In Western Europe, political discourses in the face of economic challenges usually are fierce, but they mostly result in the same reaction: be it the central banks, the governments or the parliaments, European leaders mostly opt for economic liberalization . Moreover, although Western European countries have particularly idiosyncratic structures in their public discourses on economic liberalization reforms, the outcome of these discourses is strikingly similar. Analyzing discourse in the six Western European countries Germany , France , UK , the Netherlands , Switzerland , and Austria , this book provides systematic empirical evidence that policy-related discourses are much more than noise, they are detailed expressions of institutional complementarity and political struggles.
In Western Europe, economic liberalization has become a focal issue in both popular and scholarly debates. Liberalized markets may be more efficient in satisfying peopleâs needs, but they tend to create inequalities and produce externalities (see Berger 2000). Economic markets thus provoke considerable resentments in the political sphere (Rodrik 1997; Ruggie 2008). In Western Europe, the increasing helplessness of governments to cope with the consequences of permanent austerity, i.e., the fiscal stress induced by demographic aging and a slowdown in economic growth, further amplify conflict potentials (Pierson 2001). Hence, it comes as no surprise that economic liberalization provokes fierce public debates. At the one extreme, economic liberalization is celebrated as pioneering worldwide economic development or even paving the way for a new era of a liberal peace. At the other extreme, it is blamed for undermining both democratic politics and the sustainability of advanced economies (Streeck 2011). This controversy has become especially virulent in the last crisis-prone years, for example in the political struggles between the leadership of the European Union and the recently successful populist left parties in Greece, Spain and other Southern European countries.
This study aims at researching public discourse itself and not its outcomes in terms of political decisions or policy effects. Following Schmidtâs (2008) lead, discourse is thereby understood as the processes in which ideas are conveyed, reflected, and legitimated. By putting emphasis on discourse, this study can simultaneously care for the ideas represented in discursive processes (the substance of discourse) as well as the interactive processes among political actors who generate and communicate these ideas (the structure of discourse) (see MĂŒller 2015). In terms of substance, most of the discourses in Western Europe are heavily internationalized and have embarked on a pro-market mainstream in the twenty-first century. This convergence of the substantial aspects is tightly intertwined with profound changes in Western European economies since the 1970s. At least until the recent financial and economic crisis, globalization and deindustrialization created strong cross-national convergence pressures toward free market prerogatives. In terms of structure, discourse matches the distinct regulatory regimes Western European countries have historically developed (Schmitter and Grote 1997; Huber and Stephens 2001; Schwartz 2001, p. 31). Accordingly, there is a plurality of at least partly conflicting economic interests, which feeds into multiple conflict lines in the national discourses on economic liberalization . This means that the coalitional setting and the intensity of conflicts vary greatly across countries.
The presence of both differences and commonalities in economic liberalization discourses will be addressed by taking a discursive institutionalist perspective (see Hay 2011; Schmidt 2008; McCartney 2009). 1 Further, with public discourse, political contestation in the mass-mediated arena is meant. A discursive institutionalist perspective suggests that we can specify public discourse as a key process how ideas become consequential for institutional change (see Hay 2011; Fioretos 2011, p. 375). As a starting point, it is necessary to trace the ideas that give rise to a particular discourse. Subsequently, as the discourse has become routine, the corresponding ideas become enshrined in the institutional setting of a country (Blyth 2002; BĂ©land and Cox 2011). Under new circumstances, however, the ideas formative to institutions undergo a critical reevaluation and provoke conflicting interpretations by the actors involved in the policy process. Thus, further discourse is provoked, which, in turn, has the potential to reshape a countryâs institutional setting again. The relationship between public discourse and institution should therefore be conceptualized as an evolutionary and interactive process (Campbell 2004; BĂ©land and Cox 2011, p. 10). BĂ©land (2009, p. 710) calls this âsymbolic and institutional translationâ, which involves the enrichment of given ideas inherited from a countryâs particular institutional legacy with new ideas stemming from the iterative and sometimes contentious current discourse. The mass-mediated arena is crucially shaping the perception of the broader public and the political decision-makers in contemporary democracies, a fact that led Manin (1997, pp. 218â235) famously conclude that we live in an âage of audience democracy.â
Public discourse on economic liberalization is an exemplary case to study the outcomes of a discursive institutional process. After the breakdown of the Keynesian mainstream in the late 1970s, monetarist ideas started to become prominent (Hall 1993). At most two decades later, these ideas were so much part of economic policy-making that most observers speak of the next, this time pro-market oriented mainstream (Hay 2001; Blyth 2002). One general finding of this study is that this new mainstream is achieved in distinct ways in the different countries and political arenas. This means that a broad range of oppositional actors is struggling against pro-market reforms with degrees of success varying in accordance with the institutional context. Most notably on the input side of the political systemâwhere political potentials are mobilized, innovative ideas are brought up and policy options are debatedâthe discourse is heavily polarized and opponents of economic liberalization have a strong stance. Hence, the more open public discourse , and the more it serves to coordinate the perceived interests of the actors involved, the more intense is political contestation in the public arena . This also means that the conflict intensity of public discourse sometimes runs contrary to the expectations derived from the comparative political economy literature. For example, contention is higher in the public discourse in Germany than in France , where we usually assume a more contentious style of economic policy-making (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001; Korpi 2006).
The systematic application of the discursive institutionalist perspective allows to bridge gaps between different literature in the comparative political economy. By exploring the structure of public discourse , it finds that both the accessibility and the functionality of public discourse on economic liberalizationâwhether discourse is more coordinative or communicative (see Schmidt 2008)âare conditioned by the broader institutional context. It can thus be shown that institutional frameworks create opportunities and constraints for the production and dissemination of ideas of political parties, interest groups, and public authorities (Schmidt 2002). This study therefore confirms the comparative political economy l...