1 What Is the Aim of a Good Place to Live?
There are many contrasting notions about what is and what could be, a good place to live. Each of them stems from different value judgments placed on the meaning of associated life and from conjectures on how this works. None of these, though, can be placed in a neutral sphere where there are some basic principles regarding justice, freedom , equality, efficiency, dignity, progress that have been unquestionably accepted on rational grounds by everyone (Sandel 2009). My task will therefore consist in taking sides, declaring clearly what my point of view is on the matter, and arguing openly the value judgements that I submit to the reader’s opinion (Jaeggi 2015). I shall start by summarising in a few points my fundamental idea.
The idea of a good place to live is strictly connected to the ideal according to which freedom can only be expressed in a mutual fashion: I can manifest my freedom on condition that you can manifest yours and vice versa.1 “The rule of social coexistence does not lie in the fact that my freedom ends where somebody else’s freedom starts, so that somebody else’s freedom dictates the limits of my own, on the contrary, the other person’s freedom is the very condition of my own freedom: if they are not free neither am I ” (Napoleoni 1988, p. 125). I cannot separate my freedom from yours, or yours from mine, and freedom can only be considered from a collective point of view. A good place to live, though, does not necessarily mean a place where some wonderful ideal is always flaunted, but a place where serious attempts have been made to translate this abstract ideal into the real world. The golden rule to get close to the realisation of that ideal is to “neither command, nor obey” (Colombo 2014, Chapter 4). This rule clearly shows that if nobody is able to take advantage of anybody else then nobody is potentially subordinate to anyone. This happens when in a society all the subjects are equals as far as power is concerned, and the asymmetrical and hierarchical connections between the individuals gradually fade away together with the possibility that there is somebody who gives orders and somebody who is subject to these. Therefore, the golden rule becomes the means through which the ideal of shared freedom is brought to life and effectively pursued: if I rule over you, I can widen my opportunities and means of gratification while you, by submitting to my orders, can often become frustrated and feel limited. But as far as freedom goes, we are in the same position: by ruling over you I lose my opportunity to take part in your freedom, thereby becoming enslaved myself. When subjects are not equal in terms of power , they cannot share their freedom either.
The golden rule cannot be realised by voluntarily surrendering the will to rule or obey. Let us imagine a group where there is a high level of trust and propensity to cooperate among its members. If some of them rule and others obey, it means that the former detain some form of power while the latter do not, thus creating an asymmetrical relationship . In such a situation, if those who are in power want to implement the golden rule they will have to voluntarily give away their power on condition that those who are currently obeying will not seize it. However, one of the defining characteristics of power to which we shall come back (see §13) is its ability to modify the status quo most of the times, if not always. The fact that at the beginning of a process most subjects are prepared to trust each other and willing to cooperate does not guarantee that once power comes into play, things will not change. After all, since fire has the ability to burn and water to wet, once you start a fire or let water flow, you cannot always control the outcome of your actions, no matter how good your intentions are. In the same way, there is no guarantee that power —which is by definition the ability to change the status quo—once it changes hands will not be used by those who acquire it (Acemoglu 2003). Unless there is another source of power comparable to it, which is able to keep the first one in check, in the same way it would be able to put out the fire or drain the water. This means that in order to fulfil the golden rule, whoever is in charge in the community under consideration, cannot just voluntarily renounce their power , but must do so only on condition that nobody will come and take their place, which would result in a simple exchange of the current roles. Therefore we are faced with the paradox that the respect of the principle of reciprocity—I will cease to exercise my power as long as you do not take advantage of it—can only be guaranteed by the existence of a counter-power . That is to say that in order to override a power , you need another one. In the following pages, we will be dealing on how is possible to live in a shared freedom condition, being aware that just wishing for it, does not necessarily lead to its achievement. How are we meant to follow the golden rule of neither obeying nor being obeyed, being fully aware that those in power will not relinquish it of their own accord, not even if they themselves want to follow the golden rule?
As the golden rule cannot be achieved through the voluntarily relinquishing of power , it cannot therefore be classified as a social or personal ethics principle. It does not give us suggestions about the desirable behaviour, as these indications would not be feasible. Rather, the golden rule points to the sound reasons of why we need to select a political strategy that will make the ideal of shared freedom closer to reality. The theoretical point can be made as follows: it would be utopian to imagine that we could eliminate, sic et simpliciter, hierarchical structures and asymmetrical relationships , since power tends to re-emerge and recollect. The counter-powers are the only antidote: power can only be balanced by another set of powers. We need therefore to imagine and design a type of society where the citizens are endowed with as much equality of power as possible in any situation. This type of society is what I call “isocracy ”. In an isocracy, we still have institutions like the market , organisations like the state and the firm; we still have conflicts between groups, individuals and institutional spheres, inequalities, resistance to shared improvements and unsustainable environmental situations. But if the power in its main expressions is levelled, anything which is negative for somebody is especially prone to being modified. Isocracy is, among societies, the one which is more open to change: even in the event that we do not like a change, there is the possibility to revers it, since nobody has the permanent power to uphold it.
To summarise: the golden rule “neither command, nor obey” is a method by which we can get closer to the ideal of shared freedom , and not an ethical or moral principle. On the other hand, it is also true that the ideal of shared freedom can only be achieved as freedom among subjects with equal power . As soon as we admit this theoretical point, the ideal of shared freedom turns into that of isocracy . In this respect, isocracy is the ultimate libertarian ideal, because it combines both the ideal of shared freedom and the method (the golden rule), that can actualise it. Being an ideal that combines the aim of freedom with the tool that can help achieve it, isocracy is also, as I will argue in §28, a criterion or normative principle of social justice , according to which we must reject and dismantle any unequal distribution of power .
2 Power as the Fundamental Motivation
If in the good place to live, the citizens enjoy equality of power , we need to start defining the concepts that we will be using. For the time being, we can define power in the intuitive and so far rather loose terms, as my ability to perform an action in relation to others. Bearing in mind the interdependence of associative life, I cannot pursue my goals without considering those of my neighbours. The scope of my action depends both on how much others allow me to act and on how much I allow them. My margins for manoeuvring are influenced by the capacity of others to act in relation to me just as they are by my same capacity towards them. In the many circumstances when both I and other people operate in a limited field and with uncertain goals, my power over them clashes with the power they hold over me: if I have more power than they do, then my scope for action increases and vice versa (Friedberg 1993). Under normal circumstances, power is an asymmetrical relation , in which each party involved tries to gain a greater capacity for action so that they can mould the actions of others. This is why power is the real issue at stake in the conflicts among human beings.
The great majority of the philosophical approaches tend to explain human behaviour in the light of individual internal characteristics. The reasons why a person behaves in a certain way can all be explained according to spiritual vocations, moral values, ethic choices or psychological motivations. For these approaches, it is vital to ask which motivations are prevailing, and which are the ones that ought to prevail instead. For instance, if we turn our attention to the motivational pair of selfishness and altruism—self-interest versus pro-social impulse—the debate focuses on the degree of egotism characterising human beings and on the social and personal conditions that could make them more selfless. The common trait among these approaches is that they have the underlying idea that the subject has an “inner” and an “outer” substance (Rorty 1979). Every person is supposedly provided with an “inner cavity” (where will-power and free-will dwell), which is ultimately responsible for the conscious choices of the subject. According to these theories, the inner nature (interiority) of an ...