Political Communication in Britain

Campaigning, Media and Polling in the 2017 General Election

Dominic Wring, Roger Mortimore, Simon Atkinson, Dominic Wring, Roger Mortimore, Simon Atkinson

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9783030008215
• eBook ISBN: 9783030008222
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Political Communication in Britain is a now established series of ninebooks, the first of which appeared in the aftermath of the 1979 GeneralElection. This book follows the structure of previous volumes andfeatures commentaries and assessments from the pollsters who monitoredvoter opinion during the 2017 General Election. It also includes chaptersfrom party strategists responsible for devising and executing the rivalcampaigns. Furthermore contributions from journalists offer a mediaperspective on the campaign. The remainder of the book consists of academic material designed to complement and augment theaforementioned professionals' chapters. Here the focus is on the majordynamics of political communication, specifically the roles of the press, television, advertising, internet and other such phenomena during the2017 Snap Election.

Part IMedia

© The Author(s) 2019

Dominic Wring, Roger Mortimore and Simon Atkinson (eds.)Political Communication in Britainhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00822-2_2

Begin Abstract

A Tale of Two Parties: Press and Television Coverage of the Campaign

David Deacon¹ , John Downey¹ , David Smith¹ , James Stanyer¹ and Dominic Wring¹

(1)

Social Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK

David Deacon (Corresponding author)

Email: [email protected]

John Downey

Email: [email protected]

David Smith

Email: [email protected]

James Stanyer

Email: [email protected]

Dominic Wring

Email: [email protected]

Keywords

PressTVCoverageProcessPolicy

End Abstract

Election campaigns are still shaped by mainstream news narratives despite the rise and continuing growth of alternative forms of online reporting and commentary. Moreover a significant section of the population continues to receive much of their political information from print and television sources. This in turn helps explain why the rival parties have remained committed to trying to manage the news in the hope of promoting a favourable impression to the widest possible audience or, at the very least, rebutting claims made by opponents. 2017 proved to be a more exciting, eventful campaign than most. Theresa May declared the snap election having looked unassailable since becoming Prime Minister in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum. Hardly any of the many media commentators predicted this campaign would deliver the surprise result it did. May lost her commanding position in parliament but also in terms of a carefully cultivated persona that was undone in the critical weeks running up to polling day.

This chapter is based on a detailed content analysis of news coverage produced on each weekday (Monday–Friday inclusive) between 5 May and 7 June, i.e. the final five weeks before polling day. The sample covers the major broadcast and print outlets . The television content comprises: Channel 4 News (7 p.m.), Channel 5 News (6.30 p.m.), BBC1 News at 10, ITV1 News at 10, Sky News at 8–8.30 p.m. The team analysed all election news found in the aforementioned TV programmes. The press material includes: The Guardian, The I, The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Financial Times , The Daily Mail, The Daily Express , The Mirror, The Sun, The Star. For these newspaper titles the material sampled includes election news on the front page, the first two pages of the domestic news section, the first two pages of any specialist election section and the page containing and facing the papers’ leader editorials.¹

This study explains what the campaign was about. It does so through measuring the visibility or presence of the different parties as well as other organizations and individuals in the news. The latter included the various rival politicians and comparisons are made with recent elections, especially the previous one in 2015. The chapter also identifies the issues that attracted most news attention and, by extension, those that were less prominent than might have been expected when the campaign began. Finally there is some consideration of the role of the (partisan) press, focusing on the negativity versus positivity of the coverage that appeared in print.

Parties

The Conservatives were the most prominent party in terms of the frequency of their representatives’ appearances on TV and in print. Incumbent governing parties have tended to benefit from this advantage in the past (Miller et al. 1990), although the resulting news attention—especially in this campaign—was not always necessarily favourable. Some of this coverage was, for instance, devoted to the furore that followed in the wake of the debate over the so-called ‘dementia tax ’, and the perceived failure of Theresa May to reassure journalists that she had not committed a ‘U-turn ’ on her social care manifesto pledge. Together with their principal Labour rival, the Conservatives dominated the news coverage of this campaign, particularly in terms of the way the major newspapers reported the election (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1

Prominence of parties and their leaders in the press (5 May–7 June)

Between them both major parties accounted for 84% of all politicians reported by the press. In TV terms the two accounted for 67% (Fig. 2), reflecting the sensitivity of the broadcasters to reporting the various third parties. This greater diversity of voices is in part a reflection of the regulatory codes governing the provision of television news. This also helps explain why, when appearances by their representatives were compared, the margin of difference between the Conservatives and Labour was greater for the press (9.6%) than the broadcasters (2.1%). But overall this was very much a two horse race where politicians from other parties played less of a role in terms of media coverage during the campaign . This was in striking contrast to the previous election of 2015 where there had been more diversity in respect of the representatives featured, with the Liberal Democrats, SNP and UKIP enjoying greater prominence (Deacon et al. 2017).

Fig. 2

Prominence of parties and their leaders on TV (5 May–7 June)

The Conservatives ’ advantage in terms of their being able to attract greater news coverage during the 2017 election was reinforced by them also having representatives who were most likely to be directly quoted in the press reports (Fig. 3) and heard on TV news bulletins (Fig. 4). Once again, reflecting the Tory sympathizing leanings of the newspaper industry, Conservatives were more likely to be quoted than their Labour rivals. There was, however, greater balance in the equivalent measure of television coverage .

Fig. 3

Direct quotation of parties and their leaders (press)

Fig. 4

Direct quotation of parties and their leaders (TV)

Broadcasters were as likely to give direct airtime to comments made by Theresa May as they were Jeremy Corbyn. By contrast the smaller parties were largely overshadowed in this respect: individually and collectively they received a relatively small amount of quotation time. This was perhaps to be expected from the largely pro-Conservative newspapers keen to promote the government and attack Labour. But television news similarly marginalized what were, in media terms at least, the ‘minor’ parties. This was in sharp contrast with the 2015 election where the widespread anticipation of a hung parliament had heightened interest in the various junior partners in potential coalition scenarios. Two years on, and with most polls predicting the return of a majority Conservative government, there appeared to be comparatively little reporting of the SNP, UKIP, Greens and even the Liberal Democrats.

Representatives including the leaders of the various third parties were somewhat marginalized in this election, although they were more likely to be directly quoted on television than in the press. And as with the two major parties this larger news access was necessarily a positive. Tim Farron, for instance, spent the early part of the campaign embroiled in a controversy surrounding the discrepancy between his party’s and his own stance on same sex marriage. Paul Nuttall also had a difficult start to his race with limited media attention he received largely taken up by him defending the continuing relevance of UKIP in the aftermath of a referendum vote that had delivered Brexit, the party’s raison d’etre.

Aside from the changed political landscape since 2015, another significant factor that influenced coverage of this campaign was the revision of the broadcast guidelines by the regulator Ofcom . These afforded news organizations greater freedom to exercise their editorial judgement as to the degree they reported on rival leaders, parties and candidates in this election. Cumulatively the impact of the revised Ofcom guidance may have further diminished the third parties’ already limited access to the airwaves. It would appear the live debates failed to help boost the profile of non-Labour/Conservative leaders in terms of the wider media coverage certain leaders had received following such encounters in the 2010 (i.e. Nick Clegg) and 2015 (Nicola Sturgeon ) campaigns. The marked decline in the news devoted to the third/minor parties since the last general election was a notable trend of this campaign.

The 2017 campaign saw the resumption of Labour and Conservative dominance in terms of their joint share of the electoral coverage , not to mention the actual vote itself. This two-party squeeze was most evident in press reporting. In the 2015 campaign 69.7% of politicians covered in the newspapers were Conservative or Labour whereas by 2017 this had increased quite significantly to 84.3% (Fig. 5). This trend was also noticeable in terms of TV news coverage too (Fig. 6).

Fig. 5

Party ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• Seven Weeks Is a Long Time in Politics
• Part I. Media
• Part II. Campaigns
• Part III. Polling
• Back Matter