Over the past few decades, different types of network aimed at tackling neighbourhood unemployment in UK localities that have fallen behind economically, have failed to alleviate this problem, even when the economy was buoyant. Unemployment devastates neighbourhoods, yet scholars offer little explanation as to why networks struggle to overcome unemployment and networks lose sight of their own impact. Although âprescriptiveâ networks appear to be an efficient method for addressing complex policy problems, our understanding about policy failure in the network environment and the networks themselves, as the âbarriers to changeâ, is incomplete (Scharpf 1978: 345â50; Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 15).
Classic studies from the 1970s described some of the inter-organisational limitations in policymaking, coordination, decision-making, and implementation (Tuite 1972; Hanf and Scharpf 1978; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). Recent literature has raised doubts about network effectiveness, and further understanding is required, but much less is known about network impact and the factors influencing network outcomes over time (Geddes 2000; Davies 2007; Entwistle et al. 2007; Klijn et al. 2010; Turrini et al. 2010; McGuire and Agranoff 2011). Studies of networks and partnerships in various policy fields suggest that impact and outcomes are difficult to research empirically (Dowling et al. 2004; Kenis and Provan 2009; Isett et al. 2011). Consequently, ânetwork impactâ is an under-theorised concept, and realistic accounts of network performance and the variable network outcomes that arise in localities are lacking, particularly in neighbourhoods where unemployment has risen steadily over decades.
There are many ways in which government and non-state sectors would like networks to impact, but well-intentioned networks may still be ineffective. Hence this book aims to examine theoretical sticking points in the literature, and define the challenges and impacts of real-world networks through original research. As BĂśrzel (2011) claims, there is âmore research on successful network governance arrangements than there is on failuresâ (2011: 57). In short, ânetwork governanceâ refers to the principles by which actors from different policy contexts relate to each other to govern and implement policy (John and Cole 2000: 81â2).1 However, governance theories appear preoccupied with network functions, rather than how networks connect to political, economic and social objectives (Giguère and Considine 2008: 6; Fawcett and Daugbjerg 2012: 201). Theories about âgovernance networksâ can also be faulted for saying too little about network impacts for citizens in places coordinating local economic and social development (Torfing 2005; Klijn and Kopenjan 2012). Some sceptics claim that âall governance structures failâ (Rhodes 2000: 83, italic in the original) because they disconnect from the âreal limitations of the market, state and mixed economyâ (Jessop 2000: 11). Others raise expectations for self-governing networks that operate within limits set by external power (government and formal institutions), or the use of network management to steer outcomes (Rhodes 1997; Hajer and Versteeg 2005; Provan and Kenis 2008).
Yet network-centric theories and critiques, from network formation and network structure to network dynamics, virtually ignore an impact perspective. Scholars such as Hay and Richards (2000) relate the British general election cycle to network evolution in higher tiers of government, not impact on the ground. Still looking upwards, the term âmeta-governanceâ deliberates on âthe governance of governanceâ and whether the state (competent or incompetent) or indeed any sector has a legitimate functional role to shape rules and bureaucratically control the governance sphere (Jessop 2000; Papadopoulos 2007: 474; Sørensen and Torfing 2009). For OâToole (2008: 223) âChanging or at least influencing outcomes is precisely what public authorities have in mind when they engage in efforts at meta-governance.â Swyngedouw (2005: 2001) distinguishes three âorders of governanceâ. First, institutions in the meta-governance sphere define âgrand principlesâ of governmentality. These include international organisations promoting neo-liberal policy, from the World Trade Organisation and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), to the European Union (EU). Second, governance hierarchies will codify and formalise these principals, while the third order implements the governance at ground level. Network theories, however, say little about governance in the shadow of welfare policy, governing institutions, weak economic growth, or market failure to create work, and finding out what impact networks have gained on the ground becomes an empirical matter.
Institutions engaging business organisations in networks and âpartnershipsâ, expect joint working to have an economic impact. (Moore et al. 1989). Others see networks as empowering organisations with similar values, while disempowering others (Taylor 2003). Sørensen and Torfing (2008a) claim that network theorists are more interested âin the role of governance networks in enhancing governance efficiencyâ than âthe impact of governance networks on democracyâ (2008a: 233). But networks are not successful modes of democratic accountability (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002: 150â3; Dryzek 2008). The âchains of delegationâ between constitutional authority, governance, managers and actual delivery of services has already âlengthened beyond the practical limits of answerability to citizens and their representativesâ (Lynn 2008: 8). Network meeting minutes or reports are often unpublished, and the representation of unemployed people can be superficial. Then again, âdemocratic anchorage of networksâ is just one aspect of network impact.
Network instability is another feature, linked to electoral cycles and policy change, department and institutional (re)structure or termination, EU policy and regional and local politics. Moreover, the social and economic regeneration and employment assistance policies that networks handle for reducing unemployment appear flawed, are difficult to coordinate, and neighbourhood barriers to work persist. Networks handling unemployment need to be realistic, as no economic model can accommodate all people who want to work. In Europe, the youth employment market has collapsed and youth talent accumulates âwith nowhere for it to goâ (Mourshed et al. 2014: 49). In Britain, the Conservatives pre-election campaign in 2015 announced that unemployed youth must work unpaid for benefits, but withheld the information that youth programmes had already failed to organise real work for them. Perversely, equitable training would further strain job competition, as graduates outnumber graduate jobs and infiltrate low-paid jobs or compete for unpaid internships, and many people feel underemployed (Livingstone 2004). In 2013, 3.06 million âunderemployedâ part-time workers wanted a full-time job (see Appendix 1). Taking into account regional variation, the problem affects young people, low-wage sectors and around one in five self-employed people (ONS 2012, 2013; MacInnes et al. 2013: 8â9). Following the 2008 recession, industries reduced workforce hours to avoid mass redundancies, and real consumer wages fell (Bell and Blanchflower 2013: 7). Consequently, poverty increased among working-age adults from 7.5 million in 2007/2008 to 7.9 million in 2011/2012; moreover, 5 million people were paid less than the living wage (see MacInnes et al. 2013: 14). Between 2011 and 2013, 4.8 million different people claimed JSA, and one-half of male claimants and one-third of female claimants made new claims within 6 months of their previous claim (2013: 9, 84, 106â7). This churning effect results from low-paid, insecure jobs, and weak bargaining power and employment protection for employees.
In the post-war years, âsocial-regulatory institutionsâ and trade unions organised mutual constraints, employment stability and beneficial obligations to protect the working classes from capitalismâs âself-destructive dynamicâ (Streeck 1989: 90). Subsequently, flexible labour markets fractured trade unions, but low-waged âflexibleâ service jobs are still unable to support a family with children (Scharpf 2000: 101). Network governance thinking, however, ignores labour protection issues; rather the focus is on organisationsâ communication and interaction beyond institutional power and legal frameworks; whereby âNetwork governance is neither market nor government nor civil society, it is a hybrid organizational formâ according to Bogason and Zølner (2007: 4â5). Since networks find it hard to change or reform neo-liberal institutionsâ rulings, they largely reaffirm the status quo by addressing problems selectively so as to implement governmentâs preferred policies. Network governance delimit policy choices to further field opinion. A good example is that of networks supporting industry to implement the green economy while overlooking the carbon costs of social welfare and wasting livelihoods in places without sufficient jobs.
For Denzau and North (1994: 5) the problems of economic development ârequire an understanding of the shared mental models and ideologies that have guided choices.â Therborn (1986: 133â4) indicates that governments choose unemployment to lower inflation, adjust labour structure, reduce wages and break trade union power. Another governmental approach is to blame unemployed people for lacking competitive skills, despite a scarcity of skilled jobs. Similar attitudes permeate certain networks and relate to ideologies from the past which activate emotional judgement, associated with stigmatisation theory and leadership denial (Link and Phelan 2001). In brief, for the last 200 years, following any financial crisis the UK and US governments have recycled a âperversity thesisâ that switches the reality and responsibility for the situation from being âthe fault of the economy to the fault of the poorâ (see Somers and Block 2005: 255â66). The âconversion narrativeâ claims welfare hurts the job-impoverished, discourages them from working and erodes moral character (2005). Politicians and media frequently overestimate the number of welfare cheats and stigmatise unemployed people as âundeservingâ of welfare benefits and âwork-shy,â while underplaying the problems of corporate cheats and tax evaders, corporate welfare (massive subsidies to firms) and wasteful government expenditure (Baumberg et al. 2012). The OECDâs policy advice for growth and equality, contradicts itself, as they note in âmany countries high economic growth has often been accompanied by a rise in inequalityâ ...