in the existing non-proliferation regime. These threats could involve a number of activities, including: non-state actors aiding state proliferation, non-state actors acquiring WMD, or non-state actors using WMD. It is the involvement of non-state actors in state proliferation that has been most common of these three types of riskâboth before and since the resolutionâs adoption.
Resolution 1540 is evidently not the only measure that contributes to preventing non-state actor involvement in proliferation. The precedents for 1540 include both counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures. On the counter-terrorism side, they included UNSCR 1373 (2001), which was also adopted by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII powers in September 2001, and obliges states to take a number of measures to prevent terrorism.3 The Group of Eight (G8) also adopted the âKananaskis Principles â or âPrinciples to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destructionâ, in 2002 which were heavily drawn upon when drafting the resolution. A non-binding General Assembly resolution, introduced by India , was adopted in 2003 entitled âMeasures to prevent terrorists from acquiring Weapons of Mass Destructionâ.4 Although focusing on countering WMD-terrorism, the clauses of this resolution did âurgeâ and âencourageâ states to take some of the measures that they would later be obliged to through 1540. Precedents on the non-proliferation side also include UN sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s, which provided US officials with the know-how related to the Security Council process.5
Thankfully, there have been few instances of non-state actors attempting to acquire or use WMD at any point in the past, with even fewer of these examples coming in the last decade. Cases that have been seen largely fall into two broad categories: terrorism or the threat posed by conflict and instability.
In terms of terrorism, Al Qaeda expressed interest in acquiring a nuclear weapon in the late 1990s, and also in pursuing other forms of WMD.6 There have also been other examples of non-state actors seeking to buy and sell nuclear materials.7 A number of examples have also been seen where domestic terrorists and terrorist groups have acquired, developed or used chemical or biological materials. Examples illustrate differing scales hereâfrom Aum Shinrikyoâs sophisticated and well-funded efforts to produce the Sarin used in the 1995 Tokyo subway attacks to several efforts of individuals acting alone to produce Ricin.
There has also been significant concern regarding the threats posed by non-state actors involved in conflict and civil wars. These have included fears that a state with WMD or weapons-usable material could collapse resulting in these materials falling into the hands of terrorists and rebels, or that terrorists could steal weapons or materials to produce WMD in the confusion, and potentially use them. Recent examples include the use of chlorine gas by insurgents in Iraq in 2006 and 2007, and allegations surrounding rebel use of chemical weapons in Syria in the years since 2013 (although it should be noted that most substantiated allegations have focused on the Assad regime).8
Concern has also been seen regarding the security of nuclear, chemical and other facilities in times of unrest. During the 10th anniversary year of the resolutionâs adoption in 2014, the militant group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seized a Saddam Hussein-era chemical plant storing degraded chemical agents as well as some natural or depleted uranium from a university lab in Mosul.9 While the risks in these particular cases may have been low, they nonetheless highlight the broader uncertainties that emerge from conflict and instability.
While concerns that non-state actors could acquire and use WMD provided the broader security context behind the passage of the resolution, the immediate trigger behind the resolutionâs adoption related more to the proliferation threat which is perhaps best highlighted by the revelations surrounding the AQ Khan network in 2003 and 2004. While arguably posing a less immediately catastrophic risk than WMD terrorism, the involvement of non-state actors in proliferation to state programmes is certainly more frequently seen.
Although intelligence agencies had been following AQ Khan âs activities for many years, it was only in 2004 that the full story regarding his illicit proliferation network came to light. Khanâs network linked a variety of individuals, manufacturers and suppliers to supply centrifuge technology to Iran , Libya , North Korea and others. Khan built his network from contacts obtained during his work on Pakistanâs nuclear programme. Pakistan also has and continues to advance its nuclear weapons and missile programmes, drawing heavily upon technology sourced from the international market place.
The proliferation threat posed by these non-state actorsâalthough evolved since the passage of 1540 in 2004âis as serious as ever. In fact, the urgency of the issue has arguably been heightened by the nuclear and missile efforts of Iran and North Korea . At least up until the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran in July 2015, there was clear evidence that Iran has continually been looking to the international market place to procure sensitive technologies for its nuclear, missile and military programmes utilising non-state actors to evade controls.10 Successive rounds of UN and EU technology-based sanctions, and export controls in countries around the world have worked to slow the Iranian programme. These restrictive measures have meant that Iranian procurement agents, front companies, and their suppliers have had to become ever more inventive in their attempts to tran...