Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Turkey

The New PKK

Spyridon Plakoudas

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9783319756585
• eBook ISBN: 9783319756592
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book seeks to answer the "why" and "how" questions about the insurgency of the PKK, a militant left-wing group of Turkey's Kurds, in Turkey. The PKK has been inter-locked in an intermittent war against Turkey since 1984 in the name of Kurdish nationalism. The author combines insights of Strategy and IR - from strategy and tactics in irregular warfare to peace negotiations between state authorities and insurgents, with data from qualitative research, to achieve two inter-related objectives: first, assess the current state of affairs and predict the future course of the conflict and, secondly, draw general conclusions on how protracted conflicts can end and how.

© The Author(s) 2018

Spyridon PlakoudasInsurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Turkeyhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75659-2_1

Begin Abstract

1. Why Study the PKK versus Turkey Conflict

Spyridon Plakoudas¹

(1)

American University in the Emirates, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Abstract

This chapter explains in brief the rationale behind a monograph on the intermittent war between the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê or Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Turkey since 2004: first of all, this fluctuating war (i.e. defeat of the PKK in 1999, ceasefire between 1999 and 2004, limited war between 2004 and 2011, all-out war in 2012, peace negotiations between 2013 and 2015, all-out war between 2015 and 2017 and now stalemate?) is indeed an ideal case study for specialists in insurgency and counter-insurgency (COIN), and, secondly, this intermittent conflict is still an ongoing war with a critical peripheral dimension (i.e. Iraq and Syria). This chapter argues that this book will use the insights of the disciplines of International Relations and Strategy to offer an up-to-date and critical account of the Turkey vs PKK conflict.

Keywords

InsurgencyTurkeyAKPPKKKurdish summer

End Abstract

Theoretical Framework

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, insurgency (a variant of irregular warfare) undoubtedly represents the most prevalent type of war.¹ With the exception of the (still uninhabited) Antarctica, insurgencies can be currently recorded in every continent—even in Oceania where a low-intensity insurgency rages in Papua since 1962. However, the great majority of these insurgencies are not new: they appeared many years ago and several of them will not end anytime soon.

How does an insurgency end? In general terms, an insurgency can end in three ways: (a) an outright (military) victory for the insurgents or the state authorities (e.g. the Greek Civil War and the Chinese Civil War) (b) a negotiated peace settlement (e.g. the Guatemalan Civil War) or (c) a stalemate (e.g. the War in Donbass).² Despite claims to the contrary,³ the majority of insurgencies between 1815 and 2010 ended in defeat for the insurgents.⁴ Indicatively, Turkey suppressed four uprisings of the Kurds (1925, 1927–1930, 1937–1938 and 1984–1999) in the twentieth century without suffering any territorial losses whatsoever.⁵

Although, according to recent surveys, the most durable peace settlements of such intrastate wars do not occur through accords on the negotiation table but victories on the battlefield,⁶ military victory over an insurgency does not always translate into permanent peace since space and time allow the insurgents to regroup and reclaim any lost ground.⁷ Turkey stands out as a typical case yet again. After its conclusive defeat in 1999, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê or PKK) surprisingly started a new war within Turkey in 2004. The PKK, however, declared a ceasefire in 2013 after an earnest appeal by its jailed leader—Abdullah Öcalan. A “solution process” ( çözüm süreci) to the chronic Kurdish Issue was inaugurated by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Turkey’s charismatic and authoritarian leader since 2003) which, nonetheless, ended in failure in mid-2015 after several ups and downs. Since July 2015, a vicious war between the PKK and Turkey has been raging unceasingly that wrecked south-east Turkey and spilled over to neighbouring Iraq and Syria.

Research Objective

This monograph aspires to answer whether the counter -insurgency (COIN) strategy of Turkey since 2004 can be considered a success or not and, in addition, predict whether the second phase of the PKK’s insurgency will end in victory , negotiated settlement or stalemate . Ergo, this monograph will investigate the “peace-and-war” state of affairs from 2004 until 2013, the “solution process” from 2013 to 2015 and the “war on terror” from 2015 onwards—including Operation “Euphrates Shield” in northern Syria (August 2016–March 2017) and the failed coup d’état (July 2016). Consequently, this monograph touches upon the following crucial debates about insurgencies: conflict resolution through peace negotiations or military victory, sustainability of the peace settlements and relapse to violence, as well as strategy and tactics in irregular warfare (insurgency /COIN ).

The significance of this war must not be underrated. This separatist insurgency represents the latest and biggest one in a series of unsuccessful Kurdish rebellions ever since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. In recent years, this insurgency acquired a distinct peripheral dimension since the PKK expanded its activities in Iraq and Syria in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Since the outbreak of the war in Syria and its spill-over in Iraq, the Kurds in Syria, Iraq and Turkey capitalised on these opportunities to campaign militarily for their autonomy or independence and, as a consequence, the conflicts in the three countries developed into communicating vessels: the acts of the Kurds in one country decisively impact on the policy of the Kurds in the other two countries.⁸ For that reason, the “solution process” between the PKK and Turkey possessed a special weight. Not only these peace talks represented the most serious attempt by the two parties to resolve this protracted conflict in a peaceful way and “drain” once and for all a wellspring of violence and instability in Turkey; they additionally promised to usher in a “new era” in the relations between Turkey and the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. Unsurprisingly, the collapse of the peace talks in July 2015 dangerously escalated the old conflict inside Turkey and expanded it outside the country’s borders as Operation “Euphrates Shield” demonstrates.

Literature Review

This new monograph aspires to examine the Kurdish Question of Turkey from the angle of Strategy and International Relations (not from a historical viewpoint) and answer whether this protracted insurgency (ongoing since 1984 with several intervals) will end in the near future, how and why. Several works by experts on the Kurdish Question of Turkey have been published in the last few years—though almost all study this issue from the perspective of History or Politics.

Indicatively, the monumental work by Michael Gunter⁹ examines the continuity and change in the Kurdish Question of Turkey but devotes a few lines to the peace negotiations (2013–2015) and none to the renewed war (2015–present) between Turkey and the PKK. The insightful opus by Emre Caliskan and Simon Waldman on “New Turkey” under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AKP)¹⁰ offers a wonderful summary of the origins, course and outcome of the peace talks (2013–2015); this opus, however, approaches the conflict from the angle of History, not International Relations and Strategy, and, therefore, does not interpret the dynamics of irregular warfare in a critical way.¹¹ The collective work edited by Gareth Stansfield and Mohammed Shareef devotes a whole section to Turkey’s Kurdish Issue. Experts on the subject such as Michael Gunter¹² and Henri Barkey¹³ contributed chapters which examine in depth the evolution of the intertwined Kurdish and PKK Questions under the AKP’s rule; however, they do not use the concepts of Strategy and International Relations to capture the dynamics of insurgency and COIN . Two chapters by two Turkish writers, Ali Sarihan¹⁴ and Güneş Murat Tezcür,¹⁵ combine History with International Relations to interpret the strategy of the PKK and Turkey in its proper context of Strategic Studies; however, these two chapters do not extend their analysis beyond 2010 and 2014 respectively. And last but not least, the insightful journal articles by Mustafa Çosar Ünal¹⁶ use the insights of International Relations and Strategy to interpret the strategies of Turkey and the PKK in a critical and comprehensive way. However, they do not interpret the policies of other actors (e.g. the Halkların Demokratik Partisi or Peoples’ Democratic Party [HDP ]), and they do not extend their analysis to the new “war on terror” since July 2015.

Hence, this monograph aspires to answer the “why” and “how” questions about the insurgency of the PKK—not just examine the “when” and “who” issues. In contrast to other academics who approach the Kurdish Question in Turkey as historians and/or political scientists, this new monograph will combine the insights of Strategy and International Relations (from strategy and tactics in irregular warfare to peace negotiations between state authorities and insurgents ) with the data from qualitative research (secondary sources such as books and articles and interviews with experts) to achieve two inter-related objectives: first of all, assess the cu...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Why Study the PKK versus Turkey Conflict
• 2. The “War of the Flea”
• 3. The Kurdish “Phoenix” (2004–2012)
• 4. The “Solution Process” (2013–2015)
• 5. The Two-Fold “War on Terror” (2015–2017)
• 6. What Lies Ahead
• Back Matter