Organised crime continues to plague society. Although we know much more about it, how it functions, who is involved and why it persists, we are still no closer towards eradicating it. Policymakers are beginning to understand that any response needs to be multifaceted, dynamic and persistent; however, they continue to search for an elusive silver bullet. Despite the growing diversity of our organised crimeâresponse toolbox, military solutions continue to be widely prioritised. Perhaps it is the quick wins, the direct pursuit of criminals or the outright show of force that creates the impression that action is being taken. Nevertheless, these responses are not always the most suitable.
Across all four areas of criminal activities that are explored in this book, military activity is considered a key element of the response. This was certainly the case in the response to Somali piracy, where the lack of a functioning state provided the opportunity to use force in a way that has not been possible in the Gulf of Guinea, or other areas plagued by pirates. Poaching in the Horn of Africa has also spawned a range of organisations ready to use military techniques against organised crime. Vetpaw 1 is only one amongst the most notorious of a plethora of organisations launched by retired members of the armed forces. The International Anti-Poaching Foundation was founded by ex-special operations military sniper Damien Mander. Maisha Consulting, an Israeli security company that specialises in wildlife protection includes many former soldiers in its ranks, primarily special forces and intelligence.
The other two areas considered in this bookâdrug trafficking and migrationâare not immune to military responses. As the Health Poverty Action chapter points out, the extreme end of the âwar on drugsâ has seen CIA operatives and heavily militarised civilian forces engaging in covert operations to stop drugs entering the US. Borrowing from piracy, in particular the success of operation ATALANTA, naval capacities have become a key part of the European response to migration, aiming to deter people smugglers in the Mediterranean.
Of course, not all military actions are unhelpful. For example, the Royal Lancers Counter Poaching Coordination Team, part of the British Army, shaped the role of armed forces in anti-poaching operations by developing a strategic understanding of how herds moved in order to pre-empt and cut off poacher movements. Like any response to organised crime, the role and impact of military responses is mixed and requires a deeper assessment to understand what it can offer and how they might interlink with other approaches.
That is what this volume seeks to do. It is the culmination of a series of workshops jointly organised by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime and the Royal United Services Institute to discuss and debate militarised approaches to crime. Each workshop focused on a different form of criminality. Although we are witnessing increasing crossover between crime typesâfor example, the Akasha family in Kenya is linked to the heroin trade as well as ivory smugglingâresponses still tend to focus primarily on one crime type. Such crossover does mean that responses, although focussed on a specific illicit market or activity, encounter or hinder a range of activity. An EU-funded project under the Cocaine Route Programme, AIRCOP, established Joint Airport Interdiction Taskforces in South American, Caribbean and West African airports. These taskforces seized cash, wildlife products and falsified medicines, although the primary aim is to interdict drug traffickers.
The workshops brought together a range of perspectives from academics, practitioners and policymakers, those in support of military responses and those opposed, those who have been directly involved in military action, those that have evaluated it, and those that have proposed alternative solutions.
In this volume, we have maintained the balance between these perspectives in order to draw out the nuances of the debate and understand what military approaches can contribute towards organised crime responses, but also where it can undermine them. The evidence on which organised crime analyses are based, while growing, remains thin, particularly when it comes to evaluating specific responses. This volume begins to fill that gap, as many chapters are based on empirical evidence.
What Is a Militarised Response?
At the outset, it is necessary to define the contours of this debate, in particular, what a militarised approach entails and how it comes about. As I have written elsewhere, 2 militarised approaches are at one end of a spectrum that extends to people-centred development approaches. In light of the discussions around comprehensive approaches, responses to organised crime should sit near the centre of this spectrum. They should constitute a mix of security responses that combine intelligence, law enforcement, and the direct pursuit of criminals with development strategies that engage with the factors that make a country vulnerable to organised crime.
Even in countries where different programmes are underway across this spectrum they rarely interact or work in collaboration. Development actors are beginning to focus directly on organised crime. For instance, the German development agency, Deutsche Gesellschaft fĂŒr Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), is supporting the fight against poaching in Africa and targeting illegal trade chains in Asia. However, other programmes that have a direct impact on organised crime, such as livelihood programming, are often not considered part of the response to organised crime. Rather development is primarily viewed in terms of how it is affected by organised crime, or, as in Health Poverty Actionâs chapter, how military responses to organised crime affect development. Many chapters in this volume conclude that development should play a more prominent role, most notably Rivziâs contribution, which argues that migration is merely a symptom of conditions in source countriesâan area where development can have a significant impact.
While development may be a recommendation of some chapters, the focus remains on the other half of the spectrum. On the security side, there is also great diversity. At the far end of the spectrum is direct military involvement. After the war in Bosnia, organised crime was a major problem. When the violence ended, the criminal actors who had played a key role during the war were eager to sustain their illicit activity bolstered by the legitimacy they had gained by facilitating a steady supply of food, fuel, weapons and even jeans in wartime. The EU took over from UN and NATO forces in post-conflict reconstruction with two missions, the EU Police Mission (EUPM), launched in 2003, and EU Force Althea (EUFOR), launched in 2004. EUFOR was a military mission deployed to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. In order to address organised crime EUFOR launched operations to directly pursue criminals, often independent of Bosnian police or military forces who were viewed by many as collaborating with criminals.
EUPM had a different approach. European law enforcement officers were co-located with their Bosnian counterparts. The mission led the security sector reform process, and in its final two phases, from 2009 to 2012, corruption and organised crime was the sole focus. Although the process was highly politicised and controversial, EUPM worked in partnership with local forces. In seeking to address organised crime, EUPM personnel worked with these forces on cases to identify knowledge and capacity gaps and trained them accordingly. Although EUPM was a security focused response, it was far removed from the direct military approach of EUFOR. It employed a partnership model and engaged in capacity building, shifting much closer to the middle of the spectrum.
The contributions in this volume engage with responses at different points along this spectrum. The civilian forces referred to by Erickson, Health Poverty Action and McDermott, although not military per se, can still be located towards the security end of this spectrum, as can the naval forces discussed by Forbes and Shortland in Somalia, and Roberts in the Mediterranean. Although not a direct focus, the activities of organisations like Vetpaw, referred to by Maguire, also fit here. They share a focus on direct action, and a disregard of local capacity or institutions, as well as for human rights, sustainability, or even in some instances, due process.
However, not all military action exists at the hard end of the spectrum. Some military engagement employs similar strategies to EUPM, working in partnership with local actors and seeking to build capacity to ensure long-term engagement on organised crime threats. This form of engagement is discussed in Ralbyâs chapter, which focuses on piracy in West Africa. Ralby refers to military action in the region as âcooperationâ rather than direct engagement.
Other contributions focus specifically on law enforcement of the type pursued by EUPM, such as Sellarâs chapter. Such an approach is posited as an alternative to direct military engagement, particularly as it focuses on ensuring adequate legislation is in place to prosecute individuals involved in organised crime. Shortland highlights the essential role this playsâunless these factors are addressed crime is likely to return once international military attention wanes. This has been widely recognised, although not adequately accounted for in the context of drug trafficking. Effective military or law enforcement action has created a balloon effect where criminal activity is pushed elsewhere. This is cited as the reason West Africa became a transit hub for cocaine originating in South America destined for the European market in the 2000s, with increased attention in that region reopening the Caribbean route in the mid-2010s. 3
Shortland argues the same is true for the Horn of Africa. Although the military response to piracy is recognised as a success, it merely deterred pirates while the risk was too high. All the conditions that allowed piracy to flourish in coastal communities remain in place today. Waning international attention could result in a resurgence of piracy in the region.
Ungoverned Spaces
Perhaps the greatest determinant of whether a response will be positioned at the hard end of the spectrum is the level of governance in the region. When military forces were deployed in Bosnia, there were limited governance structures in place. While the High Representative sought to rebuild these structures, EUFOR, operating in a governance vacuum, appeared vindicated in its direct pursuit of organised criminals. In contrast, as EUPM was deployed to restore the security sector, it played a key role in reconstituting police and ensuring they were equipped to pursue organised criminals, arguably having a more sustainable impact.
Similarly, as Forbes and Ralby point out, Somaliaâs statelessness effectively gave the international community, endorsed by UN Security Council resolutions, carte blanche in their response to piracy in the Gulf of Aden. In contrast, a similar strategy is not possible in the Gulf of Guinea. Although there are still a number of fragile states in the region, they are able to develop their own maritime strategy, even if assisted by internationals. There are also strong states, such as Nigeria, Ghana, Togo and Cote dâIvoire that are playing a key role in the region, supported by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nigeria even has a law preventing internationals from being armed on vessels in Nigerian waters.
However, assumptions on governance are not always well-founded, and in these cases military action can be more damaging than helpful. Von Hoesslin and Bird, for example, discuss how private security employees often engage in pre-emptive attacks, expecting to be operating in an empty environment where the normal rules that regulate military action do not apply. The result can be violations of human rights and international law, as well as escalating violence by initiating an arms race with groups benefiting from criminal activity. This makes it clear that many factors need to be considered before deciding which mechanisms to deploy to respond to organised crime.
Book Structure
In the next chapter, Shaw considers the trends, rationales and justifications of militarised responses. This chapter provides an overview and background to the evolution of militarised responses to organised crime, beginning with the war on drugs in the 1970s and continuing into other forms of illicit activity from wildlife crime to migration to piracy. It provides the context for the subsequent debates regarding the role of militarisation.
The first section focuses on the illegal wildlife trade. As violent criminal networks have become increasingly involved in the trafficking of wildlife, pushing iconic species to the brink of extinction, the argument for militarised responses has become increasingly vocal, both to protect the remaining wildlife, and to address the threat posed by poachers. This is resulting in an arms race between poachers and rangers, with a consequential rising death toll. This section focuses on outlining the effective use of military or security-based strategies to counter wildlife crime within a policy framework which combines other strategies, including criminal justice and community development responses.
Humphrys opens this section with a discussion on the underpinnings of the response to the illegal wildlife trade, and the politicisation of the military response. Rademeyer and Maguireâs chapters draw on empirical research of particular regions affected by the illegal wildlife trade where military strategies have been employedâSouthern Africa and Kenya, respectivelyâto highlight the flaws of a purely militarised response. Sellar concludes the section by exploring the commonly subordinated role of law enforcement, encouraging increased cooperation between military, police, and speciality wildlife protection bodies.
In the section on piracy we explore this phenomenon in its various manifestations across the globe, highlighting differences and identifying parallels. The naval response to Somali piracy is typically portrayed as one of the key success stories of militarised approaches, and is now being proposed in other theatres across the world, as well as for other crimes. A review of the spectrum of responses, from the deployment of navies and armed contractors to protect shipping lanes, and the impact these had on piracy allows for a greater understanding of best practice, and permits a stringent analysis of the scope for possible replication.
Forbes examines the successes of the military response in Somalia, emphasising that it was only one element of the wider response. Ralby draws on the lessons from Somalia and considers how the response on the opposite side of the continent has b...