Altogether, the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis , the WTOâs Doha Development Round breakdown, the collapse of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, so-called Brexit, and Donald Trumpâs promise to protect and âMake America Great Again,â mark a critical milestone for the global economy, trade, and the political order as determined by the United States over the past 70 years.
Since 2001, China has been emerging in the world economy; and more recently with the BRI, China is expanding its government-sponsored âGoing Globalâ development programs in size and in scope as part of the global âChina Dreamâ objective. The BRI, with its âSilk Road Economic Beltâ and âthe Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road,â is now the largest platform for international cooperation, reflecting the new approach of Chinaâs development and diplomatic strategy.
The basic idea of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is to consolidate and upgrade a dense network of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) into a multilateral arrangement, anchored by Chinaâs gravitational pull and vast open market (see Chap. 5). The BRI focuses on using the âbeltâ to link China to Europe through Central Asia and Russia; to the Middle East through Central Asia; and to Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The âroad,â meanwhile, aims to connect China with Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean; and with the South Pacific through the South China Sea. Covering 65 countries and reaching more than 60% of the global population, accounting for nearly a third of global GDP and global merchandise trade, and 75% of its known energy reserves, the BRI is the most ambitious example of global economic statecraft in the twenty-first century.
The BRI is essentially a new global architecture designed by China to frame its new role as a leading world power. It is also a massive project involving the funding and construction of an infrastructure system of roads, railways, oil and natural gas pipelines, fiber-optic and communication systems, ports, and airports. But the BRI is far more comprehensive since it covers cooperation in all aspects, from policy dialog to trade, from financial cooperation to people-to-people exchange. The costs of the BRI, an estimated US$800 billion, will mainly be funded by China and supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB).
By May 2017, 22 countries had signed the BRI Memorandum of Understanding , and 29 heads of state attended the first BRI forum in Beijing. Most of the attendees were from small developing states in Asia, such ASEAN and Central Asian countries. This gives early signs of China emerging as a great power. Because BRI threatened the Western political framework, the major great powersâin contrast to the smaller and poorer countriesârejected or objected to the BRI , including the United States, the EU, Japan, India, and Australia (see Chap. 10). Their common primary concern is about the BRIâs strategic role and the political purpose of infrastructure building. Also raised are economic concerns about debt and financial risk, and environmental and social concerns.
This book is among the first to examine the BRI , or One Belt, One Road (OBOR, for consistency and to reflect the latest name change by the Chinese government, we will use BRI as the main term throughout), in a systematic, multiperspective, and politically and ideologically unbiased way. Authors from East and West present the most prominent facets of the BRI through geopolitical, economic, business, legal, and social lenses. Over 30 scholars with roots in five continentsâAsia, America, Africa, Europe, and Oceaniaâanalyze the BRI and provide insights to its past, present, and future, and its impact on the world economy, regions, and specific countries along the BRI.
This gives a comprehensive overview for practitioners, academics, and politicians on BRI in terms of: (1) major fields of interest; (2) purposefully selected countries; and (3) effects and their causes. This book can also be used as a multiperspective China-developed countries and China-developing countries case study for teaching in the field of geopolitics, business, economicsâin particular on FTAs, foreign direct investments, and culture. Following this logic, the book is organized into four broad sections: Part IâContextual Overview of the Belt and Road Initiative; Part IIâRegional and Geopolitical Perspectives; Part IIIâInternational Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and BRI; and Part IVâFinancial, Legal, and Cultural Perspectives on the BRI.
1 Part I: Contextual Overview of the Belt and Road Initiative
Chapters 2 and 3 are by political scientists and experts in international relations and provide the geopolitical context for this study. Francis Schortgen from University of Mount Union (USA) discusses how BRI marks a new era of Chinese economic global leadership. This leadership was created to some extent by a power vacuum left by Washingtonâs withdrawal from the TPP in 2017. Xi Jinping âs defense of economic globalization at every major international event marks a new doctrine in a Chinese desire to rise peacefully and powerfully. Francis Schortgen concludes that the BRI is nothing less than a new global economic order with China at the helm, reflective of an underlying repositioning of great power relations.
Dovetailing with Shortgenâs research is Thomas Lairsonâs chapter, which examines the interdependence of structural power in Chinaâs relations. Thomas D. Lairsonâa political scientist with both Jindhal Global University (India) and Rollins College (USA)âdevelops a framework of deep interdependence and structural power as a primary feature of the strategic environment affecting the design and eventual outcome of the Chinese BRI project. Deep interdependence is a result of the liberal global system established by the United States and is posited to create both opportunities and constraints on China, including the formulation of goals , the design of the BRI, and its ultimate success or failure. Lairson suggests that China needs to develop a nuanced and accommodative set of policies and actions relating to mutual gains, governance through accommodative rules and institutions, and management of internal and inter-state conflicts within the region. He compares the BRI to the post-World War II order of the Marshall Plan. Together with the AIIB, China has the potential to reorganize the Asian security apparatus and its relationship to India, Vietnam, Japan and the United States. Lairson asserts that the BRI project will succeed or fail in creating structural power for China based on its ability to operate within a system of deep interdependence and structural power.
Both Shortgen and Lairson provide a big picture analysis of global and regional geopolitical forces based on the BRI that have the potential to change the world for years to come. The third chapter focuses on Chinaâs most important relationship, and perhaps the most influential one for the entire world. The ChinaâUnited States relationship has been dubbed the G-2 , and is seen by some as the cornerstone for the G-7 . Xiaohua Yang, Don Lewis, and Steve Roddy from the University of San Francisco (USA), and Diana Moise from the Public International Law Advisory Group (UK) analyze the BRI in relation to the United States in Chap. 4, which examines US business connectivity with Chinaâs BRI and provides insights into global cooperation between the worldâs two largest economies in the emerging digital age. Informed by resource-based and institutional-based views, the analysis shows how potential US connectivity to the current BRI could provide windfall gains for US firms possessing a competitive ownership advantage with the advent of the Cyber/Digital and Maritime Silk Roads. Their analysis also reveals the potential costs and risks of such an involvement in the uncertainty of United StatesâChina bilateral relations. Notwithstanding the geopolitical differences, nation-state boundaries, resurgent protectionist movements, and regional markets, BRI partner countries are likely to experience much deeper connectivity as a result of intensifying international trade and investment integration, and concomitant cyberspace developments in countries such as the United States and China.
2 Part II: Regional and Geopolitical Perspectives
Part II begins with a case study from Switzerland by Tomas Casas i Klett (China Competence Center, FIM-HSG University of St. Gallen, Switzerland) and Omar Serrano Oswald (University of Geneva, Switzerland) that shows how FTAs are used by the BRI as stepping-stones for multilateralism . They propose that Chinaâs FTAs are part of a long-term multilateral approach with the potential to be included in the institutional infrastructure of the BRI. By developing a BRI Initiatives Dynamic Evaluation Framework, they emphasize that initiatives under BRI will be subject to decision and evaluation mechanisms that transcend China proper. This means that rather than being static, FTAs are dynamic. The key element in this iteration is the FTA upgrade, which includes trade impact analyses, business agent surveys, utilization rates, and signaling effects. The SinoâSwiss FTA is evaluated as part of this long-term strategy of upgrading bilateral relationships into a comprehensive system that relies on institutional outsourcing of the upward kind from nations with deep institutional building experience.
By analyzing a small but advanced and strategic set of economies (the Nordics), Camilla T. N. Sørensen, from the Institute for Strategy in the Royal Danish Defense College (Denmark), examines how BRI affects the Arctic and Northern Europe. Sørensen offers a much-needed analysis of how the development of the BRI links to Chinaâs growing interests and ambitions in the Arctic, showing how China is using the BRI to further intensify and strengthen relations with the Nordic countries in the Arctic. By conducting a comparative analysis, Chap. 6 further draws attention to how geography and certain domestic circumstances and considerations play into how the Nordic countriesâ see and engage with the BRI as it broadens to the Arctic and Northern Europe. She concludes with a critical discussion of why the Nordic countries are not cooperating to a higher degree, despite growing Chinese efforts in recent years to introduce a 5 + 1 mechanism high-level NordicâChina interactions.
Analyzing another strategic region for China, JÄdrzej GĂłrski, a research fellow at the City University of Hong Kong looks at Chinaâs strategy toward Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) within the Framework of...