The Battle of Brice's Crossroads

Stewart L Bennett

• Publisher: The History Press
• Year: 2022
• Print ISBN: 9781609495022
• eBook ISBN: 9781614235453
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: American Civil War History
• Index: History

The history of this unexpected Confederate victory in Civil War Mississippi, told through a collection of first-person soldier accounts.
 
An insignificant crossroads in northeast Mississippi was an unlikely battleground for one of the most spectacular Confederate victories in the western theater of the Civil War. But that is where two generals determined destiny for their men. Union general Samuel D. Sturgis looked to redeem his past military record, while hard-fighting Confederate general Nathan Bedford Forrest aimed to drive the Union army out of Mississippi or die trying.
 
In the hot June sun, their armies collided for control of north Mississippi in a story of courage, overwhelming odds, and American spirit. In this book, Stewart Bennett retells the day's saga through a wealth of first-person soldier accounts.
 
Includes photos

Chapter 1

“Hold Forrest and as Much of the Enemy as You Can Over There”

It had been a difficult fight, but now First Lieutenant Thomas Cogley of the 7^th Indiana Cavalry Volunteers could only watch and admit, “The entire army was now in total rout. The infantry was streaming by the wagons in the marsh, beyond the control of its officers, while shot and shell from the enemy’s guns plunged through them. The scene that ensued beggars description.”¹ The disaster that Cogley and his Union comrades encountered near a crossroads in north Mississippi was one they would remember for the rest of their lives. Yet long before the rifles fired and the cannons roared near the banks of Tishomingo Creek, the fires of a civil war had touched America.

The events of 1864 would prove pivotal in the overall outcome of the war, and the fight for Brice’s Crossroads—or the Battle of Guntown, as Union soldiers recalled it—would play its part in the bigger picture of the war. This was also the year that Lincoln would put the military fortunes of the Union and its armies under the authority of Major General Ulysses S. Grant. Grant had proven his leadership after he successfully led his army to victory at Vicksburg. Later, his troops opened the Union supply line to Chattanooga, which helped break the siege of that great city. Soon after, his armies pushed Confederate forces, commanded by Confederate General Braxton Bragg, back down Missionary Ridge and into their winter camps around Dalton, Georgia.

President Abraham Lincoln finally found the general the Union needed. Due to Grant’s successes, he received the rank of lieutenant general and was given command over all the Union armies. The urgency of the situation required Grant to lead from the eastern theater of the war. When he left the western theater, he chose his close friend Major General William T. Sherman to lead and oversee the work of the Union armies in that theater. As 1864 began, Grant devised a new plan for the Union armies in both theaters of war.² In the East, Grant, with Major General George Gordon Meade at the head of the Army of the Potomac, was to keep the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia under the command of General Robert E. Lee from sending any troops toward the West. Grant was also expected to defeat the Confederate army while driving toward the Confederate capital at Richmond, Virginia. In the West, Sherman was to take the battle to the Confederate Army of Tennessee, now under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, and to keep Johnston from sending any help east to General Lee.³

Major General William T. Sherman. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

General Joseph E. Johnston. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

According to Grant, Sherman’s ultimate goal was to be the destruction of the Army of Tennessee, if possible, and capture Atlanta and hold it. However, Atlanta would become a greater focus for Sherman compared to destroying Johnston’s army.⁴ Atlanta was a major railroad hub for the South and specifically the western theater. By taking Atlanta, Sherman would sever Confederate rail lines between the two theaters of war, thus continuing to divide the Confederacy. In order to make these goals obtainable, Sherman needed a strong army and an excellent supply line. He had the army, or armies, as the case may be. Three armies made up the Union juggernaut in the West. The largest of the three was the Army of the Cumberland. Next in size were the Army of the Tennessee and, finally, the Army of the Ohio. Together, these armies totaled about 100,000 troops.⁵

It would be an incredible undertaking to defeat Johnston’s army and take Atlanta. However, Sherman believed correctly that if it was to happen, he needed to focus on how to supply his armies throughout the campaign. Although Nashville was the main depot for Union supplies, it was still considered to be in hostile territory. The supply line north from Nashville to Louisville, Kentucky, and the route from the Cumberland River also had to be guarded by Union troops. To the south, the distance from Nashville to Chattanooga was about 136 miles. Adding to this was the fact that Sherman realized, “every foot of the way, especially the many bridges, trestles, and culverts, had to be strongly guarded against the acts of a local hostile population and of the enemy’s cavalry.”⁶ This took valuable manpower away from Sherman’s front line. Nashville held much of the Union army’s needed supplies. As Sherman and his forces moved south from Chattanooga toward Atlanta, the realization of the need to leave soldiers along the supply line in order to protect it from Confederate raiders and cavalry became increasingly obvious. Sherman found that “then, of course, as we advanced into Georgia, it was manifest that we should have to repair the railroad, use it, and guard it likewise.”⁷ Damaging breaks on the Union supply line could cause lengthy delays in the Union army’s movements and could ultimately cause disaster for Sherman and his march toward the Confederate army and Atlanta.

Two main problems faced Sherman as he examined his supply line. The first was that he was depending on a single railroad track line known as the Western and Atlantic for much of his army’s supplies as they snaked toward Atlanta. Connect this line with that from Chattanooga north toward Nashville and then into Kentucky, and one quickly understood Sherman’s concerns. This line was vulnerable to attack, which led to Sherman’s second problem and, quite possibly, his most vexing: the fear of Confederate attack on this long, volatile supply line by Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest and his cavalry forces. While Sherman took into consideration the abilities and exploits of Confederate General John Hunt Morgan,⁸ no Confederate leader was more feared for destroying supply lines than Major General Forrest.

Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

While Sherman contemplated his situation, Confederate President Jefferson Davis had plans of his own. Lee continued to command the Army of Northern Virginia in the eastern theater. However, in the West, Bragg had resigned from leading the Army of Tennessee after the Confederate debacle on Missionary Ridge. After much consideration, Davis selected General Joseph E. Johnston. Now it was Johnston’s responsibility to stop Sherman and his armies from reaching Atlanta.⁹ Although Johnston’s army was smaller, he did have the benefit of fighting on the defensive in familiar territory. Johnston also understood that if he could get Confederate cavalry behind Sherman’s armies and upon his supply line, maybe enough confusion and destruction might cause Sherman and his armies to turn back toward Chattanooga and beyond. Johnston knew just the man and the cavalry that could make this a reality. It was Johnston’s hope that at one point in time, the administration would realize the need for employing Forrest and his cavalry to break Sherman’s railroad communications, by which he could then be defeated.¹⁰ Forrest was already known for some of his victories and exploits in the region. Yet it was anyone’s guess how long it would take for the Confederate government to come to an understanding of the best way to use Forrest and his cavalry.

In May 1864, Confederate Major General Stephen Dill Lee had taken command of the department that encompassed Mississippi, Alabama, east Louisiana and western Tennessee. This included Confederate forces operating within this large domain, including Forrest and his cavalry.¹¹ Although Johnston was clamoring for Forrest’s cavalry to strike Sherman’s supply line in Tennessee, Lee had his own problems. It wasn’t easy to just let Forrest and his men move off into central Tennessee. By doing so, it would leave north Mississippi’s vast cornfields and important rail lines vulnerable to Union raids. Furthermore, this could hamper the supplies to Johnston’s army, which depended on north Mississippi for much of its provisions. Also, Lee’s fears of Mississippi’s vulnerability only grew when realizing Alabama’s possible susceptibility to Union raids. Selma and Montgomery, Alabama, held important machine shops, ordnance and ammunition stores. Union raids through these areas only added to Lee’s apprehension if Forrest was allowed to leave the region.¹² However, Union raids were already being formed and were coming out of Memphis. These forces were moving on north Mississippi while Sherman continued to press Johnston ever closer to Atlanta. Something had to give.

Major General Stephen Dill Lee. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

May 1864 proved to be a crucial month in the war as Union and Confederate forces jockeyed for position. Memphis would play a key role in the western theater for the Union army. Union forces held Memphis for much of the war, and now that city would play a crucial role in Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign. Although Union Major General James B. McPherson was serving as the commander of the Army of the Tennessee and moving his army southward under Sherman, McPherson was also accountable for the District of West Tennessee, which included the city of Memphis. In Memphis could be found the Union headquarters for the District of West Tennessee. It was here that the district’s commander, Major General S.A. Hurlbut, was stationed. Memphis had seen its share of Confederate raiding and officer infighting, so much so that Union leadership here would see and feel a change in Union organization. Under Special Orders No. 150, Hurlbut was relieved of duty. By May 2, Hurlbut had begun his departure, but not without his own general orders that showed an example of the infighting that was taking place in Memphis. These orders included a stinging retort that “it is to be expected that libel and slander will follow all who are intrusted with important commands, and I do not expect to be, nor have I been, an exception to the common fate.” The district would now test a new commander, Major General Cadwallader C. Washburn.¹³

Not only did General Washburn receive command of the district, but he also needed to follow the bigger picture of what McPherson and Sherman were trying to accomplish with the Atlanta Campaign. On May 5, Sherman began the great campaign for Atlanta. Although Georgia was on Sherman’s mind, the specter of Forrest loomed large in his thoughts as well. Sherman would later admit, “There was great danger, always in my mind, that Forrest would collect a heavy cavalry command in Mississippi, cross the Tennessee River, and break up our railroad below Nashville.”¹⁴ McPherson also worried of the mischief that Forrest might do. As early as May 1, McPherson worried about the fall of Decatur, Alabama. If Decatur was not protected and held by Union forces, McPherson reasoned, “The enemy would undoubtedly hold it with a small force and throw quite a respectable force across the river into Florence and open communication with Forrest, thus endangering very seriously our communication and supplies.” Sherman understood the threat but also realized, “We must risk something.”¹⁵

Major General Cadwallader C. Washburn. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

However, Sherman didn’t leave Forrest to chance, as his statement might have sounded. Instructions for a plan against Forrest that had already been developed by Sherman were being put into motion back in Memphis. As early as April 19, Sherman had communicated his plan: “Brig. Gen. S.D. Sturgis is in route for Memphis to assume command of all the cavalry in the vicinity, and to move out and attack Forrest wherever he can be found.” Sherman was more blunt in his message to the chief of General Grant’s staff, stating, “I have sent Sturgis down to take command of that cavalry and whip Forrest.”¹⁶ For Sherman, Brigadier General Samuel D. Sturgis was a good choice. Sturgis came with a background that included military leadership. His uncle was Brevet Captain William Sturgis, who was made famous by his death at Lundy’s Lane during the War of 1812. No doubt his uncle’s exploits helped move the young Sturgis’s application along when he applied to West Point. Sturgis graduated in the famous class of 1846 that included such leaders as Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, George Edward Pickett, Ambrose Powell Hill, Jesse Lee Reno, George B. McClellan and Dabney Maury.¹⁷

Brigadier General Samuel D. Sturgis. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Once in military service, Sturgis proved his courage under fire during the War with Mexico, in which he was captured and held captive for eight days before the Battle of Buena Vista.¹⁸ Later, he proved his daring and stamina during the Indian Wars, in which he chased an Apache Indian raiding party for three days nearly sixty miles a day and overpowered the Indians near Santa Fe.¹⁹ However, his greatest test quite possibly happened while on the prairie.

In 1857, the buffalo herds were a thing of beauty and danger. Dabney Maury had witnessed the herds on one occasion and recalled, “Our first view of the buffalo was very exciting. There are thousands of them, and we were marching through them for three days, at thirty miles a day, and all day and all night the air resounded with their bellowing.”²⁰ Out west and among the buffalo, Major John Sedgwick led the 1^st Cavalry Regiment, with Sturgis as his second in command. As the regiment moved among the many buffalo, an incredible herd was sighted thundering down upon them just a couple of miles away. Sedgwick froze in his tracks. He turned to Sturgis, asking, “What’ll we do?” Quickly, Sturgis replied, “Time is too precious for explanations now, Major…better turn the command over to me for a little while—I’ll steer you through it.” Sturgis received command and had the wagons corralled as quickly as possible behind the regiment. The troopers dismounted, formed ranks and grasped their rifles as they watched the wave of buffalo speeding toward them. The column’s flanks were thrown out in an inverted V shape, with the apex of the line closest to the charging buffalo. Finally, Sturgis ordered the men to fire, thus splitting the wave to the left and right of the regiment. This continued for about a half hour until the rush had dissipated into a stream. The buffalo lay thick on the prairie in front of Sturgis and his men. The regiment had been saved. Afterward, Sturgis relinquished command back to Sedgwick.²¹ Sturgis proved his skill and ability by acting well under pressure.

The American Civil War would test Sturgis’s leadership on the battlefield. However, controversy seemed to follow him from the beginning. During the early part of the war, he found himself fighting in Missouri at Wilson’s Creek. Here, Sturgis took command of the Union army after the death of its commander, Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon, during the battle. Controversy swirled as Sturgis examined the situation at hand and decided to retreat from the field of battle. While a number of his officers disagreed w...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction and Acknowledgements
• 1. “Hold Forrest and as Much of the Enemy as You Can Over There”
• 2. “I Should Go On and Fight the Foe Wherever Found”
• 3. “The Critical Hour of the Battle”
• 4. “You Cannot Hurry Me or My Men Into This Fight”
• 5. “Everything Was Going to the Devil as Fast as It Possibly Could”
• 6. “Order Soon Gave Way to Confusion and Confusion to Panic”
• 7. “If Mr. Forrest Will Let Me Alone I Will Let Him Alone”
• Appendix A. Union Order of Battle
• Appendix B. Confederate Order of Battle
• Notes
• Bibliography
• About the Author