Election campaigns are essentially sales campaigns, a culmination of long-term awareness and support-building activities designed to get as many voters to the ballot box as possible to put their cross next to the name of the party or candidate. Studies of UK election strategies have shown parties have increasingly, but to differing extents, been informed about the design of a range of aspects of their product and communication by market intelligence (Lees-Marshment 2001; Lilleker and Negrine 2006; Scammell 2014). Public opinion and bespoke research on attitudes is utilized in order to maximize the persuasive impact of campaign communication, informing strategists what perceptions need to be changed, reinforced or created. This book focuses on the core and most innovative aspects of election campaigning: the long-term creation of the brand, the methods by which ideological stances are married to the sociopolitical context to create a platform, and how the platform, as well as a range of persuasive messages, is then communicated to the electorate. Potential voters seek cues to inform them which of the available options will provide the best representation in parliament or in government. Hence analysing the sales campaign is of crucial importance to understanding the strategies and the respective reasons for success and failure.
1 The UK Context
Elections in the UK operate on a first-past-the-post voting system where voters in a geographical area, a constituency, vote for their local member of parliament (MP). Voting forms show the names of candidates, with party affiliation in smaller letters. The notion is that voters select the individual who is best placed to represent their area in parliament. However, voting tends to follow party lines on the whole; this is because the party leader whose party has the greatest number of members elected, if that gives them an overall majority in the lower house (House of Commons), at a minimum 326 of the 650 seats, is able to form a government. UK elections are therefore characterized by a national campaign and a series of local campaigns. The latter, as is the case in the USA, tends to focus most on constituencies which are statistically most likely to change hands from one election to another: the marginal constituencies. Therefore, marketing strategies must accommodate broad voter preferences as well as target specific messages at those voters who live in marginal constituencies, have a high propensity to vote but have low partisan affiliation and are susceptible to persuasion. Communication follows a hypermedia strategy (Howard 2006), using all media to deliver messages to as many voters as possible as well as using the affordances of new technology to target specific voters.
While the broad political context presents a range of challenges, the 2015 was a unique and complex contest shaped by a range of factors. Post-recession economic recovery and having a coalition government meant the parties faced challenges in order to differentiate themselves while presenting a coherent plan and image of competence. Polls indicated the contest was too close to call, and the fear of losing votes to challenger parties, such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) or the Green Party which had previously been marginal to the overall results of an election, was a real concern to both Conservatives and Labour (Fisher 2015). The spectres of referenda hung over the election, with the fairly close ‘no’ result in the 2014 Scottish referendum stoking calls for greater devolution and raging debates over the UK’s membership of the European Union (PCRC 2015). These factors meant that two erstwhile marginal parties gained greater significance. The pro-Scottish independence Scottish National Party (SNP), which as leader of the ‘Yes to Independence’ campaign and governors in the devolved Scottish parliament, emerged as the official opposition to a ‘No’ campaign which saw the major parties (Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats) form an alliance. Indeed it may have been pivotal that Scottish Labour leaders were figureheads for the campaign as the party had held the balance of power over Scottish seats in Westminster. The SNP sought to capitalize on their positioning as the party of Scotland to undermine their local rivals. Similarly the anti-integrationist UKIP, whose demands for an in–out referendum had seen the party win the most votes at the 2014 European Parliamentary election, appeared to be threatening the Conservatives in key areas of the country. Over the summer of 2014 the UKIP gained two MPs through defections from the Conservatives and subsequent by-elections. Anti-Europeanism, as well as a highly negative campaign against Labour leader Ed Miliband, was also a characteristic of the newspapers (Deacon et al. 2015), while television became dominated by the leaders’ debates. These factors and their implications are important for framing our understanding of the election and its outcome.
The long-term context, dating back to the 2010 general election contest fought on who could best repair the UK economy, remained a key factor. Voter uncertainty is perhaps best reflected in the fact that neither of the leading contenders, Labour (then incumbent) or the Conservatives, gained an outright majority. The Conservative-dominated coalition set in motion a range of economic reforms which coincided and perhaps contributed to economic stability and limited growth. All parties seeking to govern arguably had to have a clear plan for fiscal responsibility and national debt reduction, and accurate and transparent costing was more crucial than ever before for underpinning a successful brand offering. The Conservative Party’s formal coalition with the Liberal Democrats and formation of a government in which they shared power from 2010 to 2015 was also important in shaping the contest. Unravelling the partnership posed challenges for establishing distinct brands that would gain traction among voters. The Liberal Democrat poll rating suggested they were unpopular due to their participation in the coalition and having abandoned some of the core tenets of party policy. As voters appeared to be shifting allegiances towards the SNP and UKIP and away from the Liberal Democrats, polling data consistently showed Labour and the Conservatives virtually neck and neck. Despite Labour leader Ed Miliband’s image problems and low personal rating, the party was predicted to be able to form a government, though unlikely to have a majority. Hence media focused on questions of possible coalition partnerships with a Labour–SNP alliance deemed a viable combination, one that in the end appeared to advantage the Conservatives.
Beyond the predicted strong result for the SNP, winning 56 of the 59 seats in Scotland, the close showing in the polls proved absolutely inaccurate. Averaging the media predictions based on opinion polls, the Conservatives were suggested to be the largest party, winning 279 seats; Labour was predicted to win 269 seats; the SNP was predicted to gain 51 and the Liberal Democrats were predicted to gain 25. However, the actual result saw the Conservatives win 330 seats, Labour 232, the SNP 56, the Liberal Democrats only 8, the Greens and UKIP 1 seat each.
The analysis across the chapters herein indicates that the economy determined the election, and the Conservatives secured credibility. Miliband failed to establish himself as a credible alternative prime minister and Labour failed to develop a political platform engaged with floating voters. Labour, many of the authors argue, also failed to utilize the communication opportunities fully to get their message across. Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats suffered for having entered into a coalition, perhaps because their progressive left could not reconcile their party aligning themselves with the more right-wing Conservatives. While the UKIP gained 12.6% of the vote share, their support was spread across constituencies and in the end they retained only one of their seats.
The result led to three leaders (Labour’s Ed Miliband, Liberal Democrat Nick Clegg and UKIP’s Nigel Farage) resigning. The Conservative Party’s governing majority is small but secure, though the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU remains potentially divisive in terms of party cohesion and regarding the future of the union of nations that form the UK. The increased SNP presence in parliament will also place pressure on relations between Westminster and Edinburgh as they demand a settlement that reflects the wishes of the Scottish people they represent.
2 Understanding the Campaign Through Political Marketing Research
A general election campaign can be analysed through the lens of marketing in the same way as any campaign. As Philip Kotler (1972) claimed over 40 years ago that politics is a commodity that can be sold in the same way as soap, although it is recognized that the product is far more complex (Marland 2003). A political party provides a whole range of policies that are meant to present credible and attractive solutions to problems which exist within a nation (Smith and Hirst 2001). Naturally some problems are seen as more important than others, those which map onto the most important problems declared by citizens in opinion polls (Lilleker and Negrine 2006). Therefore, a key aspect of marketing strategy is developing a position regarding important issues that resonates with a majority of potential voters (Butler and Collins 1996). Election campaigns, therefore, are intense periods when parties attempt to ensure that potential voters are aware of the party’s position on key issues and are persuaded to believe that position is salient and resonant with them by whatever means are available (Clarke et al. 2009).
However, presenting an attractive position on an issue of top public concern is not sufficient in itself for electoral success. As with any commercial brand, one can only sell a product if there is a perception that the product will be delivered (Lees-Marshment 2011). Credibility, the perception that a party has the capability to deliver, is predicated on brand experiences and communicated brand character (Cwalina et al. 2011: 45). Arguably this was as crucial for the Conservatives in 2015 as it was in 2010 (Pich et al. 2014). Party brands are a complex combination of the historical associations, past and, importantly, the current leader, and the past and current performance in presenting solutions to societal problems. Associations may involve perceived attachments to an ideology, attachments to members of specific social groups and ownership of specific policy areas. The leader may be able to bring new attachments to a party and equally weaken attachments, for example, to ideologies. Arguably, the most important role of a party leader is to demonstrate possessing the qualities required to lead a nation at a specific time, and to articulate and make relevant the policies of the parties as well as defending those policies and the party’s record. The leader therefore combines the roles of a spokesperson, a credible manager, a symbolic leader, and an in-touch and empathic public representative. Perceptions thus are crucial, and they are shaped by campaign and media communication.
Setting out policies is equally not simply a case of discussing matters within the party and relying purely on doctrine or expertise to set out a programme. Firstly, a party must design a policy that is relevant to the current public agenda and which resonates with those groups in society whose votes are most likely to be won. In other words parties must offer manifestoes that are leading on, and responding to, issues of concern (Adams et al. 2004). Secondly, though, a policy must be salient; so relevant and credible to citizens (Clarke et al. 2009). In order to present an image as a competent government, a party must present a management team that appear capable of delivering the promises they offer. More importantly, the promises themselves must be perceived as deliverable. Thirdly, a policy programme must offer some sense of differentiation, showing unique selling points that make the party stand out (Smith and French 2009). A party must offer clear reasons why voters should elect them rather than the alternatives on offer. Therefore, election campaigns are battles over resonance, salience and credibility, and each element must complement the other and be clearly marketed to as wide a potential electorate as possible. The UK electoral system means that parties must approach a campaign with a clear sense of who they are targeting and how to target those voters who are most susceptible to persuasion or conversion. Targeting is ruthless, and in particular to voters with a high propensity to vote and be likely to be persuaded, and who live in seats likely to change hands. In the first empirical chapter Andrew Mullen addresses the long and short campaign and assesses the targeting strategies of the six major parties.
Alongside the targeted campaign...