Erasmus and the "Other"

On Turks, Jews, and Indigenous Peoples

Nathan Ron

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9783030249281
• eBook ISBN: 9783030249298
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: European History

This book investigates how Erasmus viewed non-Christians and different races, including Muslims, Jews, the indigenous people of the Americas, and Africans. Nathan Ron argues that Erasmus was devoted to Christian Eurocentrism and not as tolerant as he is often portrayed. Erasmus' thought is situated vis-à-vis the thought of contemporaries such as the cosmographer and humanist Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini who became Pope Pius II; the philosopher, scholar, and Cardinal, Nicholas of Cusa; and the Dominican missionary and famous defender of the Native Americans, BartoloméLas Casas. Additionally, the relatively moderate attitude toward Islam which was demonstrated by Michael Servetus, Sebastian Franck, and Sebastian Castellio is analyzed in comparison with Erasmus' harsh attitude toward Islam/Turks.

Part IIntroduction

© The Author(s) 2019

Nathan RonErasmus and the “Other”https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24929-8_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction: Eurocentrism and Racism

Nathan Ron¹

(1)

School of History, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel

Nathan Ron

Abstract

Both “Eurocentrism” and “racism” are used in this book. Eurocentrism, as used here, means judging the “other” according to Christian-European values. The Eurocentric observation is twisted because it expects, or desires, the “other” to adapt himself to a cultural conception foreign to him. Thus, populus Christianus was immeasurably superior to Muslims and to non-Christians in general. Erasmus’ objection to the conclusion of international agreements between Europeans and Turks, or Muslims in general, is one example of his Eurocentric worldview. As for racism, against two reductive definitions of racism phrased by different scholars and presented here, the book’s arguments are tested and approved.

Keywords

EurocentrismRacismErasmusAgreementsHierarchyTurks

End Abstract

This book is about Erasmus’ ethnology. It aims at defining and classifying his attitudes toward non-Christians. No comprehensive research on Erasmus’ ethnological mind has hitherto been published. Erasmus’ attitudes toward Turks and Jews have been discussed by researchers analytically but neither synthetically nor comparatively, as is in this work. Thus, only one and “a half” books on Erasmus and the Jews are to be found, namely Shimon Markish’s book, which was translated from French, and Guido Kish’s booklet—39 pages (in German) and based on Erasmus’ letters only.¹ As for Erasmus and the Turks, no monograph at all has been written on this subject.² This book analyzes Erasmus’ attitude toward not just Turks and Jews, but also Amerindians and Black Africans, making use of Erasmus’ scarce assertions on these two last groups.³

Another innovation, methodological in essence, which the book presents, is the situating of Erasmus’ thought concerning issues such as waging a crusade, war and peace, conversion of the Turks to Christianity, vis-à-vis some intriguing contemporaries who dealt with such issues in their writings or actions. These figures include the cosmographer and humanist who became Pope Pius II, Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (1405–1464); the philosopher, scholar, and Cardinal, Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464); and the Dominican missionary, the famous defender of the Amerindians, Bartolomé Las Casas (1484–1566). Positioning Erasmus against each of the aforesaid personae enables us to arrive at a sharper comprehension of both sides of the comparison: Erasmus as well as these protagonists. One can watch Erasmus and Luther positioning themselves against each other in their famous debate on free will and salvation.⁴ Undoubtedly, attention to their positioning sharpens our comprehension of their views. Since Erasmus did not have similar debates with any of the aforesaid personalities, I have taken it upon myself to develop a comparison of the positioning of Erasmus against these protagonists regarding their views on the “other.”

Erasmus is also positioned in this book, in a different context, against three other challenging figures of his time: the theologian, physician, and humanist Michael Servetus (1509 or 1511–1553); the humanist, theologian, and religious reformer Sebastian Franck (1499–ca. 1543); and the humanist, theologian, religious reformer, and protagonist of religious toleration, Sebastian Castellio (1515–1563).⁵ The relevance to our study of Erasmus is their nonconformism and freethinking in general, and their relation to Islam and the Turks in particular. Besides, they were contemporary with Erasmus and had some sort of notional linkage to him.

Erasmus’ Turkophobic rhetoric as well as his Judeophobic assertions stemmed very much from his fear and hatred of these two non-Christian peoples. But they also derived from his Eurocentric contempt for non-European peoples. Eurocentrism, as I use it in this book, means judging the “other” according to Christian-European values. The Eurocentric observation is essentially twisted because it expects, or desires, the “other” to adapt himself to a cultural conception foreign to him.⁶ Thus, populus Christianus was immeasurably superior to Muslims and to non-Christians in general. Religious pluralism did not exist for Erasmus. Christianity, as a set of values and implications, was the sole measure for all things.

In a recent study, Geraldine Heng presents her maximalist approach of race. She sees it as “a structural relationship for the articulation and management of human differences, rather than a substantive content.”⁷ Accordingly, such terms as “ethnocentrism,” “xenophobia,” “premodern discriminations,” “prejudice,” “chauvinism,” even “fear of otherness and difference,” which have been used comfortably by historians to characterize the massacres, brutalizations, executions, and mass expulsions during the Middle Ages—should be replaced by “racism.”⁸ Without making any judgment about this wide-ranging definition of the term racism, I prefer to test my arguments against reductive definitions of racism, such as the one phrased by Miriam Eliav-Feldon, Benjamin Isaac, and Joseph Ziegler:

racism can be understood profitably only if it is seen in precise terms as an idea, or set of ideas, and an ideology. In other words, the essential difference between racism and other forms of prejudice and chauvinism is that the characteristics of the other are determined by nature while the latter attributes them to custom, social forces or education and the like. The former unlike the latter thus claim that characteristics are unalterable and passed on from one generation to the next.⁹

No less reductive is the definition of Joan-Pau Rubiés, who argues that racism “would focus on the existence of a fully worked out theory of how humankind can be classified according to fundamental biological differences that are transmitted genetically and which have an impact on cultural capacities, with the corollary that there exist naturally superior or inferior peoples.”¹⁰ Testing my arguments against these reductive definitions does not mean that I fully accept these definitions. It means that these definitions are the most challenging and difficult to cope with, and therefore the best ones to confront with my own arguments. Accordingly, I do not replace Eurocentrism with racism, although I do use racism and its derivatives when I find it fit.

Erasmus’ Christian Eurocentrism is conspicuously present in his “Education of a Christian Prince” (Institutio principis Christiani, 1516), where he put forward the following idea: “The truly Christian prince will first ponder how much difference there is between man, a creature born to peace and goodwill, and wild animals and beasts, born to pillage and war, and in addition how much difference there is between a man and a Christian.”¹¹ Thus, a Christian is superior to any non-Christian, whether Jewish, Turk, or pagan, in the same way that a man—any man—is superior to an animal. Turks are indeed human beings, but human existence, as such, is inferior to Christian existence, just as animalistic existence is inherently inferior to human existence.

The same hierarchic conception of humankind is expressed by Erasmus in his letter to Paul Volz of August 1518, which from that year onward prefaces “The Handbook of the Christian Soldier” (Enchiridion militis Christiani). In this letter, Erasmus explains the need to make the Turks convert to Christianity, explaining: “for though nothing else, they are at least human beings.”¹² To be a Christian, for Erasmus, means to occupy the pinnacle of existence on earth. In his “Education of a Christian Prince,” Erasmus warns the Christians of their potential degeneration, which might cause them to deteriorate and become Turks: “It is more likely that we shall turn into Turks than that our efforts will make them into Christians.”¹³ This idea of degeneration and deterioration into the inferior form of Turkish existence is repeated in Erasmus’ letter to Paul Volz, mentioned above. As Erasmus puts it, if we cannot set our hearts so that we become an example for the Turks to convert to Christianity; if we cannot put our hearts into showing them the true Christian way, “we shall degenerate into Turks long before we converted the Turks to our way of thinking.”¹⁴ Thus, the religious, as well as ethnic, inferiority of the Turks vis-a-vis populus Christianus is conspicuous.

Erasmus’ irenic ideal was a Christian peace and not a Christian-Muslim peace. In fact, in Erasmus’ writings there is no yearning or wish for a Christian-Muslim peace. The princes, says Erasmus in “Education of a Christian prince,” should initiate and establish eternal peace between themselves and make joint plans for that purpose. Eternal peace, indeed, but only among Christians, such that would enable Christians to unite forces against the Ottomans.¹⁵ Thus, Christian peace is a prerequisite to successfully fight the Turks.

Francis I (1494–1547) , King of France, thought and acted differently. He wove commercial and unprecedented military ties with the Ottoman Empire, ties which became by February 1536 an official alliance.¹⁶ Erasmus objected to this, as may be inferred from a few of his assertions. His stance had to do, among other things,¹⁷ with his principled objection to agreements between Europeans and Turks, or Muslims in general, which stemmed from his Eurocentric and, by essence, ethnocentric worldview. In his “Education of a Christian prince,” his advice to the ruler is as follows:

It is easy for friendship to be made and kept between those who are linked by a common language, by the proximity of their lands, and by similarities of temperament and character. Certain nations are so different from one another in every way that it would be advisable to refrain from any contact with them rather than be linked to them even by the most binding of treaties. Others are so distant that even if they are well disposed they can be of no help. There are others, finally, who are so capricious, so insolent, such habitual breakers of treaties, that even if they are neighbors they are useless as friends. With this sort the best plan is neither to break with them by open war nor to be linked to them by any very binding treaties or marriage alliances. […] One may state as a general rule that it is not advisable to be too closely allied with those, such a...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• Part I. Introduction
• Part II. Turks
• Part III. Jews
• Part IV. Conclusions
• Back Matter