One of the most intriguing dynamics since the fall of the Berlin Wall involves the sustained rise of Southern powers in global politics .1 They play increasingly important roles within their own regions while simultaneously expanding their influence in various international platforms. Relatively new institutions such as the G20 , the IndiaâBrazilâSouth Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum , and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) represent their growing influence in global politics. Indeed, with the BRICS into its ninth year of summits in 2017, it has shown an appetite for expanding its agenda and cooperation beyond strengthening economic and trade relations.
The recent BRICS Academic Forum (2017) held in Fuzhou, China , was innovative in bringing together over 400 delegates from BRICS countries and non-BRICS countries in parallel sessions involving political parties, think tanks, and civil society organisations from the respective countries in order to deepen cooperation among a wider range of actors. Indeed while differences will continue to exist in certain areas, BRICS countries have shown their willingness and ability to individually and collectively push for the reform of existing global governance institutions. They are also increasingly funding their own development ideas through the creation of institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB) , which has started financing projects in all BRICS countries and will expand that financing to non-BRICS countries in their second tranche of loans.
Accompanying these developments, there is also a growing literature on a shift in global power , from a largely unipolar to a multipolar world order (Gu et al. 2008; Renard 2009; Phillips 2008). This shift is not only accompanied by the material changes in the balance of power , but in a growing diffusion of ideas from the global South into the mainstream institutions of global governance . Indeed while the world became accustomed to receiving development ideas from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in recent decades, BRICS countries are increasingly being taken seriously in terms of their own development experiences, which have tended to not strictly follow Western prescripts and development models.
The very notion of Southern powers draws from work done on emerging powers , a concept presupposing a number of characteristics shared by the states in question. These include, among others, regional preponderance, aspiration to a global role, and the contesting of US hegemony. These characteristics arguably make the group as a whole a useful category in analysis and policy formulation (Macfarlane 2006: 41â57).
However, the term âemerging powers â may no longer be the most appropriate concept to refer to this group of countries as they are no longer âseekingâ to play a global role; they already play a global role, contest US hegemony, and have formed âpolesâ of power and influence in the multipolar world that continues to unfold. They are thus no longer âemerging powers,â but âSouthern powers.â It is also important to note that in these shared characteristics, it is irrelevant whether the nation states in question are actively seeking to challenge US hegemony as a matter of purposeful strategy or by default. This is because global power is relative, and as some countries increase their influence in global politics , some countries experience a diminished influence over others. The concept of Southern powers also presupposes that these countries share certain minimal values. These values include respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, the abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country, the settlement of international disputes through peaceful means and dialogue, and the promotion of mutual interests and cooperation in international affairs.
With countries such as China and India having risen individually and collectively, it is notable that recent changes in the transatlantic partnership, seen through the British decision to exit the European Union, and the election of President Trump in the United States may only serve to accelerate the tectonic geopolitical changes . Indeed countries traditionally known as the champions of globalisation are closing their gaze and retreating towards economic nationalism, while countries previously characterised as inward looking now appear to be the champions of an open global system. This will only create more spaces for BRICS countries to seek to fill the vacuum of a once US-led unipolar moment.
Within the broader geopolitical changes in the distribution of power , an area of increasing interest is that of Southern powers as sources of development cooperation . While some researchers have labelled them as new development partners , they have programmes as old as those of developed countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) . However, unlike members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, Southern powers are not obliged to transfer their resources to other developing countries through the provision of development cooperation .2 As a matter of fact, they continue to be recipients of development cooperation from DAC members and multilateral organisations, even though the amounts they receive continue to decline.
The current international development landscape was created by members of the DAC, and these still account for a majority of the disbursement of development cooperation , with their programmes possibly peaking in the 1990s until the beginning of the twenty-first century to 95 per cent of all foreign aid. Richard Manning (2006: 371) argues that this period was an âexceptional timeâ in the history of development aid . However, the âexceptional timeâ alluded to by Manning is now a phenomenon of the past as Southern powers increasingly grow their individual and collective commitments as sources of development cooperation . While the final decade of the twentieth century may have seen DAC members making up 95 per cent of all aid, the first decade of the twenty-first century saw non-DAC nation states accounting for at least 10 per cent of all aid as defined by the OECD (ibid).
Southern powers âoften point to two declarations as foundations for their activities: the Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation agreed by 29 African and Asian countries at the Bandung Conference in 1955, and the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries , adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1978â (Zimmermann and Smith 2011: 726). Zimmermann and Smith also add that â[t]hese documents help explain how and why emerging powers distinguish their approaches from those taken by DAC donors . The fundamental difference is that emerging powers still regard themselves as peers in mutually beneficial relationships with their partner countries, rejecting the notion that some countries are experienced donors and others recipientsâ in need of political and economic advice on overcoming their developmental challenges.3
While the financial resources they are providing have become important for developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs) , Southern powers bring a wealth of practical insights into successful and failed attempts at economic growth, poverty reduction, and dealing with transition in their respective countries. This essentially reinforces the process of looking beyond DAC countries for development models and policy ideas, âreflected in Brazilâs experience in social policy and Indiaâs experience on information technologyâ (Zimmermann and Smith, Op. cit.: 731; Task Team on SouthâSouth Cooperation 2010: 46, 49, 52). This in itself signifies an important shift in recent history as developed countries lose their monopoly on ideas regarding the role of the state , poverty reduction strategies , and economic growth .
These developments in international development cooperation , brought on partly by the phenomenon of unprecedented growth and development among Southern powers , thus ensures that the global framework of development cooperation is increasingly under pressure to re-examine its practices as countries such as China and India assume greater responsibilities while calling the existing framework into question. It has also provided more options for developing countries in Africa , who were until recently almost completely dependent on DAC donors as a source of development cooperation (Kragelund 2008: 555â584; Saidi and Wolf 2011: 7â18).
Indeed, at the time of writing, a process is underway at the DAC to re-examine their definition and practices of development cooperation . While their definition of development cooperation has remained unchanged since 1971, efforts are underway to experiment with a different definition. The proposed definition being tested is referred to as TOSSD , the Total Official Support for Sustainable Development and efforts are underway to test the implications of such a method of quantifying development cooperation .
Concern among traditional donors over possible impacts of Southern powers on the existing aid architecture is captured by Manning, then Chair of the OECD DAC. While presenting his concerns over the general aid system, he questions the possible risks to recipient countries in the developing world, namely, unsustainable debt, the postponement of domestic governance reforms due to a lack of conditionalities, and government waste on unproductive investments (Manning, Op. Cit). Implicit under such concerns is the assumption that the manner in which the DAC organises its aid programmes represents the best practice, standards which Southern powers should move closer towards. However, as Emma Mawdsley (2010: 363) argues, this assumption takes a very uncritical view of foreign aid practices from the DAC since the inception of development cooperation as a financing mechanism. This approach also assumes, often falsely, that donors know more about the national priorities of foreign countries than the inhabitants of those countries. It is this very assumption that Southern powers seek to debunk as they pos...