Social Evolution, Political Psychology, and the Media in Democracy
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Social Evolution, Political Psychology, and the Media in Democracy

The Invisible Hand in the U.S. Marketplace of Ideas

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eBook - ePub

Social Evolution, Political Psychology, and the Media in Democracy

The Invisible Hand in the U.S. Marketplace of Ideas

About this book

This book analyzes why we believe what we believe about politics, and how the answer affects the way democracy functions. It does so by applying social evolution theory to the relationship between the news media and politics, using the United States as its primary example. This includes a critical review and integration of the insights of a broad array of research, from evolutionary theory and political psychology to the political economy of media. The result is an empirically driven political theory on the media's role in democracy: what role it currently plays, what role it should play, and how it can be reshaped to be more appropriate for its structural role in democracy.

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Yes, you can access Social Evolution, Political Psychology, and the Media in Democracy by Peter Beattie in PDF and/or ePUB format, as well as other popular books in Politics & International Relations & Political History & Theory. We have over one million books available in our catalogue for you to explore.
© The Author(s) 2019
Peter BeattieSocial Evolution, Political Psychology, and the Media in Democracyhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02801-5_1
Begin Abstract

1. Introduction: Why Democracy Is Not Working

Peter Beattie1
(1)
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong
Peter Beattie
End Abstract
“What kind of truth is this which is true on one side of a mountain and false on the other?”
—Michel de Montaigne, Essays
Planes struck the towers while I was in the shower. A roommate was downtown taking photographs and, in the rudest way, received information about what would later be called “9/11”; he witnessed dozens of people choose the brief terror of jumping over the prospect of burning alive. I was blissfully ignorant for an hour. As I walked from Alphabet City to Washington Square, two miles from the World Trade Center, I missed the relevant information—“change blindness” prevented me from noticing the Twin Towers were missing from the skyline. Even as I witnessed streams of businesspeople walking north, truth eluded me. (Those whose proximity to the collapse had covered them in soot were further downtown.) It was the day of the mayoral primaries, and I interpreted the unusual migration as a trip to the polls. What a turnout, what a day for democracy!
Information about the attack only reached me from fellow students as I arrived at class and even then, much was false: Planes had hit the White House! Another attack was on the way! I tried to call my father, in the Financial District for a conference, but the cell phone network was overwhelmed. Instead, I walked to an apartment near Union Square, where, uncoordinated, friends were converging. There, as most of them walked to a nearby hospital to donate blood (there were too many would-be donors), I saw CNN’s coverage of what had happened two miles away. For billions, the news media would be their only source of information.
I remember the week after 9/11 as an unusual time. Strangers made eye contact and daily interactions were gentler. The stress of daily life was subdued, not augmented, by the mass murder. It was as if the toxic smoke from the ruins were soporific. Parks were filled with spontaneous memorials, chalk drawings, and posters with a theme so common I only found it remarkable later 1 : peace. I saw calls for resilience, understanding, to avoid violent retribution, remembering and honoring the dead by putting an end to violence.
Not so on television. The news was jarring, like entering an alternate universe where mourning and the desire for peace were replaced by rage and the desire for retribution. And fear, pervasive fear. The fear spread by the news media took root across the country, creating a sharp distinction between how New York City and the United States reacted. (Fear even snuck into my apartment—a month later, I bought gas masks for roommates and myself, should a poison gas attack force us escape across the Williamsburg Bridge.) This was my introduction to the media’s power, my first intimation of the difference between mediated and unmediated reality.
There was a question on everyone’s mind: Why do they hate us? The easiest answer, one found with only a remote control, was freedom. “They” hate “us” for our freedom. As a college student, I had the time and resources to engage in more effortful searches. The answers I found in books, magazines, the alternative and international press, community radio, and documentaries were less pat than freedom-hatred. These answers attacked my identity, how I saw myself as a member of a nation devoted to justice and democracy. They were answers—true or false—that never reached more than a small minority of my compatriots.
But why did this information reach me and not everyone? How did so many others around me come to have ideas so different from mine? These questions made me look at ideas anew. What are ideas? Fundamentally: information. Ideas are bits of information generated in or communicated to human minds, which combine, change, and spread. One’s beliefs are simply ideas—often what one was taught as a child. The mind may be mysterious, but it is not magical: it cannot survey all ideas and choose the best. The mind can only embrace ideas it is exposed to by others, or create new ideas from pieces of other ideas. Gore Vidal once put it that Montaigne wrote “about what he had been reading which became himself.” 2 Who we are—our identities and beliefs—is largely information we absorbed from our environments. Hence the distribution of the world’s religions: Catholics are disproportionately those whose parents were Catholics, Hindus those who were raised Hindu and so on.
It is not only religious ideas that we hold for reasons of geographical accident. There are few French nationalists among those born and raised in Ethiopia, just as there are few monarchists born and raised in the USA. Our political ideas, like our religious ideas, are powerfully influenced by mere geography.
Why do we believe what we believe about politics? Our parents are a primary influence, as are schools, churches, and friends. And, finally: the books and newspapers we read, the television we watch and internet sites we visit. Outside of these sources, what do we have? The news media provides the majority of us with nearly all the information we have about the world outside of our social circles. Whether that information is worthy of trust depends on the nature of the media system we have access to; citizens of North Korea would be wise to distrust information coming from their media system, while citizens of the United States can be confident that a far greater percentage of the information from theirs trustworthy. After all, the U.S. government does not actively censor the press and journalists are trained to be as objective as possible. Yet there are reasons for doubt. There need not be a conscious, coordinated policy à la North Korea for a media system to display a propagandistic character. Unconscious or unintentional mechanisms abound: political-economic pressures, ideological uniformity among the owners of media companies or journalists, and a reliance on government sources for information are candidates. Even “culture” is a candidate: norms, routines, common sense, conventional wisdom, and what “it just wouldn’t do to say” or write. Hence even in relatively free and open media systems, healthy skepticism is required.
Such unconscious mechanisms are capable of producing bias that eerily mimics conscious propaganda. Before and during the second US war on Iraq, the U.S. public largely believed the war justified because Iraq posed a serious threat to national security. Yet the majority of the world’s people outside of the United States believed the war unjustified. Simply, the U.S. media was more accepting of the U.S. government’s position than media systems globally. The result: the U.S. public believed falsehoods and most of the rest of the world did not. 3 What was true on our side of the Pacific and Atlantic was false on the others—and, as recognized by even Republican candidates for president in 2016, our “truth” was false.
Such dependence on the news media strikes us as unpleasant, even embarrassing. The more comfortable and reassuring thought is that we choose what to believe. And we do, but we are not free to accept or reject ideas we never see or hear. Herein lies the power of the news media.
A commonsense rebuttal to claims about a powerful media is that there is no evidence of any conspiratorial cabal using the media to mislead the public; rather, the U.S. media (among others) is composed of fair-minded professional journalists able to write and speak freely; that they are often adversarial toward government and corporations and tend toward the liberal side of the U.S. political spectrum; that the United States is an open society without censorship, in which citizens can read, watch, say, or believe what they please. Therefore, those concerned about media power are likely to be adherents of ideological persuasions outside the mainstream, upset their ideology has failed to gain wider acceptance. Each of these points of rebuttal is correct. Only, they are correct in themselves but do not constitute a rebuttal. This book explains why.
It explains how an “invisible hand” creates a de facto propaganda system within the American marketplace of ideas. A conspiracy is unnecessary to explain the constricted supply of information within our open society: psychological, commercial, and political pressures suffice. As Adam Smith might put it: “It is not from the malevolence of the politician, the journalist, the media owner, or the audience that a propaganda system is created, but from their regard to their own interests—and, from their psychology.”
This book will argue that the news media has a power rivaling any branch of government. It suggests that to be consistent with democracy, the power of media, like the power of government, must be submitted to democratic control—and not merely to the polyarchic plutocracy of the market. Otherwise, we must admit that ours is a sham democracy disguising an oligarchy. Or, simply a democracy in disrepair.
Explanations for this sorry state can be grouped into two broad categories. The Right insists human nature is profoundly flawed: “out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made,” according to Immanuel Kant. Our ideal forms of government cannot help but fall short of their goals, because human nature is corrupt, selfish, and tainted with evil. Hence democracy, which Churchill called “the worst form of government, except for all those other forms,” is failing of necessity. Our fallen nature can do no better, though it could do worse.
On the Left, it is argued that democracy fails only when impeded by external forces. Human nature is suited to self-government and would produce wonderful results if allowed time to flourish under true democracy. The Left’s diagnosis for the present democratic deficit is the impediment imposed by wealthy individuals and corporations. This, not any failings of human nature, is what is preventing democracy from achieving its potential.
Evolutionary and social psychology have shown that we are animals that evolved to cooperate with members of our groups and compete with other groups. Our brains are designed with biases and prejudices to facilitate this cooperation and competition—not to think with the rationality and objectivity of philosophers. We know that humanity is crooked timber: far from the liberal ideal of rationality, Homo sapiens has an evolved mind riddled with biases that skew perceptions and political thinking. But while our nature seems fallen by comparison with an imagined, Edenic ideal, it does not warrant the Right’s pessimism any more than the Left’s optimism. Our nature is Janus-faced: we have a competitive, selfish heritage from our distant simian forebears and a cooperative, group-focused heritage that emerged when our lineage diverged from that of chimpanzees. What separates our species from our closest relatives is an impressive ability to cooperate, but we still share much of their selfish and competitive instincts.
A diverse array of scientific studies provides an understanding of how the media 4 exerts political power. Unlike in the realm of law, where successful arguments are built on persuasive reasoning and the accumulated authority of judges and legislators, scientific study is constrained only by what we can observe. When a chemist says that two chemicals produce an effect if combined, we are not constrained to believe on the strength of the chemist’s authority; we are invited to see for ourselves. Hence the motto of England’s Royal Society: nullius in verba, “nothing in words” or “take no one’s word for it.” Not all science is as simple as chemistry, however; more complicated areas of study, like human societies, do not allow for pure experiments. There are always extraneous, uncontrolled factors in even the most careful social psychological experiment. And many social questions do not allow experimentation, in which case “science” refers to its older, broader definition: a systematic study that creates knowledge to explain or predict aspects of the world. Regardless, as much for chemistry as sociology, how we interpret science, and what our interpretations tell us about how we might better organize ourselves socially, politically, or economically, is open to debate. I mean to build here only a prima facie case for the power of media in politics, using the findings of scientists from several fields. Though I have not yet encountered one, a counterargument could be made that reinterprets the same findings, and others, weaving them into an opposing narrative that more satisfyingly explains the whole. (I would welcome such a counterargument, especially if it provides reassurance that democracy, in a form substantially faithful to its ideal of citizens sharing equally in political power, presently exists in the United States.)
To make this argument, first a theory of information in society—ideas, beliefs—is needed. The first chapter explores three such theories: social evolution, which ties social information to broader conceptions of information at the root of physical existence and the evolutionary process; schema theory, which conceptualizes how the human brain absorbs, processes, and stores information; and social representations theory, which explains and explores how large chunks of socially shared information disseminate through a population. These approaches cover three ascending levels, from the individual bit of information, to the information within an individual brain, to the sets of information widely shared within a society. Combining them, the resulting approach...

Table of contents

  1. Cover
  2. Front Matter
  3. 1. Introduction: Why Democracy Is Not Working
  4. 2. Information: Evolution, Psychology, and Politics
  5. 3. Evolution: How We Got the Minds We Have Today
  6. 4. When Our Evolved Minds Go Wrong: Social Psychological Biases
  7. 5. The Transition: Information from Media to Mind
  8. 6. The Supply Side: What Affects the Supply of Information Provided by the Media
  9. 7. Comparing Media Systems: What a Difference Supply Makes
  10. 8. Conclusion: The Invisible Hand and the Ecology of Information
  11. Back Matter