Increasingly, policy-makers, leaders and research scholars around the globe are recognizing the need to attend to the potential threat that faith-based radicalization and extremism pose to individuals, communities and societies, even if in some instances the threat is not clearly identifiable. Pakistan, the worldās sixth most populous country with more than 192 million inhabitants (Government of Pakistan 2015), has a diverse population in terms of faith, sect, ethnicity and other forms of identity (Syed 2008). In recent years, systematic faith-based violence there has reached unprecedented levels in terms of death and destruction for Sunni Barelvis, Sufis, Shias, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus and other communities. Addressing this issue is of global importance.
In almost all incidents of faith-based violence and suicide bombings, militant groups such as the Pakistani Taliban (known as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan [TTP]), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ, Army of Jhangvi), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP, also operating as Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat or ASWJ) and affiliated militant outfits, with overlapping, shared memberships and blurred boundaries, are involved. Almost without exception, these militants belong to the Deobandi subsect of Sunni Islam and are involved in attacks on fellow Sunni Muslims, in addition to attacks on non-Sunni and non-Muslim communities (Fair 2015a, b). There is also evidence of attacks on relatively moderate Deobandi scholars and other incidents of intra-Deobandi violence (The News 2014). On a global level there is some evidence of Deobandi militancy in other regions, including in the West and the Middle East in support of Al-Qaeda, and the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] or Daesh).
Some analysts have pointed out that Deobandi militant outfits are not isolated offshoots but also enjoy the support of a wider network of Deobandi religiopolitical parties, clerics, madrassas (religious schools or seminaries), and at least some sections of the populace and security establishment. According to Siddiqa (cited in Zia 2013), the LeJ is part of the larger Deobandi network that is connected with other groups, such as the SSP, Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI). Also, it has the Tableeghi Jamaat and Jamiat Ulema-e-IslamāFazl (JUI-F) network to depend on. Over the years it has become stronger and it is now in the process of establishing itself politically. However, its violent contingent will continue to exist and expand. In fact, it will be able to justify itself and camouflage better due to this mainstreaming.
Siddiqa notes that
LeJ and the Deobandi network has expanded quite well in parts of North Punjab and most of South Punjab. They are now getting into Sindh as well. They are focused on their ideology, which means the strengthening of a Sunni state that sees the minorities in a certain role. Minorities will always be considered as half citizens.
Reporting her personal observation of the growing influence of radical Deobandism, Siddiqa states, āI have been to villages that follow the JeM and the LeJ in South Punjab, for instance, where they express displeasure of the Shias and Barelvis. The Shias are considered a greater enemy than the Barelvis who are only treated as yet as fools who ought to be correctedā (Ayesha Siddiqa, interviewed by Zia 2013, paras 15ā18).
Given the Pakistani stateās emphasis on assimilative national identity, incidents of sectarian attacks are either ignored or under-reported, with little mention of the common denominational identity of the perpetrators. In view of the historical support given to Deobandi and Salafi jihadist groups by the Pakistani security establishment, there is also some evidence of a lack of will on the stateās part to bring the perpetrators to justice. Similar neglect is also evident in the Pakistani media. Zaidi (2014) laments the way in which the mainstream media neglects Deobandi militancy and the suffering of victim communities. He urges the victim communities to unite and to take a principled and sustained stand to defeat takfiri (apostatizing) violence.
It may be noted that Deobandis, despite their allegiance to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, are heavily influenced by the ultraorthodox Takfiri (a fanatic Muslim who considers other Muslim sects or groups infidels due to religious or political differences and justifies violence against them) and jihadist ideologies of Ibn Taymiyyah (1263ā1328) and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703ā1792). Such influences pre-date the origins of the Darul Uloom Deoband in 1867. Therefore, Deobandis are closer to Salafis or Wahhabis in their inclination to takfiri, sectarian and jihadist militancy.
Owing to the Deobandisā better organization and resources (in contrast to those of Sunni Sufis and Barelvis), their ideology remains influential in Pakistan, with little room or tolerance for other sects and faiths. Kamran (2014) notes that Pakistanās national narrative is predicated on a specific religious identity, thereby excluding those adhering to other identities. āSometimes one laments the attempts to include minorities in the national narrative as a futile exercise. In fact, their exclusion has taken on a horrific form and they are being exterminated.ā Kamran suggests that marginalization is not only limited to non-Muslims but also stretches to āotheringā within Islam. He argues that āonce non-Muslims were driven to the margins in the country, the wedge of differentiation was turned to other sectsā. He refers to the dominant Deobandi direction of the national narrative in Pakistan. Furthermore, he notes that the mention of Ahmad Sirhindi (alias Mujaddid Alf Sani) (1564ā1624), Shah Waliullah (1703ā1762) and Shabbir Ahmed Usmani (1887ā1949) as the architects of the ideology that underpins state nationalism testifies to the overwhelming sway of Deobandi ideas in Pakistan. As a way forward, Kamran recommends a new national narrative, particularly with regard to the discourse on religion, and he highlights the need for an alternative discourse with an all-inclusive humane character.
In April 2016, BBC Radio 4 broadcast two extensive episodes titled The Deobandis highlighting the armed sectarian and jihadist groups of Deobandis which are not only active in South Asia but also in the UK and elsewhere. The program shows that Deobandi Islam is intentionally isolationist and that its strict beliefs put it at odds with modern mainstream societies and beliefs. It also points towards the Deobandis role in intra-Muslim sectarianism and show how some senior Deobandi leaders in the West have links to the proscribed militant organisations (BBC, 2016).
This volume documents and highlights the Deobandi dimension of extremism and its implications for faith-based violence and terrorism. This dimension of radical Islam remains largely ignored or misunderstood in mainstream media and academic scholarship. The book addresses this gap. It also covers the Deobandi diaspora in the West and other countries, and the role of its radical elements in transnational incidents of violence and terrorism. It is interdisciplinary in nature and cuts across the fields of politics, religion, history, media studies, anthropology and governance.
In the context of violence and terrorism in South Asia, Fair (2015a) points towards generic and vague discourses that are often used in mainstream media and analyses. She argues that
While most commentators on Pakistanās dire internal security situation tend to use the anodyne descriptors of āIslamistā, āterroristā, or even āsectarian militantsā to describe these groups, these expressions suffer from considerable under-specification. In fact, the groups that are primarily engaged in this kind of Islamist domestic violence against Pakistanis in and out of government are almost exclusively Deobandi, one of the five major interpretive traditions of Islam in Pakistan. 1
The problem with generic or vague terms such as āIslamistā, āterroristā and āSunniā is that they (1) deflect attention from the specific Deobandi (South Asian) and Salafi/Wahhabi (transnational) identity of the vast majority of militants; and (2) provide legitimacy to the Deobandi/Salafi militancy. Deobandi and Salafi subsects combined represent a tiny minority within the global Sunni population. 2 Within the Salafi and Deobandi population, the takfiri jihadist militants represent a fraction of these subsects although many of their top clerics and ideologues hold and spread takfiri and jihadist ideologies.
A recent report by the European Parliament (EP) reveals how Salafi/Wahhabi groups based in the Middle East are involved in the support of, and supply of arms to, militant groups around the world. The work, commissioned by the EPās Directorate-General for External Policies, warns about these organizations and claims that āno country in the Muslim world is safe from their operations ā¦ as they always aim to terrorise their opponents and arouse the admiration of their supportersā (EP 2013). Similar discoveries were made in a leaked cable from the US Consulate in Lahore that stated that āfinancial support estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith [Salafi] clerics in the region from āmissionaryā and āIslamic charitableā organisations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the direct support of those governmentsā (Dawn 2011). In light of these developments, parliamentarians in the USA and the UK, such as Congressman Ed Royce and Lord Eric Avebury, have demanded close monitoring of Deobandi madrassas and a strict ban on the madrassas and outfits involved in militancy (Avebury 2013; PTI 2015).
The specific identification of the radical Deobandi and Salafi militants is useful to isolate them from the majority of peaceful Sunni and Shia Muslims. This provides direction to governmental resources so that they can focus on those outfits, mosques, madrassas, charities, media and social media channels that are associated with these ideologies.
In spite of extensive scholarship and developments in the field of religion and terrorism over the last few decades, not much attention has been paid to the significant role played by Deobandi ideology and organizations in incidents of violence in Pakistan and other countries. While some notice has been taken of Salafi or Wahhabi militancy and its ideological, political and financial roots in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, there is no such focus Deobandism. This is despite the fact that Deobandi outfits are reported to be responsible for up to 90 percent of violence and terrorism in Pakistan (Hussain 2010) and are known to be active in other countries, such as the UK, the USA, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.
Indeed, as Metcalf (2011) notes, many of Pakistanās Deobandi clerics are supportive of the Taliban, which shares their sectarian orientation. Metcalf argues that the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban suggests a commonality of goals with the Afghan Taliban, and that Pakistani militant organizations have demonstrably been linked to actions beyond Pakistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir. She acknowledges that, in recent decades, militancy and terrorism in Pakistan, including militancy on the part of Deobandis, has escalated, and also that the Taliban identify as part of the Deobandi school of thought (Metcalf 2002). Many of the Taliban studied in Deobandi schools (madrassas), but one senior spokesman for the Taliban in his conversation with Metcalf went so far as to declare, āEvery Afghan is a Deobandi.ā
However, instead of taking a clear stance against Deobandi militant outfits, such as the Taliban, SSP/ASWJ and JeM, senior Deobandi clerics in Pakistan and India have resorted to a discourse that shifts the blame of Deobandi militancy towards āZionists and Western crusadersā (Sikand 2008). For example, in the much publicized anti-terrorism convention held at De...