This book explores a variety of themes in the areas of economics, politics, social change, media and culture in order to present a broad, critical account of contemporary Spain. In this account, some years and dates are of special importance. Thus, extreme inequality, increased debt, weak productivity and low growth are often associated with the aftermath of the Great Recession that started in 2007. In the case of Spain, one should also add the irruption of the Indignados or 15M Movement.1 Beginning on May 15, 2011, hundreds of thousands of (mostly) young people filled the plazas of the largest cities under the motto “No nos representan” (“They [the politicians] do not represent us”).2 What happened during the following months could well be described as the discovery of participatory democracy by a significant swath of the Spanish population. This level of politicization had not been seen since the years of the so-called Transition to democracy (1975–1982)—a time when there was still a highly organized Left in Spain, which included the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), unions, the student movement and hundreds of neighborhood associations which played an important political role in major urban centers such as Barcelona and Madrid.3
The alteration of the material conditions of life and the prospects of a bleak future were behind the change in perceptions signaled by the 15M Movement. However, its full political impact took some time to transpire. Although the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) lost close to 40% of its previous vote in the 2011 General Election, the conservative People’s Party (PP) won an absolute majority and was able to deepen the austerity program dictated by the Troika.4 It took several rounds of elections until the Spanish political system was destabilized by the emergence of Podemos, a political party that was able to attract new young voters, as well as old Left-party voters.5
The disruption of Spain’s political establishment has also led to questioning the consensus reached by the unions and the political parties that signed the 1977 Moncloa Pacts, which marked the acceptance by the Left of the Second Bourbon Restoration. Likewise, the arrival of representative democracy, once hailed as an exemplary democratic process, is now being questioned for its role in silencing (and providing amnesty for) the multiple crimes brought about by Franco’s dictatorship, as well as for the opacity of the conditions under which the entire process took place. The settlement secured by the Moncloa Pacts was complemented by the neutralization of social movements—like the powerful neighborhood associations of Madrid and Barcelona—and by the co-optation of a hedonistic urban culture eager to explore alternative lifestyles. As José Vidal-Beneyto has argued, the significance of the so-called Movida did not reside in the intensity of the social fracture that it could produce but in the effectiveness of its institutional recovery (59). In a short period, a narrow understanding of cultural subversion substituted political subversion tout court. Spain was normalized and the cultural Movida was born and broadcast internationally in order to signal Spain’s arrival to modernity.6
In this sense, modernization theory and the distinction between totalitarian regimes (those that impose a totalizing ideology on the population and that cannot be transformed into a democratic system) and authoritarian regimes (those that maintain the established order by authoritarian means and which may eventually become democratic) are two basic components of the Transition narrative , as can be attested by their influence in structuring books like the well-known Spanish Cultural Studies.7 In this text, the Spanish Second Republic is presented as a ‘failure of democratic modernization,’ whereas Franco’s dictatorship is viewed as an example of ‘authoritarian modernization’ (Graham and Labanyi xii). However, what looks like a commonsense pattern to describe the development of modern societies—industrialization leading to social and cultural change and then to democracy—becomes a rationalization for Franco’s coup d’état and the ensuing destruction of the Second Republic. In the end, this logic secures the legitimization of the Second Bourbon Restoration and its shortcomings (i.e. the permanence of Francoist social and economic arrangements, as well as the low quality of Spain’s democracy). Working within this frame, the present work assembles a variety of voices that confront the historical significance of the 15M Movement with the goal of challenging the standard Transition narrative and the promotion of an isolated cultural sphere floating over our capitalist dystopia.
In addition, there are pressing reasons to do just this. On December 2, 2018, the coalition formed by Podemos and United Left (IU ) was unable not only to attract new voters but also to retain old ones in the Andalusian regional election.8 More importantly, this election saw the irruption, for the first time in a regional parliament since the return of democracy, of a Far-Right party, Vox, which obtained 11% of the votes. These results led a political commentator to declare that the 15M has died (Rodríguez), whereas more circumspect analysts observed that the political momentum initiated by the 15M is wavering.9 In short, it seems the time has come to assess its impact, and here we will briefly draw some basic lines.
To begin with, the 15M was a real social movement. If contentious politics, which is usually the term used in sociology to refer to social movements, consists of people coming together and organizing to challenge ‘hegemonic norms,’ whether they are ‘located in the state, the market or civil society’ (Leitner et al. 157), then there is no doubt the 15M suits the concept entirely. Moreover, the challenge was successful in some important respects. It opened a new political cycle that broke up the Spanish two-party system in such a way that some political analysts began to talk about a second Transition.10 The 15M also ‘marked a return to social and economic inequality and injustice as master frames galvanizing mobilization’ (Tejerina and Perugorría 3). Hence, the defense of public services as a common good for society and the proliferation of social economy initiatives. The political culture of the country was also transformed. For instance, new emphasis was placed on self-management, participation, transparency and accountability. In general, the cultural impacts were substantive. Monge Lasierra highlights, among other factors, the awareness of the political nature of many of the problems people have been confronting since 2007, as well as an awareness of the transformative nature of collective action and of the emergence of new media (15M Un movimiento político 171–172).11 Considering everything, we can claim the 15M was able to ‘promote and enact alternative imaginaries,’12 which is one of the main goals of contentious politics (Leitner et al. 157–158).
The reordering of the Spanish political imaginary, one might add, was a reaction against the economic policies implemented by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, Prime Minister of Spain in 2011 and a member of the PSOE, whose ideological position is accurately described by the “progressive neoliberalism” label.13 For instance, in a 2006 interview, he asserted that the ‘program of a modern Left consists of a well-steered economy with public budget surpluses, moderate taxes and a limited public sector. All this combined with the extension of civil and social rights. This is the program of the future.’ The 2011 electoral results and the general mood of the country after the Great Recession contradicted this prediction, and it is fair to say that the political imaginary during and immediately after the 15M could be characterized in terms of a retreat from identity politics and a renovated emphasis on economic matters. This was reinforced when the two major political parties (PSOE and PP) passed a reform of the Spanish Constitution on September 2, 2011—without any electoral consultation—to include a balanced budget amendment in Section 135.
However, identity politics made a comeback when the political energies released by the 15M converged with the problematic territorial integration of Catalonia in Spain. In a short period, from 2006 to 2013, Catalans in favor of an independent state went from 14% to around 47% (Muñoz and Tormos). This change does not easily correlate with a change in national identification. Economic considerations are extremely important for those Catalans who are in favor of independence and have a dual national identity (Catalan and Spanish): they believe that independence from Spain in the context of the European Union (EU) and economic globalization will provide a better environment to protect their economic status. However, matters got even more complicated when the Parliament of Catalonia passed a Law on the Referendum on Self-determination of Catalonia that the Constitutional Court of Spain later suspended. Still, the consultation was celebrated on October 1, 2017, and, after the Parliament of Catalonia passed a resolution declaring the independence of Catalonia, the Spanish Government applied Section 155 of the Constitution and the Government of Catalonia was suspended.
The Catalan pro-independence movement is a significant factor in the resuscitation of a belligerent Spanish nationalism with deep cultural roots in Franco’s dictatorship. For many years, the difficulties to articulate a Spanish national identity were ridiculously expressed through the slogan “The Spain brand” (“La marca España”), a state policy originally promoted by...