Jihadist Infiltration of Migrant Flows to Europe

Perpetrators, Modus Operandi and Policy Implications

Sam Mullins

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9783030133375
• eBook ISBN:
  9783030133382
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book explores one of the most topical and controversial issues of recent years –jihadist terrorist infiltration of irregular migrant flows to Europe. Utilizing robust sampling criteria, more than a hundred such cases are identified and rigorously assessed. The analysis reveals the characteristics of offenders, their travel patterns and operational activities, and critically evaluates subsequent law enforcement and judicial responses. The author draws upon interviews with a range of European security officials, as well as non-governmental organization employees, and a recent refugee, in order to provide a series of practical recommendations.

© The Author(s) 2019

Sam MullinsJihadist Infiltration of Migrant Flows to Europehttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13338-2_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Sam Mullins¹

(1)

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany

Sam Mullins

Abstract

This chapter offers a critical assessment of the highly politicized debate regarding terrorist infiltration of the recent wave of migration to Europe. Mullins argues that while on one end of the political spectrum, the threat has been greatly exaggerated, while on the other it has been summarily dismissed. Both historical and contemporary evidence are presented to show that terrorists have long exploited European asylum systems and continue to do so today. Yet, as is also made clear, the extent to which terrorists have infiltrated recent migration flows remains controversial, divisive and poorly understood. The need for systematic and empirical analysis of this issue is therefore particularly acute. As explained in the sections on “terminology” and “methodology”, the book attempts to address this need with an in-depth examination of more than a hundred jihadi “terrorist asylum-seekers” who came to Europe since the beginning of the recent migration crisis in 2011.

Keywords

TerrorismMigrationAsylumRefugeesSecurityEurope

End Abstract

Throughout 2015, the height of the current migration crisis in Europe, an average of nearly 3000 people a day arrived via the Mediterranean —most of them travelling in rickety boats packed far beyond capacity.¹ The vast majority were fleeing from conflict in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, but the migrants came from far and wide and for a variety of reasons—many simply seizing the opportunity to pursue dreams of economic prosperity. Whatever their reason for coming, many were in possession of fraudulent documents or simply had no paperwork at all, and even when there was time to take fingerprints, many refused to cooperate.² The “hotspots ” in Greece and Italy were overwhelmed. The result was that tens of thousands of people were able to enter Europe without being fingerprinted, registered or subject to security checks.³ Even when such checks were performed, they would only yield results if the people in question were registered in European or Interpol databases. This would be unlikely for foreign nationals emerging from the midst of civil war and insurgency, where law and order were largely absent. Such a chaotic situation is clearly ripe for exploitation, but it is also extremely perilous and thousands of migrants lose their lives each year trying to reach European shores.⁴ Yet despite the risks involved, terrorists were quick to seize the opportunity to slip into Europe undetected.

The first public indications that this might be happening date back to October 2014 when the German tabloid, Bild am Sonntag, claimed that US intelligence services had learned that ISIS was planning to dispatch operatives to Europe hidden within the flow of migrants from Turkey.⁵ The article even went as far as to specify that the terrorists would travel in teams of four and would be equipped with falsified passports.⁶ There was, however, a caveat—there was thus far no evidence that such attack teams were already on the way. As it turned out, they were just getting ready.

In the aftermath of the attacks in Paris in November 2015, it soon emerged that two of the attackers, believed to be Iraqis, had come to Europe posing as refugees, entering via the Greek island of Leros on October 3rd that year.⁷ Both men had been photographed and had their fingerprints taken, but with no indication of connections to terrorism they had been allowed on their way. It would later emerge that all of the Paris attackers—with the apparent exception of Brahim and Saleh Abdeslam—had similarly infiltrated the migrant flows to (re)enter Europe beginning in the summer of 2015.⁸ Leaving little to chance, the operational leader of the group, Abdelhamid Abaaoud , had taken care to dispatch a handful of scouts to travel the migration trail in advance—the first of whom were in position in Greece by late December 2014—little more than two months after Bild had raised the alarm.⁹ Of course, ISIS had been planning this for months. As a former hostage of the group who was held from March 2013 until May the following year revealed to Italian investigators, ISIS interrogators had asked “lots of questions about the refugees who sought asylum in Europe… [and] wanted to know how the procedure worked”.¹⁰

Including Abaaoud , at least twenty-seven ISIS operatives connected to the Paris attacks network (eleven of whom were European residents or citizens who had left to join the jihad in Syria) managed to infiltrate Europe posing as refugees before being arrested or killed.¹¹ In addition to the assault on the French capital, they were responsible for the narrowly thwarted Thalys train attack of August 2015 and the bombings in Brussels on March 22, 2016. In total, they claimed 162 lives and hundreds of injuries. These individuals were thus by far the most deadly group of terrorists to infiltrate the recent migrant flows to Europe. However, they are certainly not the only ones to have done so, nor were they the first. In fact, there are cases that date back to the very beginning of the crisis in 2011 when the wave of Mediterranean migrants first began to swell in response to the uprisings in North Africa. The first person to be prosecuted under Italy’s new “anti-foreign fighter” legislation—a Tunisian drug dealer named Louati Noussair—had come to Europe on a migrant boat which arrived at the Italian island of Lampedusa on March 20, 2011.¹² His countryman, the now infamous Anis Amri , who drove a 40-tonne truck through the Breitscheidplatz Christmas market in Berlin in December 2016, travelled the same route, arriving on April 4th.¹³ Less than three months later, a seasoned al-Qaeda (AQ) operative named Ibrahim Harun —a man of “murderous zeal” intent on attacking the West—was apprehended by Italian authorities after arriving on a boat from Libya.¹⁴

Since then, the number of “terrorist asylum-seekers” in Europe has risen quite rapidly and—at the time of writing—not a month goes by without a new case being discovered. Focusing on those who migrated or claimed asylum since 2011, they have so far been responsible for at least thirteen attacks in seven European countries, while some two dozen additional attack plans have been thwarted.¹⁵ They have further engaged in a variety of other subversive activities including recruitment, distribution of propaganda, fundraising and facilitation. Many of these individuals were trained operatives sent to infiltrate migration flows by foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) . As already noted, some of these operatives were in fact long-time European residents and citizens (i.e. returning “foreign fighters ”) who were well known to authorities and could not risk regular means of travel for fear of being detected. The majority, however, have been foreign nationals with no previous ties to Europe for whom there would be little way of knowing they were members of FTOs . Others—such as the aforementioned Tunisians, Louati Noussair and Anis Amri —travelled as more or less legitimate migrants only to radicalize and be drawn to terrorism after their arrival.

In the light of these facts, there is legitimate cause for concern. Yet unsurprisingly, given the collision as it were, of two issues as politically charged as terrorism and migration, confusion and hyperbole abound. It has been suggested, for instance, that at the height of its powers ISIS had orchestrated a “Trojan horse” strategy —simultaneously driving migration flows while systematically infiltrating them in order to destroy Europe from within.¹⁶ Indeed, a number of self-professed ISIS supporters and collaborators have endorsed this theory—most notably an unnamed individual who met with reporters from Buzzfeed in southern Turkey in January 2015. Stipulating that “there are some things I’m allowed to tell you and some things I’m not”, he claimed to have already sent 4000 fighters to Europe posing as aspiring refugees.¹⁷

As was noted at the time, this number seemed “improbably high” and could have been a ploy to “boost the group’s stature and spread fear”.¹⁸ Importantly, just a few months later, IS...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Jihadist Infiltration of Europe Since 2011: An Overview
• 3. Travel
• 4. Operational Activity and Connections
• 5. Investigations and Prosecutions
• 6. Counter-Terrorism
• Back Matter