Complexity Thinking for Peacebuilding Practice and Evaluation

Emery Brusset, Cedric de Coning, Bryn Hughes, Emery Brusset, Cedric de Coning, Bryn Hughes

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781137601100
• eBook ISBN: 9781137601117
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book covers the design, evaluation, and learning for international interventions aiming to promote peace. More specifically, it reconceptualises this space by critically analysing mainstream approaches – presenting both conceptual and empirical content. This volume offers a variety of original and insightful contributions to the debates grappling with the adoption of complexity thinking.

Insights from Complexity Thinking for Peacebuilding Practice and Evaluation addresses the core dilemma that practitioners have to confront: how to function in situations that are fast changing and complex, when equipped with tools designed for neither? How do we reconcile the tension between the use of linear causal logic and the dynamic political transitions that interventions are meant to assist?

Readers will be given a rare opportunity to superimpose the latest conceptual innovations with the latest case study applications and from a diverse spectrum of organisational vantage points. This provides the myriad practitioners and consultants in this space with invaluable insights as to how to improve their trade craft, while ensuring policy makers and the accompanying research/academic industry have clearer guidance and innovative thinking. This edited volume provides critically innovative offerings for the audiences that make up this broad area's practitioners, researchers/academics/educators, and consultants, as well as policy makers.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Emery Brusset, Cedric de Coning and Bryn Hughes (eds.)Complexity Thinking for Peacebuilding Practice and Evaluation10.1057/978-1-137-60111-7_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Why Consider New Approaches to Peacebuilding and Evaluation, and Why Turn to Complexity for Answers?

Emery Brusset¹ , Cedric de Coning² and Bryn Hughes³

(1)

Social Terrain Limited, Sudbury, Suffolk, UK

(2)

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway

(3)

Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia

End Abstract

This book addresses the core dilemma that every peacebuilding practitioner has to confront. How do we function effectively in situations that are often fast changing and always complex, when we are equipped with tools designed for neither? To be more specific, how do we reconcile the tension between a programming culture that requires us to use linear causal logic and assumptions in the design of our peacebuilding interventions, with the highly dynamic political nature of the societies in transition that peacebuilding interventions are meant to assist?

This tension is especially apparent and problematic to those tasked to evaluate peacebuilding programmes. ¹ In order to present a potential donor or political incumbent with a clear and persuasive argument as to why a particular peacebuilding intervention deserves their support, those responsible for the design have to simplify complex political and social change processes into simple linear causal frameworks. The linear causal assumptions underpinning these reductionist frameworks are increasingly packaged in neat, single-sentence ‘theories of change’ to make it easier for the funding agency to understand what they are supporting and why. This mainstream practice provides evaluators with a specific set of causal assumptions to analyse, with most evaluations tasked to assess the extent to which a given project achieved what it set out to do.

It should come as no surprise therefore that most evaluations of peacebuilding projects in this day and age follow a remarkably similar logic. They analyse how the money was spent and what it was spent on. They also attempt to answer the question whether the project achieved what it said it would do, within the limited context of the ‘theory of change’ logic.

To use an automobile analogy: a mechanic looked under the bonnet and then drew up a report that showed which parts needed what types of repairs and at what cost in order to function well, all based on the manufacturer’s original designs and official instructions. The report does not worry about whether the designs themselves are appropriate or even if a different mode of transportation altogether might have been a better choice.

These kinds of evaluations serve an administrative purpose: they give the funder the necessary confidence to continue funding such projects, as well as a basis (namely, a few easily rectifiable technical fixes) from which to exercise fiduciary responsibility. In other words, they satisfy the administrative need to demonstrate that accountability is in place.

The problem is that while linear causal logic is well suited for complicated systems such as automobiles, it is decidedly inadequate for examining the highly dynamic and complex social systems that peacebuilding interventions are attempting to influence. ² The contrasts between the ontologies are many, and stark. Peacebuilding evaluations thus have to grapple with matching the linear causal logic inherent in the design with the highly complex social reality they observe, and they have to generate an assessment that meets the funder’s expectations of providing definitive findings and clear recommendations for improvements.

It is this mismatch, and the inherent tensions that it generates in peacebuilding practice, and especially evaluations, that is the focus of this book’s analysis. We explore a new approach to peacebuilding, and peacebuilding evaluation, which augments the growing debate around how insights from Complexity may bring new ideas, methods, and tools to peacebuilding practice and evaluation.

This is an approach which recognises the Complexity that peacebuilding interventions encounter, and that incorporates our understanding of how complex systems function into our methods and approaches, so that we are better able to influence such complex systems. What is more, it can be utilised to monitor and evaluate the effects, intentional and unintended, that our interventions are having on the societies that peacebuilding interventions are trying to assist. ³

This book may serve as the introduction to Complexity thinking for many readers. We offer our own particular take on its implications for peacebuilding, including monitoring and evaluation. We analyse several specific attempts by peacebuilding practitioners to implement approaches informed by Complexity thinking, both in organisations and in international missions, and we share new tools and methods for analysis and engagement that have been inspired by Complexity thinking and practice. The application of Complexity thinking to the peacebuilding field, as well as to evaluation practice, is relatively new. However a body of experience has been slowly building that enables us to study and analyse the results of this new approach. This book represents one of the first attempts to do so.

The Importance of Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation

We argue that the rigours of the Results-Based Management approach force peacebuilding practitioners to apply linear causal assumptions in the design of peacebuilding programmes. The result is programming that is simplistic in its analysis and design, and therefore unlikely to be effective. At the same time there is an increased risk of harmful unintended side effects. ⁴ However, we should not throw the baby (results) out with the bath water (simplistic design). It is important to be clear about what it is we want to achieve, and it is important to assess whether we are achieving our objectives.

Thus, we do not object to the importance of results per se, we are critical of the simplistic linear causal logic that has become the mainstay methodology associated with results inspired Logical Frameworks.

Thus analysing the conventional Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system helps us both to understand what is wrong with the simplistic logic of the linear results system, and to explore the value of alternative results frameworks. A useful starting point may be to revisit the underlying reasons for M&E, so that we can then reassess how best to accomplish those purposes. Is M&E essentially about accountability? Is it, in other words, about making sure that scarce donor resources—the hard-earned tax payer’s contribution—are being used as efficiently and effectively as possible to make a material improvement to the lives of the people these programmes are meant to assist?

While concurring that accountability is important, we maintain, along with others such as Anderson, et al., ⁵ that M&E should also have an important learning function. M&E should be an important part of organisational and institutional learning, and learning is a critical element in the adaptation that needs to take place for programmes to remain relevant in any dynamic and complex environment. Organisational learning is an important sub-theme in this book and the various chapters highlight different facets and experiences of learning and the role M&E can play in helping peacebuilders make sense of, and adapt to, the environments within which they operate.

There can be no doubt that peacebuilding is one of the most challenging types of social interventions conceivable. Peacebuilding interventions take place in times of great social upheaval when even the most basic social institutions are likely to be contested and undergoing transformation. Peace is difficult to codify beyond the absence of violence, and its constituent elements such as justice, security, and good governance are highly contextual. Peace emerges from messy political processes embedded deep within the cultural belief systems of the societies in question. However, its emergence is not automatic, and what may have worked in another context, or in an earlier intervention, can rarely be guaranteed to work again. When peace does start to emerge, peacebuilders have to take into account that the rate for conflict recurrence is estimated to be as high as between 20 % and 50 %. ⁶

Peacebuilding is also typically characterised by a large number of stakeholders that are engaged in attempts to influence the behaviour of the societies experiencing conflict. This means that there is usually a very large number of programmatic interventions being undertaken simultaneously at different levels, by different professional communities, and with widely ranging timeframes. There are also always conflicting notions of what final outcome would be considered desirable, and how best to arrive at such an outcome. When so many different interventions are targeting the same society it is obviously difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the causal effects that one specific intervention may have from the many other causal factors at play.

It is thus highly challenging for evaluation analysts to make strong claims about the effects or impacts any one specific intervention may or may not have in such a highly dynamic and complex environment. However, as long as donors give financial support to programmes that intend to cause a particular effect in a social system, the question of whether that support has had the desired effect is a reasonable and inevitable question. And when we try to answer it, the investigation will have to follow the basic principles of causal inference in social science.

A set of basic standards that are required for evaluations in the field of peacebuilding should not be qualitatively different from the standards used in other areas of evaluation. The challenge lies in isolating linkages between causes and effects in complex social systems where many interventions are simultaneously underway. In addition to the sheer number of causal factors, other complex system effects are also at play, such as non-linear effects, unintended consequences, and feedback loops, as explained in the next chapters. These difficulties point to serious challenges for the design of peacebuilding interventions, and thus also for the methodology of peacebuilding evaluations.

What Is the Contribution of This Book?

Given that we are not the first ones to ponder ways in which Complexity thinking can be harnessed to improve programming and evaluation, what value can we add to the body of knowledge in this space? In the first instance, a diversity of perspective and experience is represented in this book. Not only do the authors come from vastly different parts of the world, operating from the myriad of organisational types spanning government, academe, private sector, and not-for-profit organisations, but also their empirical insights stem from places as varied as the Balkans and Africa. This richness of viewpoint is a key advantage of edited volumes like this one. At the same time it constructively reflects the Complexity of the very complex systems we examine herein.

These diverse perspectives come together as one voice to argue that the traditional peacebuilding design and M&E tools—and inescapably the underlying assumptions on which they are based—are inappropriate and inadequate for the complex environments in which they are meant to function. The issues summarised here indicate the wide array of challenges troubling mainstream approaches. These are the challenges we address head-on in this edited volume.

Causality:

• The struggle to isolate variables, and thus rely on ‘specific problem’ diagnosis to design systems of indicators in environments. These are notoriously difficult to assess with any precision because the conditions are continuously changing and boundaries are blurred;
• The difficult task of analysing causality, and therefore defining influence itself, in situations where multiple and simultaneous factors impact outcomes, often with disproportionate effects;
• The impossibility of arriving at universally agreed-upon conclusions regarding causality in situations marked by multiple and contested stakeholder perspectives on all facets of interventions.

Local voices and capacity:

• The difficulty of situating local actors at the core of designing, planning, and evaluating interventions;
• The dearth of vital local perspectives and insights for evaluations that results from insufficient inclusion;
• The lack of local ownership and empowerment, as well as capacity building, that proceeds from a lack of involvement.

Approaches to M&E:

• The desire for certainty and predictability which leads to rigid, longer-term planning is ill-suited to ever-changing circumstances in which peacebuilding organisations must maintain fluid and tactically undefined objectives to adapt to unintended consequences;
• Cumbersome reporting conventions that espouse lengthy procedures and complicated formats make findings unnecessarily outdated and largely inaccessible to the many stakeholders in need of knowledge generation, while also frustrating practitioners by taking them away from their core business and giving them little say in the matter;
• The wide diversity and specialisation of methods for analysing conflict in a satisfactory way complicates and confuses those working in the space;
• The locking-in of plans with corresponding high-stakes pressure to meet performance indicators creates perverse incentives, including manipulated quantitative indicators, because ‘what gets measured, gets done’;
• A reliance on traditional, Western sources of data (e.g., government reports) in places where such sources are typically the least valid, not to mention least legitimate in the eyes of many local stakeholder groups.

To address these challenges, and to overcome the shortcomings of the traditional peacebuilding design and M&E tools, we turn to Complexity thinking and practice. In the next two chapters we introduce Complexity thinking. In the second part we turn to the application of Complexity thinking to practice by analysing several specific attempts by peacebuilding practitioners to implement approaches informed by Complexity thinking, both in organisations and in missions. And in the last part of the book we share new tools and methods for analysis and engagement that have been inspired by Complexity thinking and practice.

We thus suggest a shift in thinking and practice from the traditional linear Logical Framework (commonly referred to as Log Frame) or associated approaches to designing and evaluating peacebuilding projects, and in its place we suggest an approach that recognises the Complexity of the social systems and institutions that peacebuilding programmes are attempting to influence, and that tries to use the knowledge acquired from the research on Complexity to influence our assumpti...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Frontmatter
• 1. Introduction
• 1. Insights from Complexity Thinking
• 2. Insights from Complexity Practice
• 3. Coping with Complexity
• Backmatter