Historically throughout the Arab world, national governments have used repressive laws to muzzle the national media and implement a culture of selfācensorship. Regimes have used their Ministries of Information to ensure that media content is not infringing on entrenched red lines and to preserve their ability to enforce predetermined narratives and autocratic practices.
The processes of media reform launched post-uprising(s) were attempts to abolish repressive features in the regulatory framework. This goal has not been met, as a heavy arsenal of restrictive legal dispositions persists that make professional journalistic practices practically impossible. Attempts to abolish Ministries of Information have been generally unsuccessful, with new regimes opting for the reinstatement of these ministries as a ānecessary measureā to discipline the chaotic media landscape that prevailed in the aftermath of the old regimesā fall.
In this chapter, I will present an overview of the main features of the media industries in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, looking at commonalities and particularities in these landscapes. I will analyze the major features of media reform and the main handicaps that threaten its successes. I will also present principal amendments and changes within the regulatory framework governing national media, both state-run and private. (It is important to note that a later chapter will deal in detail with state-run media and the reform of this media sector.)
I. Tunisian Media Reform: An Example To Follow?
Media reform in Tunisia can be considered the most advanced in terms of moving to an open and diversified media landscape. However, this reform process remains very fragileābasic features of the plan still need to be approved by the new, largely conservative parliament, the first elected after the political transition post-uprising. Many doubt the new electorateās willingness to embrace progress and their sympathy towards these reforms. Journalists and media outlets continue to face physical and verbal attacks and legal intimidation, raising questions regarding the effectiveness of this process. New legal dispositions prescribed by anti-terror laws threaten to impose additional restrictions on independent reporting.
a. Old Media: The Same Old Story
The media industry in Tunisia has undergone drastic changes since the Jasmine revolution of 2011, moving away from a unilateral narrative toeing the regimeās line to a diversified landscape reflecting the dynamism of the new political and social scene. A comprehensive legal and institutional reform process was launched immediately after the uprising with the aim of removing the repressive features of the old media system and introducing liberal ones. The Tunisian media was known as being among the most heavily censored media industries in the Arab world. As such, it was managed and controlled by a number of governmental bodies that insured media content adhered closely to the official discourse. Taking a ācarrot and stickā approach, the government used advertisement and public subsidies as efficient control mechanisms, rewarding those outlets that were reverential and sanctioning those that were critical, thus jeopardizing the survival of independent media projects. 1
In its bid to present an image of reform, the Ben Ali regime allowed the introduction of private broadcast media in its later years, in what was perceived internally and internationally as a cosmetic attempt to modernise national media. The audio-visual sector, previously under heavy government control, was opened up to private broadcasters, leading to the launch of two private television channels 2 and ten radio stations. The nature of the ownership of this private media sector, tied to the regime through friendship, family, or de facto nepotism, meant that its media content was as reverential as that provided by state media. The prohibition of private broadcast media from tackling politics made their impact on public opinion essentially null and void. According to a World Bank report released in May 2014, Tunis-based radio and TV stations, in addition to newspapers and magazines, were at least part-owned by a member of the Ben Ali family. 3 In regard to print media, the regime tolerated private presses but imposed several restrictions that hindered their viability, such as depriving them of advertisements coming from public administrations.
State and private media alike had to abide by editorial rules set by the regime, especially the prohibition of tackling the inner affairs of the Ben Ali family and topics such as corruption, the wealth disparity, or poverty. The Ministry of Communications held overall responsibility for the management of Tunisian media, while the Ministry of Interior was responsible for approving applications for new print publications. Neither Ministry released clear criteria or made any attempt to justify their decisions. The system of license provision for private broadcast was equally inconsistent and overrun by nepotism. 4 The approval or rejection of a license application was linked to politics without due process of any kind.
A major player in this landscape was the Agency for External Communication, created in 1990 as part of the Ministry of Communications. The agency was responsible for distributing the advertising revenues from public administrationsāfundamental for the economic viability of various media outletsāto these organizations. The agency was also tasked with encouraging international media outlets to publish friendly and positive reports on the regime by sponsoring journalistic trips to Tunisia or even paying direct remunerations for such publications. 5 One of the most prominent beneficiaries of these trips was the former French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, MichĆØle Alliot-Marie. She was forced to step down after the French press published the news of her Christmas holiday to Tunisia while the uprising was raging. 6
Another important player, The Tunisian Internet Agency 7 (rebranded now as Attounissiya Internet) was responsible for policing online content, effectively blocking online pages containing any content that could annoy the regime or question its practices. After the revolution, access to the internet became uncensored; as a result, the agency has struggled to redefine its identity. Recently, the agencyās management has frequently spoken out against attempts to return to an era of internet filtering. 8 For instance, the agency resisted calls for imposing a blanket ban on access to pornographic websites, a ban that was overruled by Tunisiaās highest court. 9 The management of radio and television signal distribution was the jurisdiction of the National Broadcasting Corporation or Office National de TĆ©lĆ©diffusion (ONT). It was the regimeās control instrument, operating in part by restricting access to the frequencies that enabled transmissions of broadcast content. 10 It is currently under the oversight of the new broadcast regulator (HAICA) and has assumed a purely technical function.
The fall of the Ben Ali regime was followed by an immediate suspension of the functions of most of these bodies. The Ministry of Communications that used to oversee the sector 11 was abolished, and the previously powerful Agency for External Communications was largely stripped of its prerogatives. However, no comprehensive restructuring of the former media system and its main agents was implemented.
The end of the previously rigidly regulated and monotone industry unleashed a long-repressed and eager appetite for publishing. According to the National Authority for the Reform of Information and Communication (INRIC), the body that was tasked by the first interim government with overseeing the reform of the media, as of November 2011, a total of 228 new Tunisian print publications had sprung up post-uprising,. 12 Since then, a large number of these publications have simply vanished. There are today a dozen dailies and around 30 periodicals, in addition to roughly 30 public TV and radio stations, and around 10 private television stations. 13 Print publications formerly owned by the ruling party 14 and which used to act as a platform for disseminating its ideology and narratives, were shut down, and their staffs merged into the state owned media. The Prime Ministerās office confiscated those outlets that once belonged to the Ben Ali family and nominated ājudicial administratorsā to oversee their new management. The ownership situation and future of these outlets remains unclear. The Prime Ministerās office also created a special unit for managing relations with national and international media, including granting accreditations for foreign correspondents, and dissolved the Agency for External Communications in January 2014, merging its staff and resources with that of the Prime Minister. 15 However, there are no clear rules on the distribution of public advertising revenues.
b. Regulatory Reforms: The Struggle for Legitimacy
The regulatory reform of Tunisian media focused primarily on abolishing the repressive legal features governing the media and setting the basis for a liberal and modern new legal framework. However, the process was hampered by a lack of support...