Ideas have consequences and ideas have origins. In thinking that ideas have consequences, we acknowledge the importance of what follows from them. In acknowledging that ideas have origins, we acknowledge the importance of those origins. But why are origins of ideas important?
Origins are important because they reveal particulars and contexts and alternatives. The idea of the automobile, for example, originated in a context where people moved about in vehicles drawn by animals; those vehicles were not self-moving. In that context, āself-mobilityā was not possible. Combine that pre-automobile context with some inventions, along with the creativity of Henry Ford
and his precursors, and you have the origin of self-mobilityāautomobiles.
Seeing the origin of the automobile, and the idea of it, draws attention also to elaborations of that idea. A āflying car,ā for example, represents the intersection of the ideas of an automobile and an airplane. Ideas, coupled with contexts and human creativity, have cultural consequences. The idea of the automobile originated in a specific context, and apart from that context, the idea might not have appeared. Automobiles originated in the Western
, industrial world, not elsewhere. In addition, the origins we know might have produced different results and different cultural consequences.
Henry Ford
, for example, was famous for saying about his cars, āPeople can have any color they want, so long as itās black.ā If Ford had prevailed, automobiles might not have become the colorful appliances we see about us today. One might elaborate particulars and contexts of origin for many ideasāindeed for all ideas. And one might explore as well questions naturally associated with the idea that ideas have origins.
Why, for example, did automobiles originate only in the Western
, industrial world? Why did Henry Fordās preference for black automobiles not dominate for long in the commercial production of automobiles? Why did the Chinese or the Indians not produce automobiles? All such questions must be answered in terms of the particulars and contexts that give rise to ideas and their uses in particular places and times. What about ideas of morality? Do they have origins? Do they have particular contexts wherein they arise and function?
Justice
All ideas have origins, and one may understand ideas of morality by attending carefully to the particulars and contexts in which they originate and have their home. The idea of justice
is of special interest in the contemporary American world.
The American world is morally complex in specific ways we barely acknowledge and rarely mention. American history is, from contemporary perspectives, rife with immoralities. The genocide we inflicted on Native Americans
for five centuries, we rarely acknowledge. The slavery
we practiced for four centuries, we believe we have transcended. Was it just for our forebears to kill Native Americans and to take for themselves and us the lands those Natives had lived on and with for thousands of years before we crossed the Atlantic? Was slavery a justāor at least not an unjustāinstitution?
We now know the answers to these questions, and we believe we have put aside the immoralities of our American ancestors. But the trauma of those immoralities continues to shape our American world. So perhaps we have not really gotten away from those injustices? Perhaps they continue to shape our lives?
Race
The most prominent expression of the injustice that continues to shape our lives is racism
. Native Americans
now live on reservations far from population centers and are little in our awareness. Black Americans, however, live among white Americans, and the legacy of slavery
and of the century and a half following it lives on in our American world.
Twenty-first-century racism is the long shadow of Americaās 500Ā years of racist white supremacy. Specific parts of that long shadow are contents of the following chapters. Black ācriminality
ā and police shootings of black men and boys are some parts of that shadow that are important in what follows. But part of that 500-year legacy of racism
and white supremacy, and part of that long shadow are the moral ideas interwoven with it.
All moral ideas in our contemporary world have origins and histories. Understanding those origins and histories enables us to see alternatives. Seeing alternatives to our moral ideas can empower us in ways we seldom imagine.
Seeing how Platonism
is writ into our moral ideas enables us to think alternatives to those Platonist dimensions of our thought. Seeing how Enlightenment ideas of morality are embedded in our moral thinking enables us to think beyond those ideas. Seeing how our understanding of justice
has specific historical roots enables us to think beyond those roots.
The point of this book is to reveal some historical foundations of contemporary moral thinkingāand in particular of our thought about justice. Our American racism
is intricately interwoven with the historical roots of our thought about justice.
Plato
, the Enlightenment
, our Constitution and our long, messy history of racism need to be revealed in their naked collusion. We need to see our racist history and our moral traditions as intimately woven together. Only seeing how our moral traditions enforce our racism, and also how our racism reinforces our moral thinking can enable us to see a more constructive world beyond the racism deeply embedded in our lives.
This book is a partial unmasking of the moral traditions that enable and perpetuate our racism. Part I (Our Problem, Our Justice, Our Past) is an argument that our large Western
moral traditions are racist. Five primary chapters elaborate Western sources of our moral traditions and a sixth summarizes those five.
Part II (Our Problem, Our Responsibility, Our Future) finds a constructive alternative to our moral traditions rooted in an indigenous, American moral tradition that holds the promise of freedom
from our racism
. Four chapters bring us into a contemporary world that needs our indigenous moral traditions.
* * *
A note about my use of the term āindigenous.ā
I use the term more expansively than is customary, and I hope doing so is not objectionable to those accustomed to using it in a more restrictive way. The normal restrictive way of using the term constrains its application to Native Americans
or First Peoples
or to what originates solely with them. My more expansive use of the term allows it to include perspectives of non-European and still American origin. Thus W.E.B. DuBois
and John Dewey
, since their perspectives on matters moral, religious and social do have deep roots in the American, non-European world are legitimate representatives of indigenous thought. And I believe significant benefits follow from this more expansive use of āindigenous.ā
One benefit of the more expansive use is that connections between genuinely (restricted use) āindigenousā peoples
and the (expansive use) āindigenousā perspectives I see in DuBois and Dewey become stronger together, and more distinctive in contrast to the European perspectives I claim are racist. Scott Pratt
has elaborated this connection nicely in his
Native Pragmatism
, and I would be happy to claim Prattās imprimatur for the claims I make here about the indigenousāand pragmatistāperspectives of DuBois and Dewey. Our European heritage is racist. Our indigenous traditions are not.
