âSouth Asia is united by a common thread of misgovernance.â This statement by Sobhan remains as valid today as in 1993 when it was first made. Several reasons account for malgovernance, of which two appear to be crucially important: lack of accountability on the part of those responsible for governance, and lack of any ârealâ stakeholder involvement in the process of governance. The issue of accountability , however, has long been recognized and debated in different forums. Although substantial disagreements still exist on the âappropriateâ way of ensuring accountability , the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in different countries of the region can be seen as an essential first step toward securing an accountable governance system. South Asia, as a whole, is more democratic now than at any time in the past. Most of the countries in the region, however, can be labeled as âelectoralâ democracies. Some major difficulties still discourage their transition from âproceduralâ to âsubstantiveâ democracies, although these are not equally noted in different countries.
For example, while in Bangladesh the lack of agreement between the government and the mainstream opposition on the process of government succession remains a stumbling block, the over-dominant role of the military in the political process in Pakistan seriously affects consolidation of the nascent democratic process. In Nepal, after years of trial and tribulation, the dominant elites appear to have reached a compromise and a new constitution providing for the inclusion of all important groups in society has been adopted. Although some groups still express resentment, the adoption of the new constitution can be seen as a major step toward democratic consolidation . Bhutan has had a new democratic beginning since the monarch decided to introduce a parliamentary system of government by decree in March 2008. Two parliamentary elections have been held since 2008 without any allegations, as in some other countries, of vote rigging or irregularities. More importantly, the party which won the first elections in 2008 was comprehensively defeated by the main opposition in the second elections in 2013, and there was an orderly succession of government.
Overall, nowhere in the South Asian region can one find a country run by a military dictator. Nor is there, apparently, any serious threat to the democratic system by âanti-systemâ opposition. Notwithstanding differences of opinion, democracy appears to have greater acceptability among the majority of the population and particularly the elites. In fact, the presence of the democratic system itself can be considered as an improvement considering South Asiaâs turbulent history. The mere existence of a democratically elected legislature can provide a passive check on the executive, forcing it to anticipate the assemblyâs reaction to a proposed course of action (Hague and Harrop 1982). Democracy implies the existence of a pluralistic political order where different non-governmental actors and agencies exist and provide some kind of check on the abuse of power by those formally responsible for governance. Besides, international concern with dysfunctional consequences of misgovernance has prompted different countries in the region to move toward introducing new accountability mechanisms and/or making the existing ones work, at least up to a certain extent.
However, although the issue of accountability has received some attention, the other issueâlack of stakeholder inclusion in the governance processâhas long remained neglected. It has, however, received special attention in recent years, especially since the restoration of democracy. Democracy requires accountability by those with power and more participation for those without. Inclusive governance has been referred to as a governance mechanism that includes active participation of all citizens, particularly marginal groups such as the poor and women. According to UNDP (2007):
To be inclusive is a core value of democratic governance , in terms of equal participation, equal treatment and equal rights before the law. This implies that all people â including the poor, women, ethnic and religious minorities , indigenous peoples and other disadvantaged groups â have the right to participate meaningfully in governance processes and influence decisions that affect them. It also means that governance institutions and policies are accessible, accountable and responsive to disadvantaged groups, protecting their interests and providing diverse populations with equal opportunities for public services such as justice, health and education.
Inclusiveness has different dimensionsâsex, race, color, ethnicity, region, religion, economic base and political orientationânot all of which can be dealt with simultaneously or given equal attention. There is therefore a need for prioritization. Moreover, inclusion does not automatically generate better results; what is needed is the creation of scope for the engagement of diverse groups of people in the governing process. The involvement of stakeholders is considered to be necessary for making the governance process more broad based. It should encompass all groups. Those involved with governing a country do not have equal access to influence and power. In almost all governing institutions, power is unequally distributed, with some exercising greater influence than others, and many remaining outside the formal scope of power. To be inclusive, one has to take into account the importance of involving not only individuals and institutions that remain outside the formal machinery of governance; inclusive governance will require the involvement of different groups within the same institutional setting.
For example, generalists, who have traditionally dominated the civil service/administrative system and monopolized policy positions, need to accommodate professionals/specialists to ensure inclusive governance. Exclusion breeds discontent and may even cause outright conflict among different groups within administration/government. Similarly, many Westminster-derived parliaments , which have traditionally followed majoritarian principles in decision-making, have in recent years devised mechanisms to include the âexcludedââgovernment backbenchers and opposition membersâthereby trying to make parliament a more inclusive institution. Public consultation on different issues that confront parliament including pre-legislative scrutiny of public bills, which has become institutionalized in the West, is also seen as an important step to make the legislature more inclusive than before. However, a judiciary cannot be inclusive in the same way as the other two branches, i.e. including outsiders in decision-making; it has to be functionally inclusive and also accessible. An inclusive judiciary refers to the idea of an able and willing judiciary that enforces the rules to ensure inclusiveness in the other two organs of the state. Inclusive governance will specifically require diminution of inequality in gender influence. Women remain seriously disadvantaged vis-Ă -vis men in almost all governing institutions . Although some improvements have been made over the years, mainstreaming gender in different governing institutions in South Asia still appears to be a challenging task (see Ahmed 2018 forthcoming).
The involvement of both insiders and outsiders cannot be seen as mutually exclusive; one can reinforce the other. The inclusion of insiders is needed to generate better outputs, while making outsiders (stakeholders) part of the governing process is likely to make outcomes more effective. However, inclusion alone cannot always ensure the optimum outcome. To be effective, those responsible for governing have to remain accountable for their actions. In other words, inclusive governance cannot always guarantee accountability . The involvement of outsiders may make the governing process more broad-based, but it cannot ensure that âgovernorsâ will be accountable. It is not unlikely that the more those âwithout powerâ (outsiders) interact with those âwith powerâ (âdominantâ insiders), the more they are likely to behave in a similar manner, and may try to avoid responsibility. There is thus a strong case for bringing stakeholders associated with inclusive governance under the framework of accountability . Gilman proposes a multi-pronged strategy that recognizes both the power of traditional government as well as broader definitions of governance that encompass a range of civic actors. This includes thinking beyond efficiency, for example, service delivery , toward effectivenessâmore accountable, transparent, inclusive, participatory, representative and responsive governance (Gilman n.d.).
There is, however, no one best way of ensuring accountability . Traditionally two different approaches to accountability have been emphasized, with one stressing the need for eliciting responsible behavior, and the other focusing on the importance of enforcing it. The first approach, expounded by Carl Friedrich , eulogizes the value of moral responsibility , while the other, popularized by Herman Finer , considers political responsibility to be more important. Referring to the need to elicit responsible conduct, Friedrich observed:
Responsible conduct of administrative functions is not so much enforced as it is elicited. It has been the contention all along that responsible conduct is never strictly enforceable, that even under the most tyrannical despot administrative officials will escape effective control â in short, the problem of how to bring about responsible conduct of the administrative staff of a large organization is, particularly in a democratic society, very largely a question of sound work rules and effective morale (1966, p. 240).
Finer , however, distinguished responsibility as an arrangement of coercion and punishment, in contrast to Friedrich who believed in reliance upon responsibility as a sense of responsibility that was largely unsanctioned, except by deference or loyalty to professional standards (Finer 1966, p. 248). He found the need for strengthening external political control to be a means for exacting responsibility and criticized Friedrich for neglecting its importance, arguing that: âHe [Friedrich] gives the impression of stepping over the dead body of political responsibility to grasp the promissory incandescence of the moral varietyâ (Finer 1966, p. 254). Finer, like Friedrich, also agreed that some latitude be given to administrationâboth owing to the technical impossibility of complete political coverage and the wise recognition that the permitted latitude could be used for technically good policy (Fine r 1966, p. 257). But he differed with the latterâs proposal that auxiliaries could be an alternative to political/legislative control. In such a context [absence of political control], âa self-serving, self-perpetuating bureaucracy would be the principal receptacle of power and knowledge, leading to a government of the technocrats, by the technocrats and for the technocratsâ (Kearney and Sinha 1988).
This classic debate that took place between Friedrich and Finer in the 1940s still remains valid as governments across the world struggle with the issue. Both approaches have some limits, and there is a need to adopt measures that are aimed at balancing the effectiveness of the two. If internal mechanisms, particularly hierarchy, become weak or ineffective, external mechanisms of accountability are unlikely to have much relevance. One of the important reasons that accounts for the rise of âunaccountableâ administration in many emerging democracies is the gradual weakening of hierarchy that mostly results from the tendency to politicize administration. One can notice some kind of fusion of (narrow) political and bureaucratic interests in many countries. Sobhan explains the causes and consequences of such politicsâbureaucracy collusion in Bangladesh affecting administrative discretion and autonomy in the following way:
⌠attempts to politicize the administration have been compounded by the compulsions of the administration to seek political patronage in order to advance their bureaucratic career. This has led to a collusive link between bureaucrats and politicians whereby bureaucrats transfer their political loyalty from one regime to the other to cover up their corruption and incompetence and to seek advantage over more professional minded colleagues who are dishonestly denounced as being loyalists of the previous regime. This attempt to seek political patronage to promote bureaucratic advancement is encouraged by political leaders who believe, quite erroneously, that they can build a coterie of politically loyal bureaucrats from the local administration upwards to serve both party and personal interests. This process neither builds a politically reliable nor an efficient administration but merely perpetuates misgovernance. (2007, p. 121)
The institutional capacity of the bureaucracy to govern has gradually declined mostly as a result of politicization. Party politicians are more interested in using the bureaucracy to serve political purposes than to strengthen it. This is ...