âNo problem is as consubstantial to literature and its modest mystery as the one posed by translationâ, writes Jorge Luis Borges (1999b: 69) in âLas Versiones Homericasâ. While Borges may appear to be saying that translation is a central problem of literature, he in fact suggests something even more fundamental. The word âconsubstantialâ suggests that the âproblem [âŚ] posed by translationâ is in some way made of the same substance as literature and its âmodest mysteryâ. The problem of translation, literature and literatureâs âmysteryââwhatever this may beâare composed of the same material. However, âconsubstantialâ could suggest a still closer linkage. In Christian theology, the doctrine of consubstantiality teaches that the three parts of the Trinity always already existed together: the Father, Son and Holy Spirit existed, of one substance, prior to everything else. Through the word âconsubstantialâ, Borges suggests the âproblemâ of translation is inextricable from literature; to attempt to read literature is necessarily to face the âproblemâ of translation.1 The third part of this trinity is literatureâs âmodest mysteryâ. As modest, it may not be noticed, yet, as a mystery, it remains unexplainable. This âmysteryâ is present in all literature and all translation. Yet as David Johnson (2009: 6) points out, Borgesâ word translated here as âliteratureâ, letras, âalso means, simply, âlettersâ, graphic alphabetic symbolsâ. It is not only âliteratureâ in question here, but writing as suchâtexts. Translation, texts and textsâ âmysteryâ are inseparable.
The question therefore arises what it might mean to talk of âtranslated textsâ. This means asking not only which texts count as âtranslatedâ, but also whether texts understood as âtranslationsâ are ontologically different in some way from other texts. The âproblem [âŚ] posed by translationâ, in Borgesâ terms, is the question of what a âtranslated textâ isânot merely in the sense of asking how we define âa translationâ, but asking what, if anything, marks a translated text, as a text, as different from other texts. The answer necessarily has implications for how we understand textualityâthat is, what defines a text as a text, what is âtextualâ about texts. Either a âtranslated textâ is markedly different from other types of text, in which case there are multiple types of textuality, or there is no difference, prompting the further question of how we could distinguish between translations and other types of text.
Despite the highly diverse body of work that composes Translation Studies as a discipline, the link between definitions of translation and textuality remains under-discussed. Similarly, the rise in new theorisations of âworld literatureâ comprises much important work on the question of âtranslatabilityâ, but such studies often focus on how literature or philosophical concepts âtravelâ, rather than the more fundamental question of the relationship between translation and textuality itself (see, for example, Damrosch 2003; Apter 2013). Walter Benjaminâs writings on translation begin to explore these subjects. Jacques Derrida develops, responds to and critiques some of Benjaminâs concerns in his own writing on translation. Despite Benjaminâs and Derridaâs philosophies of translation differing, both writers were interested in translation as a textual, as well as linguistic, phenomenon, and sought to describe the specific nature of the translated text. The current study highlights the extent to which both Benjamin and Derrida suggest a reshaping of our ideas of âthe textâ through their writings on translation.
Benjamin seemingly uses a specific term to describe the nature of translated textsââafterlifeâ. âA translation issues from the originalâ, he writes, ânot so much from its life as from its afterlifeâ (Benjamin 1996d: 254). Derrida (2004b: 83), in his essays on Benjamin and translation, reformulates afterlife as âliving onâ or âsur-vivalâ, and writes that âtranslation is neither the life nor the death of the text, only or already its living on, its life after lifeâ. Translated texts, for both Benjamin and Derrida, are defined by inhabiting a state of âafterlifeâ. To understand what a translated text is, therefore, we need to understand âafterlifeâ.
This study argues that Benjaminâs and Derridaâs concepts of âafterlifeâ suggest that all texts, not just those usually called âtranslationsâ, are involved in a continuous process of translation. It is not simply that all texts are translatable, or that all texts are translated. All texts are continually in translation, continually changing: there is nothing outside translation. The idea of âafterlifeâ as a process of constant translationâhere called âoverlivingââthus necessarily implies a model of textualityâa novel way of understanding what âa textâ is. This model of textuality is complicated through another concept shared by Benjaminâs and Derridaâs thought: the âmessianicâ. For both Benjamin and Derrida, the âmessianicâ refers to something outside current structures of thought; for example, a messianic event could not take place within (what we currently understand as) âhistoryâ. The messianic is an important motif in both Benjaminâs and Derridaâs thought on history, language and translation. While the centrality of the messianic to Benjaminâs thought on language in translation has been well-recognised, this book shows how a full appreciation of the role of the messianic in Benjaminâs and Derridaâs thought on translation is necessarily bound up with âafterlifeâ, and therefore, textuality.
This book therefore has two aims: to show how Benjaminâs and Derridaâs writings on translation suggest a new model of textuality, through the concepts of âafterlifeâ and âthe messianicâ; and secondly, to show how we should understand what âa textâ is, in the aftermath of these ideas. This book develops a concept of textuality that understands texts as defined by an infinite potential for translation. Because the status of this potential as potential is what is essential to textuality, this book also shows that there is no meaning or state beyond translation that is accessible through translation. There is nothing but translation. It is this, however, that reaffirms the inexhaustibility of textualityâs potential.
The concept of âafterlifeâ as a continual process of translation is developed through reading Benjaminâs and Derridaâs writings on translation, language and history. Language and history are our primary foci here as Benjamin and Derrida define these as the parameters within which translation takes place; moreover, both suggest that, in turn, translation is essential to the structures of both language and history. Building on and expanding what is suggested by Benjaminâs and Derridaâs writings on translation, this book emphasises the role of textuality itself as a third parameter. As we will see, both Benjaminâs and Derridaâs writings on translation have wide-ranging implications for the way we understand texts, even if neither writer draws attention to this fact himself.
The implications of our reading of Benjamin and Derrida are illustrated and developed through focusing on the âafterlifeâ of one text in particular: Miguel de Cervantes Saavedraâs El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha, particularly its various rewritings by Borges. Borgesâ Quijote texts provide a particularly apposite exemplar of the nature of âafterlifeâ, as understood here, thanks not only to the fact they are âtranslationsâ or rewritings, but also because Borges repeatedly returns to Quijote, thus demonstrating different aspects of Quijoteâs âafterlifeâ. The multiplicity of rewritings of Quijote, including Borgesâ rewritings, also helps shape our understanding of the relationships between texts in âafterlifeâ, and the idea of âafterlifeâ as an experience of potential, multiplicity and excess. Borgesâ Quijote texts frequently explore questions of translatability and the potential for âanother storyâ, and frame Cervantesâ Quijote as a precursor equally concerned with these ideas. Many of Borgesâ poems, essays and fictions that return to Don Quijote are, essentially, rewritings about rewriting. They therefore help us work through how we might understand âafterlifeâ in relation to individual texts, in addition to its âtheoreticalâ development here through Benjamin and Derrida.
Although, as with Benjaminâs and Derridaâs own writing, the examples used in this study are primarily from âliteratureâ, this is not because the ideas derived here relate exclusively to a particular genre or form of texts. The âliteratureâ of this bookâs title should be understood in the broadest sense. The arguments developed here concern translation and textuality, the very nature of what âa textâ is. The literary texts referred to here help us understand how texts are translated, the nature of translation and the relationships between textsâbut historical, philosophical or scientific texts, for example, are subject to the same conditions of âafterlifeâ described here, as they are texts. In Derridaâs writing, literary texts frequently exemplify or even shape the âphilosophicalâ arguments made, but they do not define or set the limits of those arguments. Similarly, this study uses literary examples which do indeed help shape our understanding of âafterlifeâ, but seeks to claim that overliving, a process of continual translation, affects all textsâbecause of their nature as texts.
Afterlife and Overliving
The term âafterlifeâ comes from Benjaminâs 1923 essay on translation, âDie Aufgabe des Ăbersetzersâ. Benjaminâs (1996d: 254) statement that âa translation issues from the originalânot so much from its life as from its afterlifeâ implies that a text must already be within âafterlifeâ to be translated. âAfterlifeâ makes translation possible. To understand Benjaminâs thoughts on translation, we must therefore clarify what he means by âafterlifeâ. Derrida discusses similar concepts to Benjaminâs âafterlifeâ, âliving onâ or âsur-vivalâ [survie], in his essays on Benjamin and translation, âLiving On/Border Linesâ and âDes Tours de Babelâ. For Derrida, âafterlifeâ appears to be a matter of a text outliving itself. He cryptically writes that âliving onâ is âneither life nor deathâ, and âis not the opposite of living, just as it is not identical with livingâ (Derrida 2004b: 110). In âDes Tours de Babelâ he describes how in a state of âsur-vivalâ, âthe work does not simply live longer, it lives more and better, beyond the means of its authorâ (Derrida 2002: 114). âAfterlifeâ or âliving onâ is a kind of extended life for texts that is bound up with translation, but for both Benjamin and Derrida, it is not merely an âextraâ life given to texts through translation. Benjamin implies a textâs âafterlifeâ must exist prior to translation, while Derrida suggests that, in being neither life nor an opposite of life, âliving onâ is not simply a...