Introduction
The global fashion industry is booming. A fundamental piece of the cultural and economic consumer picture, the apparel and footwear sector was valued at $1.7 trillion dollars in 2017 (Euromonitor 2018). Despite cries of the âdeath of the high streetâ and several big fashion brands running into financial trouble in recent years, the industry is remarkably adept at adapting, evolving and flourishing even in times of global financial crises (see European Commission 2018). Changes in how we consume, largely impacted by developments in technology and global travel, on the one hand have manipulated when and how we consume fashion, yet on the other hand, perpetuate and increase our desire to consume fashion. As the industry continues to grow, and opportunities to consume fashion develop and expand, increasing concern has been afforded to the illicit counterfeit fashion industry. These concerns largely have rested with the economic damage counterfeit branded goods have in terms of intellectual property rights infringements, yet, further lie with the recognition that counterfeit production and supply provides a low risk and high profit opportunity for funding criminal lifestyles and activities.
Reflecting the nature of the international trade, the trade in counterfeit goods is a globally complex network which spans international borders, diverse legal systems, not to mention competing policy priorities. Although there has been increasing recognition from regulatory and law enforcement officials nationally and internationally regarding the âgrowing problemâ of counterfeiting, academic criminology in the large part has been somewhat slow in addressing the issue (Yar 2005; Wall and Large 2010; Large 2015; Hall and Antonopoulos 2016; Sullivan et al. 2016; Antonopoulos et al. 2017). This is particularly evident with the specific issue of fashion goods that are often described as ânon-safety criticalâ counterfeits (see Yar 2005). Understanding the consumption of, and trade in, counterfeit fashion goods proves troublesome for traditional boundaries of criminology. On the one hand, this is due to the differing legal statuses associated within the counterfeit transaction: â for example within England and Wales under the Trade Marks Act 1994, manufacturing or retailing a counterfeit product is considered a criminal offence; yet purchasing the counterfeit (at least for personal use) is not necessarily. However, buying a counterfeit is, in the large part, positioned as deviant and problematic. Therefore, a considerable emphasis of anti-counterfeiting policy attempts to convince potential consumers why not to buy counterfeit (see Large 2015). On the other hand, counterfeiting, especially of fashion products, is considered as a less pressing priority on the criminological agenda, that is no doubt related to its definition as ânon-safety criticalâ counterfeiting and perception as a âvictimlessâ crime (Anderson 1999; Patent Office 2004).
A Background to Counterfeiting
To set the scene, counterfeiting, along with piracy has been described as the most financially valuable trade in illicit goods for âtransnational criminalsâ (May 2017). A report by Global Financial Integrity estimates the retail value of counterfeits at $923 billion to $1.13 trillion US dollars (May 2017: xi). Other estimations include that of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) who in April 2016 suggested that the global import trade in counterfeit goods amounts to nearly half a trillion US dollars (OECD and EUIPO 2016). Another common estimation suggests counterfeiting makes up approximately five to seven percent of all world trade, although the empirical basis for this claim is not clear (see Spink and Fejes 2012). The OECD, however, does estimate that approximately five percent of imports into the European Union (EU) are counterfeit (OECD and EUIPO 2016). The range of counterfeit products traded, reflects the diversity of products and items in the legal marketplace. As one law enforcement official in research by Antonopoulos et al. (2018) on the financial aspects of the trade in counterfeit products suggests:
In terms of the global flows of counterfeit goods, China is recognised as the main source for counterfeit goods that enter the EU, with Chinese origin counterfeits making up 66 percent of the volume of the goods detained at EU borders (European Commission DG TAXUD1). Other countries of special concern to the European Commission (EC) include India for pharmaceutical products and Turkey for cosmetics and perfume. In 2013, customs seized EUR 26.1 million worth of cosmetics and perfumes originating from Turkey alone. These figures suggest that although China may well be the biggest player in the production of counterfeit goods, it is by far from the only source of goods. Notably, China, although suggested to be the source country for over two thirds of counterfeit goods circulating in the EU, it is also where most of the legal goods circulating in the EU are also produced (Europol and OHIM 2016). The prominence of China, and also Turkey, as legitimate importers is an important point to consider in any assessment of illicit counterfeit markets. The parallel nature of counterfeit trade is highly relevant (see Rojek 2017 for a discussion), as is the recognition of the temporal, spatial and cultural definitions of legal and illegal activity (see Hudson 2019). These points will be returned to shortly.There are two categories for the things that are counterfeited. There is everything and there is anythingâŚ. (Interview with Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit Officer cited in Antonopoulos et al. 2018: 1)
A Note of Caution on Trends Data
Much of what we know about the scope and trends of counterfeiting comes from various official, trade and industry sources. However, despite the wide citation of statistics on the size of the industry, so much so that Spink and Fejes (2012: 258) suggest they have achieved âmythological statureâ, caution does need to be exercised with their accuracy. Spink and Fejes (2012) identified how statements about the size of the industry can be traced back primarily to three documents. In reviewing these âcore reference documents (CIB 1997; OECD 2007; FBI 2002)â they noted:
Customs seizure data underpins most official estimations on the trade and although those sophisticated techniques may quantify the economic impact of counterfeiting (see OECD and EUIPO 2016), caution is needed. Valuation estimations are based on assumptions about the product and consumer, which as explored in forthcoming chapters, are often problematic. Seizure data may provide ideas about goods seized, frequency of seizure and origin and destination information, however, it does have the potential to be skewed for a number of reasons (see Large 2019). Additionally, customs data does not help us understand the domestic market for counterfeit goods, nor, intricacies and nuances in the local and global supply and demand of counterfeit goods.The two full reports â CIB 1997 and OECD 2007 â emphasized the challenges of developing both a sound methodology and a data gathering process to provide a statistically supported estimate. The FBI (2002) reference was a one page release with no reference to the methodology used for the estimate. Conversely, while the two full reports were substantial and had a developed methodological foundation, they clearly stated that the methodology was, at best, an educated guess. (Spink and Fejes 2012: 265)
The Nature of Counterfeit Goods
One of the common ways of describing the nature of counterfeit goods is to refer to their âsafetyâ in relation to their potential physical harms to the consumer. The tendency here is to separate goods into a distinction of âsafety criticalâ or ânon-safety criticalâ (see Yar 2005). Non-safety critical goods such as clothing and fashion items (Wall and Large 2010; Treadwell 2012; Large 2015) that appear relatively harmless to the consumer are available, as are safety critical goods that can pose serious health and safety consequences such as vehicle/airline parts (Yar 2005); defence products (Sullivan and Wilson 2017); food, alcohol and tobacco (Antonopoulos 2009; McEwan and Straus 2009; Shen et al. 2010; Lord et al. 2017; Shen and Antonopoulos 2017) and pharmaceuticals (Hall and Antonopoulos 2016; Hall et al. 2017) amongst other things. For some, this justifies a concern about some types of counterfeits more so than others. This distinction between types of counterfeit goods may provide a useful broadly contextual starting point, however it is important to not treat these as binary or mutually exclusive categories. For example, seemingly âsafeâ leather fashion goods may be treated with toxic chemicals or sunglasses may have no adequate UV protection. Further, this kind of conception of counterfeit goods places a clear emphasis on consumer safety with an assumption that the consumer faces the biggest risk of victimisation when buying substandard goods. Following this, an implicit assumption can be made that the next âvictimâ may be the legitimate retailer whose brand might be harmed if consumers are put off buying their products due to negative experiences with counterfeits. Other conceptions of harm and victimisation however, might consider broader environmental risks: for example, mass production of clothing using toxic chemicals, which may or may not be directly harmful to humans but have considerable impacts on the environment. Given the concerns...