The Power of Opposition

How Legislative Organization Influences Democratic Consolidation

Simone Wegmann

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2022
• Print ISBN: 9781032282459
• eBook ISBN: 9781000598322
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Democracia

Proposing a novel way to look at the consolidation of democratic regimes, this book presents important theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of democratic consolidation, legislative organization, and public opinion.

Theoretically, Simone Wegmann brings legislatures into focus as the main body representing both winners and losers of democratic elections. Empirically, Wegmann shows that the degree of policy-making power of opposition players varies considerably between countries. Using survey data from the CSES, the ESS, and the LAPOP and systematically analyzing more than 50 legislatures across the world and the specific rights they grant to opposition players during the policy-making process, Wegmann demonstrates that neglecting the curial role of the legislature in a democratic setting can only lead to an incomplete assessment of the importance of institutions for democratic consolidation.

The Power of Opposition will be of great interest to scholars of comparative politics, especially those working on questions related to legislative organization, democratic consolidation, and/or public opinion.

Part I The Moderating Role of Parliamentary Procedures

Chapter 1 Institutions, the Role of Opposition, and Democratic Consolidation

DOI: 10.4324/9781003005360-2

Democracies are fragile. In recent times, the classical question of democratic stability and democratic support among citizens has again become widely discussed. Within these discussions, it has become clear that even established democracies are by no means safe from threats of democratic decline or breakdown. Some contributing works in these discussions point to increases in dissatisfaction with democracy and anti-democratic opinions among citizens in democratic regimes. While some authors point to a decreasing level of support for democratic regimes in well-established and stable democracies and a wave of autocratization and democracies in crisis around the globe (see, e.g. Lührmann et al. 2019; Przeworski 2019; Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017), others emphasize that no such decrease in the level of support for democracy exists (Voeten 2016). Undoubtedly, recent debates have increasingly been oriented toward the question of whether democracy is in crisis and whether the level of dissatisfaction with democracy among citizens has increased. But, for the survival and stability of democracies, it is essential to not only question if the level of dissatisfaction with democratic regimes has increased but also why such dissatisfaction occurs in the first place.

Research questions related to the organization and performance of different political systems, including democracies, are embedded in one of the most traditional fields in political science. But despite this long research tradition, recent developments show that questions about the determinants of successful democratic consolidation and stability remain highly relevant. This is due to the fact that an initiated process of democratization is by no means a sufficient condition for democratic consolidation and stability. Also, as highlighted above, even established democracies may face increasing levels of dissatisfaction which may ultimately result in threats to their stability. Furthermore, the factors to explain democratic consolidation and stability in political science research are varied and, so far, have not led to clear results.

In democracies, citizens are represented and, to varying degrees, included in the decision-making process. So why do citizens in some polities express dissatisfaction with the functioning of the democratic regime or even prefer non-democratic forms of government while others do not? This question lies at the heart of the present book. It thereby takes on a classical question in political science that has again become widely discussed in recent times. However, I propose a possible answer to this question that lies within the different institutional settings of democracies themselves but has been neglected by most research: the role of the power granted to opposition players to influence the policy-making process.

Focusing on the relationship between institutions and democratic consolidation is of particular relevance. It relates to the extent to which institutions influence public opinion (i.e. dissatisfaction with democracy) which, in turn, might lead to protest and instability. Research has repeatedly pointed to the existence of a winner-loser gap when it comes to satisfaction with democracy (see, e.g. Bernauer and Vatter 2012; Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson and Guillory 1997). If we see losers as crucial actors when it comes to democratic consolidation, assessing how political institutions might affect citizen support for democracy is merely impossible without a detailed look at the roles of these losers, both within democratic institutions and among citizens.

So far, however, the research on the role of institutions for democratic consolidation and stability neglects two important aspects: the role of individual citizens and the legislature. On the one hand, studies on the role of institutions for democratic consolidation often neglect the role of individual citizens. This is extremely surprising as the democratization literature repeatedly mentions this dimension of the individual in definitions of democratic consolidation and stability. For example, Linz and Stepan (1996: 15) define a consolidated democracy as “(…) a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, ‘the only game in town’.” The authors go on and describe what “the only game in town” means from a behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional perspective. All three perspectives point toward the crucial role of political actors and citizens to adhere to democratic rules (Linz and Stepan 1996: 15–16). Similarly, Diamond (1994: 15) has emphasized that “(…) consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down” (see also Diamond 1999; Pridham and Vanhanen 1994; Linz 1990b). According to these definitions, democratic consolidation is inherently about individual attitudes and opinions.

On the other hand, although recognizing the important role of minorities, the research on institutional determinants of democratic consolidation has largely focused on different procedures of government formation (i.e. the difference between parliamentary and presidential regimes or majoritarian and consensus democracies) and neglected the legislature as a policy-making institution and central body representing citizens. But, if consolidation is inherently about citizen attitudes and opinions – and democratic consent of losers is especially important for democratic consolidation – focusing on the role of the institution that actually represents citizens (i.e. the legislature) seems imperative.

To further elaborate on these shortcomings, this introductory chapter proceeds as follows: In the first step, I outline a brief overview of the concept of democratization as used in the current literature and the role of citizens for democratic consolidation. In the second step, I outline a short overview of the existing work on institutional determinants of democratic stability as well as legislative studies, and outline some key shortcomings. In the third step, I present the key questions this book aims to answer. I finish the chapter with an overview of the outline of the book.

1.1 The Role of Citizens

The term democratization has been used in democracy studies for two distinct developments. Beckman (2012: 162), for example, differentiates between democratization as the transition from dictatorship to democracy and democratization as a “gradual development towards the perhaps never fully achievable ideal of democracy” (see also O’Donnell 1992: 19). Hence, democratization does not necessarily only describe a regime change from a non-democratic to a democratic form of government but can also take place within an already democratic regime (see also Schedler 1998: 94).

However, the research of the former conception of democratization (i.e. the transition from dictatorship to democracy) has also relied on the concept of democratization further differentiating between two related but somewhat different processes (Haerpfer et al. 2009; Pridham and Vanhanen 1994)¹ On the one hand, the concept of democratization can be used to label the process of a democratic transition, meaning a regime change from dictatorship toward democracy (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 6). Following Pridham and Vanhanen (1994: 17), the democratic transition “runs from the point at which the previous authoritarian system begins to be dismantled, through the constituent phase of the new democracy to its inauguration and early operation.” On the other hand, the process of democratization is also about what is referred to as consolidation, meaning the solidification of democratic rules as “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996; Linz 1990b: 5). Thus, whereas democratic transition involves changing political institutions, democratic consolidation involves “the full institutionalization of the new democracy, the internalization of its rules and procedures and the dissemination of democratic values” (Pridham and Vanhanen 1994: 2). Put differently, “consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down” (Diamond 1994: 15). In a subsequent work, Diamond (1999:65) presents a more detailed definition:

(…) consolidation is most usefully constructed as the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine. (…) At the mass level, there must be a broad normative and behavioral consensus – one that cuts across class, ethnic, nationality, and other cleavages – on the legitimacy of the constitutional system, however poor or unsatisfying its performance may be at any point in time.

A consolidated democracy will ultimately also be a stable democracy. Hence, a stable democracy is a consolidated democracy in which the probability of democratic backsliding is minimized, or put differently, the probability of preventing democratic breakdown is maximized. Following O’Donnell (1992: 19), such democratic breakdown not only comes as “rapid deaths” of democracy in the form of classical coups but also in the form of “slow deaths” in the form of “successive authoritarian advances.” Hence, democratic stability here refers to the “negative notion of consolidation” (Schedler 1998: 103) meaning the prevention of democratic breakdown and not the deepening of democracy, in general (positive consolidation).

Now, the minor difference between democratic stability and consolidation becomes apparent. Consolidation refers to its “(…) original mission of rendering democracy ‘the only game in town’ (…)” (Schedler 1998: 91). Democratic stability, however, refers to the reduction of the “(…) probability of [democratic] breakdown to the point where they [proponents of democracy] can feel reasonably confident that democracy will persist in the near (and not-so-near) future” (Schedler 1998: 95). On the individual level, a consolidated democracy is a political regime in which individuals agree that democracy is the best form of government (“the only game in town”). Moreover, the satisfaction with the way the democratic regime is working in a given country also influences the willingness or unwillingness of its citizens to defend it. This willingness or unwillingness to defend democracy, in turn, influences the level of consolidation of democracy and, ultimately, its stability.²

It becomes evident that considering political attitudes is of utmost importance for the studies of democratic consolidation and stability. Unsurprisingly, research on the influence of mass beliefs on democratic stability (see,...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• Part I The Moderating Role of Parliamentary Procedures
• Part II Policy-Making Power of Opposition Players and Its Consequences for Democratic Consolidation
• Appendix
• Index