In this chapter, we provide a detailed case study analysis of two countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, to better understand the microlevel dynamics involving our second key explanatory variable: the occurrence of a food crisis. Due to the variance of urban development in the country, Pakistan—the case analyzed in the previous chapter—is instrumental in illustrating how the temporal variations in urban development per capita levels corresponded to the frequency of anti-regime demonstrations and, correspondingly, the probability of state-led mass killing campaigns during food crisis episodes. Unlike in the case of Pakistan, urban development per capita levels in both Indonesia and Malaysia were stable and relatively high. As we show more systematically below, the degree of urban development per capita in both countries is relatively high throughout their entire respective nondemocratic regime spells: 1976–1998 in Indonesia and 1978–2009 in Malaysia.
Although urban development levels in these countries remain constant over these respective periods, however, they differ markedly on the frequency both experience food crises. In Indonesia, severe food crisis episodes do not occur prior to 1996, but then happen repeatedly between 1996 and 1998. Therefore, in contrast to Pakistan, Indonesia offers us a natural experimental treatment on our second key explanatory variable, the outbreak of food (particularly crop) output crises, which occur in the context of a high level of urban development per capita during the 1996–1998 period. According to the theoretical argument presented in Chapter “Food Crises, Urban Development, and Mass Killing in Nondemocratic States,” the frequency of collective mobilization in major urban areas against the country’s military regime, led by General Suharto, should increase significantly during the food crises that occur after 1996. Moreover, and again according to our theoretical argument, we expect to see that such overt challenges (i) were perceived by the Suharto regime as an existential threat, which, and (ii) motivated the nondemocratic regime to employ mass killing campaigns against urban civilians to maintain power.
In contrast to both Pakistan and Indonesia, Malaysia, which was observed as a nondemocratic state within the entire temporal period of our analysis (1977–2009), did not experience any serious food crisis episodes. However, as shown in the latter half of this chapter, civilians residing in important cities, especially the capital Kuala Lumpur, have frequently protested against the single-party Barisan Nasional ’s (BN’s) rule and its political grip. Further, these protests occurred within the context of relatively high levels of urban development per capita, but in the absence of food crises. Hence, the Malaysia case provides us with the appropriate empirical background to evaluate the theoretical prediction stated in Corollary 2: that in the absence of food crises, large urban areas would still experience protests and mass killing, although these will be much lower in frequency and intensity, respectively.
The rest of this chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section includes a mixed-methods analysis of food crises, anti-regime demonstrations, and mass killing in Indonesia. We begin with an overview of the political and economic history of the country since independence, with a particular focus on the agrarian sector. We then discuss trends in both urban development per capita and the outbreak of food crises over the 1976–1998 period. Next, we discuss in detail primary and secondary historical evidence to see how the sudden onset of food crises in Indonesia concatenates with sufficiently high levels of urban development to increase (i) the frequency of overt civilian opposition to Suharto’s regime and (ii) the latter’s strategic decision to conduct mass killing campaigns as a preemptive strategy to maintain its political rule. Finally, as we did in the case study analysis of Pakistan, we report a detailed within-country statistical analysis of 14 cities in Indonesia to illustrate how the interaction of urban development per capita and the occurrence of food crises impact the probability of (i) anti-government demonstrations, and (ii) localized state-led mass killing.
In the second part of this chapter, we turn to analyze the case of nondemocratic Malaysia. Again, we begin with a summary of the political and economic history of the country, with a particular focus on the agrarian sector. We then provide an illustration of the history of urban development in the country, starting in 1977. Having showed these trends, we conduct a detailed historical analysis of primary and secondary sources, focusing on some key examples of the linkages between high urban development and collective mobilization against the ruling elite; and how the latter responded to such mobilization efforts. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion of our main findings.
Indonesia: A Concise Overview
Indonesia is a prominent developing country. It has the largest economy in Southeast Asia, which is larger than both Pakistan’s and Malaysia’s in nominal GDP terms. 1 Indonesia is also an important emerging developing market and is considered a key player in the G-20 group of nations (Schwarz 1994; Hill 1999; World Bank 2010). Similar to most developing countries, Indonesia’s economy is characterized by a division of labor between formal and informal sectors, and an uneven distribution of wealth and income (Hill 1999; World Bank 2008, 2010). The formal sector is based on mining, manufacturing, services, and agriculture and is relatively well developed. Yet, as we discuss below, the country’s agricultural sector is weighted heavily toward production of staple crops for food consumption and as such, it is a central part of the country’s economy.
Indonesia made a transition to a full-fledged democracy in 1999 (Eklöf 1999; Philpott 2000). However, prior to 1999 the country was ruled by several military regimes and is thus observed as an authoritarian regime (McDonald 1980; Mulder 1996; McLeod 1998). Between the end of World War II and 1998, Indonesia, a former Dutch colony, was ruled by only two presidents: Sukarno and Suharto. Sukarno, the main political leader of the independence movement and Indonesia’s first president, forged a national identity through his ideals of Pancasila.
Mohammed Suharto, a general, established a military dictatorship in Indonesia in 1965 after taking control of the executive’s office via a violent coup (McLeod 1998; Philpott 2000). As the newly appointed “commander for the restoration of security and order,” Suharto oversaw the military’s retaliation (Mulder 1996; Eklöf 1999; Philpott 2000). Formal titles bestowed over the next few years provided evidence of his control of the government. He was granted executive powers in 1966, was named acting president in 1967, and was finally formally established as the country’s president in 196...