1.1 Awkward Partners in Regional IntegrationâDefinitions and Applications
The adjective awkward is defined in the Cambridge dictionary as difficult to do, use, or deal with. Our interest in this book lies in the third aspect, being difficult to deal with; we are seeking to understand when, why, and with which consequences states that join regional integration processes, but routinely stay outside the mainstream in their particular regions, are perceived as awkward by their partners. What and who determines when a state is considered awkward? How does this judgement impact on such statesâ ability to achieve their objectives? To what extent does it impact on the region itself? Is there anything significant that can be generalised across instances of awkwardness in a given region, or regions in general?
The idea of an âawkward partnerâ originated in EU studies, when Stephen George (1998) used it to encapsulate the UKâs relationship with European integration in general and the EU in particular. As we collaborated on this book, the UK voted in its referendum of 23 June 2016 to leave the EU; this is the most obvious case of regional awkwardness in a long history of strained relations between London and Brussels (Wall 2008). Never before has a Member State of the EU voted to leave the region; never before has a Member State obliged its partners to grapple with what secession from the EU should mean for the EUâs single market or for its extramural relations with wider instances of European integration, such as the European Economic Area and Council of Europe. 1 This is, then, the paradigm case of being an awkward partner in Europe, and may remain its epitome/nadir for some considerable time.
However, the UK is not the only awkward state in European integration. Within the EU, other states regularly sit outside the policy mainstream with opt-outs (e.g. Denmark and the single currency). Others routinely throw spanners in the works by rejecting EU Treaties (Ireland) or blocking significant policy reform over decades (e.g. France and the Common Agricultural Policy ). The Czech Republic, like the UK , refused to sign up to the 2012 Fiscal Treaty. But such states are not automatically considered âawkwardâ by their partners, despite causing significant political and/or policy challenges. Why is this, and how do such states avoid the label?
Moreover, other instances of regional integration across the globe also include awkward partners, and although the two phenomena are not synonyms, differentiated integration (in which states opt-out of regional policy, or gain sometimes time-limited exemptions from it) may be a near-universal feature of regional integration (Warleigh-Lack 2015). There has thus been a revival of interest in the concept of awkward states in regional integration processes, and recent studies have attempted to refine the concept so it can be applied comparatively (Murray et al. 2014). That said, research in the area is nascent, and requires both greater empirical depth and greater conceptual refinement.
Using the Nordic cases in this book, we aim to explore how well, and how far, the concept of awkwardness can travelâthat is, the extent to which it is a useful concept in helping to understand a stateâs relationship with a regional integration process of which it is part, and what it can reveal about the nature of the region in question. We also want to investigate whether the Nordic cases can help generate more refined conceptual thinking about the phenomenon of awkwardness. In relation to the Nordic case(s) how, when and to what extent is awkwardness a useful descriptor?
In this book, then, we focus primarily on the empirical issues, exploring five cases of awkwardness in European integration in an attempt to systematise evidence in a way which could eventually feed into a process of conceptual or theoretical refinement (see below). We explore the Nordic states through three dimensions in relation to the âEUâropean integration process; these dimensions are identity , economic, and political (security) matters. This allows us to take awkwardness further as the dependent variable, exploring a range of independent variables which is held constant across our cases. We use Murray et al. (2014) cluster of independent variables (see Table 1.1. below).
Table 1.1
Independent variables of awkwardness
Independent variable | Relevance | |
|---|---|---|
1 | Relationship with extra-regional security guarantor | The relationship may be privileged over regional ties by the state. |
2 | Elite view of state identityâas âdifferentâ from the region | May colour state actor perception of what is necessary/feasible in the region |
3 | Popular scepticism towards or opposition to participation in the region | May limit the room for manoeuvre or capacity to bargain |
4 | Internationalisation by state actors of regional values and norms | If inadequate, this may produce cognitive dissonance in the region and/or sense of difference from partner state actors |
5 | Policy preferences | If consistently different it may increase perception of alterity |
6 | Perception of potential gains from cooperation by state with regional partners | If considered few or minor this preclude (significant) compromise |
7 | Attempts to create material and tangible alliances | May diminish perceptions of awkwardness with regional partners |
8 | Regional agenda-setting efforts | Reveals whether and how a state seeks successfully to overcome political marginality in the region |
The first independent variable is the relationship the state in question has with an extra-regional security guarantor, if pertinent. What is this relationship like, and why? Is it privileged over the regional ties the state has with other states in its neighbourhood? The second independent variable focuses upon the elite view of state identity in our selected countries, and on whether and how such identity is considered to cohere with that of the region. This is of interest as it may colour state actor(s) perceptions of what is necessary and or feasible within the region. The third independent variable is that of public or popular scepticism towards participation in the regional integration project. If there is scepticism within the population this may limit the political eliteâs room for manoeuvre or limit the eliteâs capacity to bargain, or even be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations. Related to the previous independent variable is the fourth one, namely whether and how state actors internalise a regionâs norms and values. If there is a (large) discrepancy in relation to the regionâs norms and values this may produce cognitive dissonance within the region and/or a sense of being different from partner state actorsâa view which may be shared, and viewed as problematic, by the partner states in question.
The fifth independent variable is that of policy preferences: are there persistent differences between the choices of an awkward state and those of its partners, and does this increase the perception by the latter of the formerâs alterity? The sixth independent variable regards the stateâs perception of potential gains from cooperation with its regional partners. If the potential gains are considered few or minor this may mean the state is unwilling to make significant compromises with its partners. The seventh and penultimate independent variable is whether the state under the microscope attempts to create deeper material or tangible alliances with other partners, either within the regional integration...