In recent years, feminism has been subject to seemingly contradictory challenges. Despite gender equality gaining widespread recognition through gender mainstreaming 1 policies adopted at local, national and international levels, and wider efforts to improve representation of women in public office and international fora,2 there has been a notable backlash against feminism . The rise of right-wing populism in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and indeed the USA, has threatened womenâs rights. In response, a âfeminist springâ (Healy 2014; Ford 2016) has emerged. In 2016, mass protest against the Polish governmentâs proposal to ban abortion took place, and in 2017, millions worldwide participated in womenâs rallies in response to the election and inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the USA, in a show of solidarity and defence of feminist gains and norms (ABC News 2017).
In this book, we locate these challenges to feminism in two complex ways that both have masculinist foundations and outcomesâfirst in the rejection of feminism as a label and political project, and second, its co-option in the context of neoliberal individualism . In some political, academic, and public discourse , feminism has become a troubled label. Whilst we are witnessing phenomena such as celebrities (Vagianos 2016; Duca 2014; Wasley 2015) and world leaders (Gray 2016) identifying as feminist by articulating their allegiance to equality (see the #HeforShe campaign), there remains strong resistance to both the term and some of its precepts, even when ostensibly advocating feminist agendas. Within the neoliberal context, Scharff has charted a âdisidentificationâ of young women with feminism , where feminism is commonly viewed as extreme (2016). Submissions to the Tumbler page, Women Against Feminism, for instance, clearly associate feminism with misandry. Australian Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop (Liberal Party) has rejected the label of feminism as no longer useful or relevant (Ireland 2014), exemplifying what McRobbie calls âanti-feminist endorsement of female individualisationâ (2004: 257; see also Duca 2014). Such caution demonstrates that popular conceptions of feminism still reduce it to a problem of individual women and men , culturally as well as politically. In a Time Out interview, actor Meryl Streep, following her backing of greater diversity in the film industry, was asked ââAre you a feminist?â Her response: âI am a humanist, I am for nice, easy balance.ââ (Child 2015). Similar sentiment was expressed by female actors in the Hulu miniseries adaptation of Margaret Atwoodâs The Handmaidâs Tale (Smith 2017) who claimed a âhumanistâ, rather than feminist, message.
This substitution of âhuman rights â for âfeminismâ has been identified by Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie as problematic, because it âden[ies] the specific and particular problem of genderâ (2014: 41). In a Vote Compass poll conducted in 2016, Australian male support for gender quotas in parliament was only 22%, with 56% against.3 In the same month, former Prime Minister Tony Abbott accused the Australian Human Rights Commission proposal for organisational gender quotas as âanti-menâ and âpolitically correct rubbishâ (Murphy 2017). Conservative commentators remain resistant to gender -based approaches and interventions in domestic and family violence (Oriel 2016b; see also Chap. 3). The assumption that to be feminist is to discriminate against men , or privilege women, rests on an implicit premise that there is already equality , and feminism aims for something more.
Furthermore, there is a paradox in womenâs complicity in movements such as neo-conservatism or the alt-right that inherently support womenâs subordination. Vladimir Putin, for instance, was more popular among women than men in polls carried out during the 2004 Russian presidential elections, and support has remained consistently strong (Sperling 2015: 44). This also features in liberal western democracies. The British anti-PC newspaper The Daily Mail has the highest volume of female readers (Kirk 2015). Richard Spencer, key spokesperson of the US alt-right movement that gained visibility during the US presidential election campaign of 2016, claims women make up one fifth of the alt-rightâ s membership4 and the rise of âWomen for Trumpâ is evident not only at political rallies but also on social media, where Facebook pages and groups boast thousands of members. The intersection of gender with other axes of hierarchy and complicity with subordination is also exemplified by the 53% of white American women who voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 USA presidential election (Beckett et al. 2016) in âa campaign based on racism, misogyny and bullyingâ (Freeman 2016).
At the same time, the label of feminism is being co-opted towards individualistic but âsafeâ modes of identification, especially in the neoliberal era which is particularly genderblind. In many populist approaches to feminism or post-feminism, the focus has also shifted to âchoice feminism â, with more structural analyses out of fashion (Thwaites 2017; Crispin 2017). Many populist exponents of gender equality promote a form of empowerment that is wedded to managerial, commercial, and practical measures, seen in the success of publications such as Sheryl Sandbergâs 2013 book Lean In: Women, Work and the Will to Lead, and its subsequent movement LeanIn.âorg. Ivanka Trumpâs 2017 book, Women Who Work, likewise offers an aspirational form of female empowerment ,5 which many have critiqued in terms of âneoliberal choice feminismâ (Penny 2017). Additionally, the controversial âfeministâ face that she lends as an adviser to the Trump administration has drawn attention for both its commercialisation and for âproviding a salve for Trumpâs misogynyâ (Valenti 2017).
Assumptions about choice and associating feminism with individual achievement removes much of its political and philosophical content and transformative potential. Furthermore, it promotes the active participation of women in power structures that can be the source of their inequality (Crispin 2017). At its most extreme, we are witnessing what McRobbie calls a complex backlash which differs from that previously articulated by Susan Faludi (1991), in that it both accepts some of the precepts of feminism such as the principle of liberal equality and choice, alongside hostility to feminism , exemplified by the neoconservative âpopulist correctnessâ of Trump and Brexit style rhetoric (Mahadawi 2017), the rise of âAngry White Menâ (Kimmel 2013) or the view that white heterosexual men are the ânew minorityâ (Gest 2016) or âhate target of choiceâ (Oriel 2016a). The undoing of a norm of feminism , then, can be seen from two different directions with similar outcomes, from âthe co-existence of neo-conservative values in relation to gender , sexuality and family life...