Environmental Heresies

The Quest for Reasonable

Juha Hiedanpää, Daniel W. Bromley

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781137600820
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137600837
• Topic: Volkswirtschaftslehre
• Subtopic: Umweltökonomie

This book systematically deconstructs the pervasive and counter-productive discourse surrounding environmental policy. The authors argue that environmental policy problems are always framed such that conflict is inevitable—a particular project or policy must be accepted versus a specific environmental asset that must be protected. Over the course of 12 chapters, the authors demonstrate that confident yet contradictory assertions by contending interests preclude necessary deliberation and reason giving. They argue that deliberation is an important social process of reflecting upon the reasons for doing something. Their innovative approach allows discourse and collaboration to continue, until—after honest and informed deliberation—the better way forward is arrived at. This approach to environmental policy illustrates just how very constructive and enabling the quest for the reasonable can be.

© The Author(s) 2016

Juha Hiedanpää and Daniel W. BromleyEnvironmental Heresies10.1057/978-1-137-60083-7_1

Begin Abstract

1. The Consequences of Pragmatism

Juha Hiedanpää¹ and Daniel W. Bromley²

(1)

Natural Resources Institute Finland, Helsinki, Finland

(2)

University of Wisconsin-Madison, Wisconsin, USA

End Abstract

1 The Importance of Understanding Each Other

Grasping a concept is mastering the use of a word (Brandom 2000, p. 6).

I understand pragmatism to be a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of all ideas, but only of what I call “intellectual concepts ”…those upon the structure of which, arguments concerning objective facts may hinge (Peirce, CP 5.467)

The emergence of environmentalism gave rise to a number of ideas and concepts that now frame discussions of environmental policy . Examples include sustainability , biodiversity , global warming, the land ethic , stakeholder , the tragedy of the commons, tropical deforestation , command-and-control, payments for ecosystem services , maximum sustainable yield, and resource rent. Notice that these terms are what the philosopher F.S.C. Northrop (1967) calls concepts by postulation . That is, such concepts—words and phrases—have very explicit meanings that emerge from, and are central to, a specific community of scientific practitioners. By way of contrast, concepts by intuition are immediately apprehensible to everyday discourse. The color blue is a concept by intuition—we know something is blue because we have been taught that the sky and lakes are “blue.” A child will then declare, with obvious delight, that a robin’s egg is also blue. We come to know blue as a word to be applied to objects of a certain familiar color. But blue is also a concept by postulation to a physicist who understands blue by its very specific light absorbing attributes. Those physical properties give off reflected light that physicists, well aware of naming conventions, call blue.

Unlike concepts by intuition , concepts by postulation are the purposeful creation of disciplinary practitioners (an epistemic community) who then invoke those concepts to convey a very specific intellectual idea. These postulations (stipulations) play a very specific and purposeful role in all disciplinary discourse (Wittgenstein 2001). These concepts by postulation become how an epistemic community carries on a conversation. Wittgenstein insisted that language is simply a tool for doing necessary work, and this reminds us that particular disciplines are epistemic communities united by a shared set of linguistic stipulations and conventions. Those conventions are concepts by postulation. As members of a discipline carry on their work, new linguistic conventions (postulations) will emerge as the need arises. A black hole is just such an emergent concept by postulation. Who would have imagined, a few decades ago, the need for such terms as “payments for ecosystem services ” or “biodiversity ”?

Clearly, individuals outside of a particular epistemic community cannot be expected to grasp the precise meaning of concepts such as biodiversity , common property , stakeholder , or sustainability . Interestingly, that rarely prevents them from invoking those concepts in a contentious environmental discourse. When this happens, such terms can become pivotal aspects of policy debates—with the unfortunate result that participants inevitably hold quite divergent understandings of the issues under discussion. In practical terms, these concepts are often introduced as trumps—conversation stoppers. Who can possibly be against sustainability? Who can oppose biodiversity? Who can object to a land ethic ? Who can possibly support policies that are characterized as command-and-control? In other words, many environmental debates are language games purposely designed to obfuscate and to deceive by the artful use of language.

The emphasis here on language and concepts arises because of the urgent need to engage the general public—including government officials—in the necessary quest for clarity about the language and concepts central to environmental policy discussions. Progress on policy debates is impossible in the absence of this shared understanding. This careful attention to the exact meaning of intellectual concepts may seem overly pedantic to those who believe that certain environmental problems—climate change —represent urgent existential threats. Such individuals may grow impatient with efforts to clarify vague language. Ironically, this reluctance to be precise about language is one reason why many serious environmental disputes persist and remain contentious. Climate change is an exemplar in this regard.

At a local level, when a speaker declares that cities or other jurisdictions must become more “sustainable,” the intuitive response is certainly to affirm this claim. But the obvious problem here is what exactly does the speaker mean by “sustainable”? Pragmatism asks us to understand sustainability as some state of affairs that matters. Then the practical state of affairs places constraints or conditions on successful signification—what is sustainability in this particular situation. Perhaps then sustainability policies can be articulated so that others might come to understand precisely what the speaker intends. Charles Sanders Peirce ’s insistence that the primary contribution of pragmatism is its commitment to an honest epistemology suddenly can be seen in a very different light. There is nothing quite as practical as being clear about what is being said. Pragmatism brings a commitment to good-faith efforts to agree on what is being discussed and debated. Here Peirce stands with Wittgenstein who insisted that all philosophical problems are nothing but the problems of meaning making. What, exactly, is the meaning—in practical terms—of claims on behalf of sustainability?

Our purpose here is to demonstrate that pragmatism provides a way out of the inevitable tendency toward conflict. This promising effect emerges because pragmatism pushes antagonists to focus on the reasons being advanced for particular declarative assertions—save this wetland , impose a tax on carbon emissions , preserve more wolves . In the face of such normative demands, pragmatists insist on hearing reasons why these declarative claims should be taken seriously. Why save this wetland rather than another one over there? Why is this wetland more valuable than that one? How shall the optimal carbon tax be computed? What shall be done about the other sources of carbon that are not so easily taxed? Why is it necessary for more wolves to be protected? What, exactly, is the minimum viable number of wolves in this area? How do you know—and here we mean really know—that specific environmental policies will work as alleged? Pragmatism enriches and elaborates the nature of environmental discourse by promoting the asking for and giving of reasons. Richer discourse reduces the tendency to fight.

Depending on the context, reason giving works in several important ways. Notice that there are several classes of “truth claims ” in the above assertions. First, there is a normative declaration —a desired end or goal (save this wetland ). Restated, the truth claim becomes “it would be good to save this wetland .” We call such assertions “truth claims” because they are offered with the aspiration—the hope—of being found true. If the wetland is indeed saved from destruction then a pragmatist would say that the discourse around saving that particular wetland resulted in an outcome in which the truth of the claim—“it would be good to save this wetland ”—was affirmed. The truth claim is revealed to be true. But the truth claim could, with a different outcome for the wetland , be false. If the speaker is unable to bring enough others to her side, and the wetland is eventually paved over, then the truth claim—“it would be good to save this wetland ” is obviously not true. Not all truth claims are true—they merely aspire to be true. The disappointed speaker and her allies may still regard the truth claim to be true. However, they were unable to convince enough others of its truth content. Environmental policy is not about everyone getting their way. Democracy is about affirming those normative claims that manage to bring a sufficient number of others to a winning side. Public policy produces winners and losers.

Second, the truth claim “it would be good to save this wetland ” could be offered as a consequentialist assertion . Here, the meaning of “good” is that if the wetland is not saved, a number of undesirable consequences might result—loss of critical bird habitat, or diminished nutrient filtration that would then increase pollution of downstream lakes and rivers. Once again, if the speaker is able to bring enough others to her side, then her truth claim is indeed revealed to be true. But she may fail.

A third version seen above is an instrumental truth claim —a tax on carbon is the best means to reduce carbon emissions . This truth claim is also aspirational in nature . The instrumental truth claim—“a carbon tax is the best means to reduce carbon emissions”—most likely emerges from a disciplinary specialist, but it could also be advanced by a non-scientist who is merely reporting what other experts have said. An economist is the most likely source of this particular truth claim. But just as above, the truth content of this assertion is only as good as the collective decision concerning carbon emissions. If the political process rejects the idea of a carbon tax, then quite clearly the truth claim about a carbon tax is not true. The economist who advanced the particular claim may remain convinced of its wisdom, but enough others found it insufficiently compelling that the policy advice was rejected. The truth claim turns out not to be true in the eyes of the larger political community. Regardless of what the specific advocate of that policy option may think, the proffered truth claim is not true.

A fourth variety of truth claims combines all three versions—it is normative, it is consequentialist, and it is instrumental. Consider the truth claim—“we should adopt an agenda of sustainability in this city.” The speaker probably believes in the innate goodness of sustainability, the speaker apparently believes that becoming more sustainable will have agreeable consequence for environmental outcomes, and the speaker seems to believe that those improved environmental outcomes will arise because of a reduction in energy use, garbage, and water consumption—among other changes in local behaviors. We might call this fourth variety perspectivism . It is easy to imagine that others in the local community might hold different views on these matters. The task of democracy is to arrive at settled belief about the truth content of contending truth claims—different perspectives.

Indeed, all environmental discourse entails a wide range of contending truth claims . Regardless of the specifics of any particular dispute, all contestations eventually come down to understanding the practical consequences of reasons offered for a particular choice. Why must that wetland be saved? Why do you prefer carbon taxes? Why do you refer to regulations as “command-and-control”? Do you really believe that there is much “command” or “control” in a democratic market economy? The profound contribution of pragmatism, with its emphasis on asking for and giving reasons, is that in the course of contestation over specific environmental issues, extended discourse will reveal that not all reasons are found to be equally good. The obvious advantage of democratic discourse is that reasons, to be accepted as compelling, must be considered good by a significant proportion of individuals engaged in a debate. Reasons cannot just be good to the person advancing such reasons—reasons must be found good by a sufficient number of others pertinent to the ultimate decision. All speakers use reasons to bring others to their side. In a democracy , citizens fight each other with their reasons.

The scope—the discursive possibility space—of reason giving is necessarily bounded by what seems reasonable to others. Richard Bernstein insists that “all reason functions within traditions (1983, p. 130)”—and traditions are simply mental habits . Each of us is embedded in specific customary livelihoods, practices, and language games. The reason individuals engage in reason giving is to find reasons for a specific problematic situation and how to bring about necessary change. And the only reasons that individuals find sufficient for action are those reasons that they come to regard as reasonable. Few people knowingly act on unreasonable reasons. And there you have the reason for our subtitle—we are interested in what is found to be “reasonable.” Throughout what follows we will come back to the idea of what it would be reasonable to do about wolves , about ocean fisheries, about biodiversity , about climate change , about tropical deforestation —indeed about any environmental standoff.

It is to be expected that strict moralists will object that pursuing the reasonable is being too soft on those who wish to cover wetlands with asphalt. And some economists might denounce “the reasonable” as being insufficiently devoted to the pursuit of economic efficiency. But of course it is precisely here that the fighting inevitably gets started. Pragmatists challenge the standard accounts of “good” or “correct” environmental policy precisely because those accounts pay insufficient attention to reason giving —not just particular reasons offered up in serious efforts to persuade, but those contrary reasons advanced by others with different interests. One of the important consequences of pragmatism is the empowerment of many speakers, not just experts. Pragmatists insist that good processes are the necessary precursors to good decisions.

Our focus on reasons and reason giving calls attention to several additional issues. First, we come to the question of what constitutes knowing . What does it mean to know something? In other words, how do people “know” what they claim to know? This question concerns what people believe to be the case.

2 On Knowing

We can only know what it makes sense to doubt (Grayling 1988, p. 94, on Ludwig Wittgenstein ’s philosophy of “knowledge.”)

When it comes to knowing , why is less interesting than how. It is common to be asked: “How do you know that?” We doubt that anyone has been asked “Why do you know that?” The state of knowing something automatically shifts attention to the question of how—by what means—that claimed knowledge was acquired. Did the knowing person read it somewhere? Did someone whisper the alleged knowledge in her ear? Is her knowing the result of some factoid retained since grammar school? Knowing comes from before—it is backward looking as it builds on and adds to...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Frontmatter
• 1. The Consequences of Pragmatism
• 2. The Landscape Ahead
• 1. Concepts and Concerns
• 2. Practices and Problems
• Backmatter