In September 2007, as ASEAN was drafting its first Charter, thousands of Buddhist monks and members of the public marched in downtown Yangon in a show of opposition to Myanmarâs ruling military junta. The crackdown was swift and brutal; monks were beaten and detained, monasteries were raided, and riot police used tear gas and live ammunition on the crowds. The official death toll was fifteen, but many observers believe that far more were killed. International condemnation followed, and many observers criticised ASEAN for not doing more about the political situation in its problematic member state (e.g. Davies 2012).
ASEAN had been reluctant during the previous decade (following Myanmarâs admission as a member in 1997) to exert more pressure on the junta to ease its repressive tactics. However, following the September 2007 incident, ASEAN leaders were uncharacteristically outspoken. Then ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong acknowledged that â[t]he world is outraged after the shooting of monks by soldiersâ (quoted in De Clercq 2007). George Yeo, then Foreign Minister of Singapore (which was the ASEAN Chair that year), claimed that he and the other ASEAN foreign ministers felt ârevulsionâ and were âappalledâ at reports of automatic weapons being used against demonstrators (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). This was significant; by being openly critical, the Foreign Ministers challenged the ASEAN norm of ânon-interference in the internal affairs of one anotherâ (ASEAN 1976, art. 2(c)). Two months later, in November 2007, the ASEAN Charter was adopted. It included multiple references to democracy and human rights as core principles and purposes of the organisation, and stated that ASEAN would create a regional human rights commission. This was despite the fact that most member states are not democratic, and only half have national human rights commissions.
This book traces the processes through which the ten ASEAN member countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) agreed to promote the liberal norms of democracy and human rights. These norms have now become standard references in ASEAN rhetoric. The book argues that the leaders of these ten countries are particularly concerned about appearancesâabout the way ASEAN is perceived by the outside world. Some countries, such as Indonesia and Singapore, seek to project the image of liberal democracies and good global citizensâand they want ASEAN, as a regional organisation which represents them, to embody this image.
More broadly, the book argues that regional norms are shaped by competing perceptions of legitimacy. Legitimacy refers here to the social judgments of an entity as appropriate, proper or desirable, within a particular institutional environment (Coleman 2007, 21; Suchman 1995, 574). ASEAN rhetoric is shaped by political elitesâ perceptions of how those outside the region (including states and interstate organisations) view the legitimacy of the regional organisation and its norms; the book refers to this as external regional legitimacy (ERL). Thus, for example, the international outrage over Myanmarâs crackdown on protesting monks brought ASEANâs concerns about ERL into sharp relief, as indicated by Yeoâs statement above. These concerns influenced the member statesâ decision to establish a regional human rights body, which they believed would be an important mechanism to improve the legitimacy of ASEAN and its norms, as perceived by extra-regional actors.
ASEAN member states agreed to democracy and human rights as key regional principles . But their acceptance of this rhetoric is not necessarily evidence of the internalisation of democracy and human rights norms ; rather, it is driven by their perceptions of legitimacy, and concerns about the reputation, credibility and image of ASEAN. State leaders have varying understandings of the meanings of democracy and human rights, and discussion about these meanings is assiduously avoided in ASEAN dialogue. The references to democracy and human rights in ASEAN statements and key documents such as the Charter are construed broadlyâas agreed-upon aspirations or objectives. This makes it easier to achieve consensus (which is required in ASEAN decision-making ) about the need to employ this rhetoric.
It also enables member states to participate in the institutionalisation of human rights . ASEAN members have agreed to several human rights initiatives since the adoption of the Charter; they established the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in 2009 and the ASEAN Commission on the Rights of Women and Children in 2010. They also adopted the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers in 2007, and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012. However, the norm of decision-making by consensus means that member states are able to agree to the institutionalisation of human rights at the regional level, without making any particular promises to undertake domestic reform, or being concerned that their human rights records will be closely scrutinised.
Thus, the extent to which these liberal norms of democracy and human rights reflect the realities of domestic politics and societies is open to question. Myanmar is certainly not the only ASEAN member state with a poor human rights record âin fact, most members have been criticised in regard to human rights by international organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Freedom House, and by governments of states outside the region. Moreover, democracy is absent or struggling in most Southeast Asian states; there is much evidence of backsliding (retreating from or eliminating democratic rule: Bermeo 2016) in the region. The academic literature on democratisation tends to assume that democracy spreads and has universal appeal, and that once a democratic transition occurs, a state will make linear progress towards consolidated democracy (e.g. Diamond 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996). However, the Southeast Asian experience challenges these assumptions, making it a fascinating case study for exploring the appearance of the adoption of liberal norms .
The adoption of democracy and human rights as key principles of ASEAN presents a critical puzzle. Liberal rhetoric in ASEAN raises questions about the centrality of language to reputation, legitimacy and public acceptance of regimes. This book interrogates that rhetoric, and critically analyses the implications for our understanding of politics and regionalism in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world. The fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of ASEAN in 2017 renewed interest in the debate about what ASEAN has achieved, and the role it plays as a representative of its member states and as an international actor. There is a clear tension between ASEANâs aspirational language in regard to democracy and human rights, and the backsliding of both democracy and human rights in the region.
Regional organisations are commonly seen as focused on facilitating integration among their member states. ASEAN is an interesting case in that it was motivated by policy coordination in the interests of stability and economic prosperity, but not necessarily integration. As such, it was consciously designed in a manner distinct from the European Union (EU), the most highly institutionalised and legalised regional organisation, and also the most extensively studied by regionalism scholars. The integration project conceptualised in post-war Europe required far more common ground in regard to domestic governance. As such, the so-called Copenhagen Criteria for admission to EU membership require states to be liberal democracies with market economies and good human rights records.
In contrast, ASEANâs membership criteria do not refer to any particular regime type; they refer only to the need to be located in Southeast Asia and to accept the obligations of membership as set out in the ASEAN Charter. The norm of non-interference traditionally entails that member states refrain from criticising, or even publicly commenting on, each otherâs domestic affairs; this reflects the motivation at the time of ASEANâs founding (in 1967) to stay out of each otherâs state-building projects. The locus of decision-making resides with the individual member states, particularly their foreign ministries. ASEAN is a forum for consultation and negotiation more than a collective actor.
In more recent years, the non-interference norm has been challenged, particularly by humanitarian crises (e.g. the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar), which have provoked international criticism of ASEANâs role vis-Ă -vis its member states. ASEAN has also been forming plans to become a ârules-basedâ organisation, and thus (ostensibly) more institutionalised (Goldstein et al. 2000, 387). Some scholars argue that ârhetoric-action gapsâ are typical of ASEAN (e.g. Collins 2013); the question thus arises whether ASEAN real...