25 March 2017 saw the 60th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome . It was doubly symbolic as it saw the adoption of a new Rome Declaration on the way forward for the European Union (EU) but also because the commemorative gathering of EU leaders only included 27 Member States and not the United Kingdom (UK), which had voted to leave the EU in its referendum of June 2016. The future of the EU had already become more uncertain than ever before as a result of the successive economic and migration crises and the rise of nationalistic and Eurosceptic populism in many EU countries. The prospective departure, however, of one of the largest Member States posed the biggest challenge of all, and this became more tangible on 29 March 2017, only 4 days after the Rome Anniversary, with the formal tabling by the UK of its Article 50 notification, which gave its formal notice to leave the EU.
The negotiations that are now taking place between the UK and the remaining 27 EU Member States have three main components. The first is the actual Article 50 withdrawal agreement that the treaty specifies should be concluded by March 2019, but could take longer to negotiate if there is unanimous agreement on such an extension among the EU 27. The second is a longer term framework agreement between the UK and the EU that cannot be formally concluded until after the UK has left and that could take much longer to negotiate. Finally some transitional arrangements are almost certain to be necessary.
In December 2017, there was a joint EU–UK report1 on the three key issues in the first phase of discussions that then led the European Council of 15 December 2017 to declare that sufficient progress had been made for negotiators to proceed to negotiations on the second and third phases. Nothing, however, will be finally agreed until everything is agreed and the outcome on each of these three elements is still highly uncertain. It is even possible, if unlikely, either that talks might collapse and that the UK will leave the EU in 2019 without a formal agreement, or else that the Article 50 notification might yet be revoked (the legal possibilities for which are about to be tested in the courts).
The full consequences of an eventual Brexit will depend on the terms of any final settlement, whether any new arrangements are relatively close to or much further away from the status quo, and how long it will take to negotiate and to phase-in such new arrangements. Whichever option is chosen, however, the implications for the remaining EU member states and on the nature, institutions, culture and future policies of the EU as a whole are likely to be profound. Although the questions raised are inevitably speculative, the main objective of this book is to examine the range of Brexit’s potential impacts on the remaining Member States (henceforth EU 27), and how it might help to shape the very future of the Union.
The question can also be framed in a different way. What was it that drove the UK to vote to leave the EU, what lessons can be learnt from this experience by the other Member States, and how might they best respond? It has been put in a brutal way by Laurent Wauquiez , elected as leader of the French right-of-centre party, “Les Républicains ” in late 2017: “Everyone is pretending to say, ‘OK, Britain is out, that’s perfect,’ without there being any sort of reflection to say: ‘Can we propose an overhaul of the EU that would take into account what they’ve expressed?” …“There will be an after, we’ll need to keep talking, and maybe find a way that would allow them to rejoin, but differently”.2
Others, including his political rival, President Macron , have very different visions. For many of them, Brexit can also be seen in a more positive way and as a real opportunity for Europe3 Whichever view prevails, Brexit is not just a challenge in itself but does pose the question of what kind of EU there should be in the future.
Chapter 2 examines this initial question of whether the EU will become stronger or weaker or even disintegrate as a result of Brexit. These contradictory futures for the EU were mooted in the course of the UK referendum campaign, and are becoming increasingly examined by academic theorists, who are starting to be as interested in the idea of disintegration as of integration.
Chapter 3 reviews the wider context of options on the future of the EU by examining attitudes within the 27 Member States (both of their governments and of public opinion) to the implications of the Brexit referendum. These are examined both in terms of their views on the future of the EU as a whole and also for their country’s place within it, including the fears of Brexit contagion in certain countries where Eurosceptic views are strongest. This chapter concludes that the EU is stronger both economically and in terms of public support than at the time of the referendum and that EU unity among the remaining Member States has been better maintained than many had believed to be possible. On the other hand, this EU unity is still to be fully tested and the EU is still quite fragile and Euroscepticism is still strong. There seems little ambition for much deeper European integration, although the supporters of such a development do have a strong new advocate in Emmanuel Macron .
Chapter 4 then goes on to examine the immediate response of the EU institutions to the challenges facing the EU in the light of Brexit, including their closing of ranks in defence of the EU. It only briefly touches on their guidelines for the Brexit negotiations, concentrating instead on their initial views on where the EU should be heading. These are still very general in nature in the case of the European Council, and somewhat more specific in the case of the European Parliament . The most detailed views, although still framed in terms of broad brush options, are those expressed by the European Commission , in the White Paper on the Future of the EU,4 the subsequent Reflection Papers on different policy areas and in Commission President Juncker’s 2017 State of the Union speech.5
Chapter 5 reviews the potential impacts of Brexit on EU institutional structures, notably on the voting rules in the Council and on the composition and political balances within the European Parliament , and, even more fundamentally, on changing balances of power within an EU of 27 Member States. Will Germany become even more dominant, will the Franco -German alliance be rekindled, what will be the position of Italy , Spain and Poland? What will happen to the influence of the smaller and medium-sized EU countries and what new alliances might be forged?
Chapter 6 looks at the cultural impacts of Brexit. It examines the possible impacts of Brexit on the EU’s future language regime, and, in particular, the future role of the English language when the percentage of EU citizens speaking it as their first language will have been so greatly reduced. It also looks at some of the potential impacts on the ways of doing business within the EU.
Chapter 7 reviews a range of issues relating to the UK and Europe, beginning with a look at the cost of “non-UK” for the EU. The departure of the UK will lead to an obvious decline in the size and economic weight of the EU, but will have a disproportionate impact in certain sectors, notably financial services, military and security capacity, as well as the scientific and academic world. In an even wider sense, however, was De Gaulle right and was the UK a permanently awkward partner and even a brake on the EU’ s development, or did it play a more complex and often constructive role? Where was it particularly influential, and what policies and practices might change as a result of its absence? The chapter concludes with a brief look at the role of UK actors during the Brexit process , as well as the nature of links between the UK and the EU in the future. A post-Brexit EU will have major impacts on a UK which is outside the bloc, but which will continue to be influenced by the EU in so many ways. In its turn, the UK will continue to have some, if inevitably lesser, influence on the EU.
The UK will retain ties with the EU in many specific fields, not least in those areas and policies where it might seek a continuing involvement, such as Europol and other EU agencies and the European standards bodies. It will also be a member of other Europe-wide organisations, notably the Council of Europe , but perhaps also the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA). It will presumably continue its involvement in those European political parties and foundations which are pan-European in nature. Might these become even more important for the UK when it is no longer a direct member of the European Parliament and of the other EU institutions?
Chapter 8 reviews the potential impacts of Brexit on specific EU policy objectives, returning to the initial question that was posed, but looking at it from a different perspective. Might it lead to greater integration or to a more cautious approach as to what the EU should or should not be doing? Might it lead to a more open or a more closed Europe? What will happen to intra-EU trade and to third-party trade agreements? What might the impacts be for European economic and fiscal policy, the size of the EU budget and the nature of EU own resources, EU social policy and the concept of EU solidarity, and European foreign policy and security cooperation? Will issues of EU democratic accountability be addressed with more urgency, and might there be further EU Treaty reform, with the political risks that this might entail in a number of EU countries? What will happen to the process of further EU enlargement? In a nutshell, will the EU be any different in nature after a UK departure, or will it merely be a downsized and only slightly...