1
ÎÎœáż¶ÎžÎč ÏΔαÏ
ÏÏΜ (gnáčthi seautĂłn): with these two words Socrates demonstrated, through the usage of philosophical irony, his great philosophical wisdom. And this ironical denial has since Socrates made history. Without desiring to list all those who have taken recourse to the âSocratic irony,â we find it very much present in the author that stands at the center of this volume: the Portuguese Nobel Prize laureate JosĂ© Saramago.
In an entry on May 17, 1993, of his Lanzarote Notebooks ( Cadernos de Lanzarote ), Saramagoâthe future author of, ironically, a novel entitled The Cave , which opens with an epigraph from Platoâs Republicâconfesses: âI understand nothing of philosophyâ (CL 1:42). He will repeat this so-called ignorance on several occasions, stating either that âI have nothing of the philosopherâ (CL 2:197) or âI know very little of philosophyâ (GĂłmez Aguilera 2010, p. 165). These âconfessionsâ must not be taken at face value but, obviously, rather ironically. In fact, at the same time he proclaims to know nothing of philosophy, he repeats, in several talks and interviews, that âour present society needs philosophyâ (ibid., p. 165) and calls for a âreturn to philosophy,â in the sense of a return to âwhat we hope to find in philosophy, that is, reflection, analysis, a sensibility that be critical and freeâ (Saramago 2005). This âreturn to philosophyâ is intended, therefore, as a âreturn to thinking,â to a dimension fundamental to and âinseparable from [,] human natureâ (Saramago 2005) which contemporary society seems to have lost or at least belittled. Philosophy means here, broadly, âa space, a place, a method of reflection,â âsimply a way of feeling life, of living life, which culminates, when it happens âŠ, in peace of mind [serenidade]â (GĂłmez Aguilera 2010, pp. 165, 96â97). In this sense, Saramago even argues that âphilosophy should be included in human rights, and everybody should be entitled to itâ (ibid., p. 471).
This commonsense view of philosophy does not exclude, however, a more concrete interest in actual philosophy, in the âphilosophy of philosophers.â Notwithstanding his ironical confessions of his philosophical ignorance, in Saramagoâs diaries, talks and interviews, there appear sparse but regular references to philosophers and philosophies. For exampleâand leaving aside the already mentioned reinterpretation of Platoâs allegory of the caveâand once more through an ironical confession of his ignorance in philosophy, in a diary entry on September 17, 1994, he avows never to have taken interest in the philosophy of Karl Popper (who had just died) and wonders whether he has thereby missed some important tools to understand the world. The answer is negative, though the real target of Saramagoâs ironical disinterest is Popperâs political â(neo)liberalâviews (CL 2:197â98). In the same vein, on the occasion of the publication of one of Gianni Vattimoâs books in Spanish (Philosophy, Politics, Religion: Beyond âWeak Thought,â 1996), he confesses never to have understood Vattimoâs âweak thoughtâ and especially his many âreconsiderationsâ about itâwhereby, again, Saramagoâs targets are the political impacts of these views (CL 4:229â30).
Not all of Saramagoâs direct confrontations with the philosophy of the philosophers are, however, relegated to the ambit of ironical confessions of ignorance. At times he also goes for a much more direct âshowdownâ with the professional lovers of wisdom. For example, he recurrently attacks Francis Fukuyama for his thesis of the âEnd of Historyâ that triumphally sanctifies neoliberal democracy as the final stage of human evolution (Saramago 1999; CĂ©u e Silva 2009, p. 384). Furthermore, he also criticizes Jacques Derrida for reducing the world to a text or Roland Barthes for his thesis of the âThe Death of the Authorâ (CĂ©u e Silva 2009, p. 101).
Saramagoâs philosophical lineage goes back, rather, to those masters of refined and compassionate rationalism like Montaigne or Voltaire (GĂłmez Aguilera 2010, pp. 139, 219; CĂ©u e Silva 2009, p. 254n85; Baptista-Bastos 1996, p. 33), to an anti- (or pre-)academic philosophy that explored the depths, lights and shadows of the human condition in forms that confound and blend literary genres and academic compartmentalization. It is precisely in this sense that his oeuvre is profoundly âphilosophicalâ (Grossegesse 1999, p. 10; Amorim 2010, pp. 27, 274): like the old masters, his works exercise systematic doubt, iconoclasm and pessimism, recurring to an implacable reason and embracing universal compassion. And this feature of his work has not been overlooked by interpreters and even by some perceptive philosopher: the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj ĆœiĆŸek, for example, has on multiple occasions taken recourse to Saramagoâs novel Seeing (ĆœiĆŸek 2009a, b)âalbeit mistakenly1 (Vanhoutte 2013)2âand even before ĆœiĆŸek , Peter Hallward, the author of one of the more interesting reflections on the philosophy of Alain Badiou, wrote as a side-thought (but we all know that short remarks and quick âby the wayâ comments in philosophy contain the most interesting thoughts) that âSaramagoâs story The Unknown Island (1997) might even be read, up to a point, as an allegory of Badiouâs philosophy in generalâ (Hallward 2003, p. 385n11).3
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The reference to Montaigne and Voltaire is not accidental and helps moreover illuminate a peculiar trait of Saramagoâs work, of which he was well aware. On many occasions he repeated that âprobably Iâm not a novelist; probably Iâm an essayist who needs to write novels because he cannot write essaysâ (Reis 1998, p. 48); âin all my novels,â he stated again, âthere is an essayistic temptation,â and so his books can be considered as âessays with fictional charactersâ (GĂłmez Aguilera 2010, pp. 223, 264). Saramago saw his novels as âthe place of a reflection about certain aspects of life I care about. I invent stories in order to express my concerns, my questionsâŠâ; in fact, he emphasizes, âI donât write books to tell storiesâ (GĂłmez Aguilera 2010, p. 264). Importantly, this âessayistic temptationâ dissolves the divisions and separations between literary genres and transforms the novel into what Saramago himself calls a âliterary spaceâ (espaço literĂĄrio), which, as such, admits everything into his realm: essay, science, historiography, poetryâand also philosophy (CL 4:212; GĂłmez Aguilera 2010, p. 199). Saramagoâs novel is âa total expression,â a sort of summa, a âreunification of all genres, a place of wisdom. It accommodates epic, theatre, philosophical or philosophizing reflectionâ (ibid., p. 263). And perhaps philosophical reflection even takes a leading, unifying role:
I think that here there are reasons to approach what Iâve done not merely from the point of view of literary studies, but also from another point of view, which I wouldnât know how to name, but that has to do with other kinds of inquiries. Is it worth here to name philosophy, or another research of this kind? (Reis 1998, p. 49)
This can be sensed already from the titles of his many books. In fact, as he himself notes (Saramago
2013, pp. 36â37), the titles of his novels are not âappropriateâ to traditional novels and confound genre divisions. His first âmatureâ novel is titled
Manual of Painting and Calligraphy (1977), and the book that made him internationally famous is titled
Memorial do Convento (literally,
The Monastery Memoir, English translation
Baltasar and Blimunda, 1982). Other titles include
The History of the Siege of Lisbon (1989),
The Gospel According to Jesus Christ (1991),
Ensaio sobre a Cegueira and
Ensaio sobre a Lucidez (literally
Essay on Blindness and
Essay on Lucidity, English translations
Blindness and
Seeing , 1995 and 2004). âManual,â âmemoir,â âhistory,â âessayâ and even a âgospelâ: Saramagoâs âliterary spaceâ combines and merges all genres in a critical analysis of the moral, social and political
predicaments of our times, just like Montaigneâs
essays and Voltaireâs
stories and novellas. In the philosophical attempt to explore...