The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century

Roderick Ogley

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2022
• ISBN:
  9781000636536
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Originally published in 1970 The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century documents the various shapes and forms that neutrality has taken. The most important are neutralization, traditional neutrality, ad hoc neutrality and non-alignment. Each of these terms is carefully defined and illustrated by documents running from the beginning of this century to the late 1960s. This enables students to judge for themselves whether neutrality can again become, as it was in the past, an honourable convenience, or whether, except in so far as it contributes to mediation and peacekeeping, it is an anachronism.

PART I Traditional Neutrality

As we saw in the introduction, the nineteenth century, from 1815 onwards, was a good time for a European state to be neutral. There were no general wars after the defeat of Napoleon, and no wars at all in Europe for the last twenty years; and when war had occurred, states that did not want to involve themselves in the quarrels of others could usually declare their neutrality with some confidence that it would be respected, even if they bordered on the belligerents.

In the early years of this century, two contrary processes were at work. On the one hand, the legal basis of neutrality was clarified and formalized. At the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, attended by representatives of almost all states of political significance in the world, conventions were accepted which specified in considerable detail the legal duties of belligerents to neutrals, and of neutrals to belligerents, in time of war. On the other, the political basis on which neutrality rested was being eroded. For neutrality to thrive, it must be possible to localize war, or at least confine it within some geographical limits. But in the last quarter of the nineteenth century a system of alliances had grown up which made it likely that any war between European states would be a general war. Germany and Austria were joined in the Dual Alliance of 1879, which was extended, less convincingly, to include Italy and become a Triple Alliance in 1882. France was allied to Russia from 1894 onward. This trend continued into the twentieth century. By ententes first with France in 1904, and then with Russia in 1907, Britain, without committing herself to a legal alliance in either case, made it highly probable that her weight would be thrown on the side of those two countries in any conflict with the Dual, or Triple, Alliance.

The first two documents illustrate the elaboration that had taken place in the legal concept of neutrality from Grotius to the Hague Conferences. Grotius, writing in 1625, is often called ‘the father of international law’. Yet in his three-volume work on the law of war and peace this brief extract is virtually all he has to say about neutrality. By contrast, the Hague Conference of 1907 took the question of neutrality seriously enough to draft two separate conventions (that is, multilateral treaties), one for naval and one for land warfare, and each ran to more than twenty articles.

DOCUMENT 1. Extracts from On the Law of War and Peace by Hugo Grotius, translated by Francis W. Kelsey (Oceana, 1964).

What the duty of those at peace is towards belligerents

1. On the other hand it is the duty of those who keep out of a war to do nothing whereby he who supports a wicked cause may be rendered more powerful, or whereby the movements of him who wages a just war may be hampered, according to what we have said above. In a doubtful matter, however, those at peace should show themselves impartial to either side in permitting transit, in furnishing supplies to troops, and in not assisting those under siege. In Thucydides the Corcyreans say that it is the duty of the Athenians, if they wish to be impartial, either to prevent the Corinthians from hiring troops on Attic soil, or to allow them the same privilege. Philip, king of Macedon, was charged by the Romans with having violated his treaty in two ways, both in having done injury to the allies of the Roman people, and in having aided the enemy with soldiers and money.
   The same points are stressed by Titus Quintius in a conference with Nabis:

   ‘Still’, you say, ‘I have not, strictly speaking, done violence to you and your friendship and alliance.’ How many times do you wish me to prove that you have done this? I do not wish to do so at greater length, and I shall sum up the gist of the matter. By what things, then, is friendship violated? In very truth by these two things, by treating my allies as enemies, and by allying yourself with the enemy.

2. In Agathias we read that an enemy is one who does what the enemy wishes; and in Procopius, that he is counted in the ranks of the enemy who supplies a hostile army with what is directly useful for war. Demosthenes long ago said: ‘He who creates and devises the means whereby I may be captured is my enemy, even if he does not strike me nor hurl a javelin at me.’ Marcus Acilius told the Epirotes, who had not supported Antiochus with troops, but were accused of having sent him money, that he did not know whether he should class them as enemies or those at peace. The praetor Lucius Aemilius censured the people of Teos for having aided the fleet of the enemy with supplies, and for having promised them wine; adding, that he would treat them as enemies unless they gave the same to the Roman fleet. And there is recorded a saying of Caesar Augustus: ‘A state, which receives an enemy, loses the right of peace.⁵
3. It will even be of advantage to make a treaty with either party that is waging war, in order that it may be permissible to abstain from war while retaining the goodwill of either, and to render to each the common duties of humanity. We read in Livy: ‘Let them desire peace with either side, as befits impartial friends; let them not intervene in the war.’ Archidamus, king of Sparta, when he saw that the Eleans were leaning to the side of the Arcadians, wrote a letter containing only this: ‘It is a good thing to remain quiet.’

Editor’s Note to Document I

Corcyra became an ally of Athens in 433 B.C., the year before the Peloponnesian War broke out. She had appealed for Athenian support, or at least neutrality, in her conflict with Corinth, an ally of Sparta. By agreeing to a defensive alliance with Corcyra, Athens increased the tension between her alliance system and that of Sparta and thus contributed to the outbreak of the war.

Titus Quintius, Marcus Acilius, and Lucius Aemilius were Roman commanders in the Greek wars at the beginning of the second century B.C., first against Philip of Macedon, and later against Antiochus of Syria. Nabis was king of Sparta.

Agathias and Procopius were historians, Greek and Byzantine respectively, of the sixth century A.D.

The Archidamus referred to is Archidamus III, who was king of Sparta in the middle of the fourth century B.C.

DOCUMENT 2. Extracts from the Hague Conventions of 1907, from The Reports to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 edited by James Brown Scott (Oxford University Press for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1917).

(a) Convention V respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land.

With a view to laying down more clearly the rights and duties of neutral Powers in case of war on land and regulating the position of the belligerents who have taken refuge in neutral territory;

Being likewise desirous of defining the meaning of the term ‘neutral’, pending the possibility of settling, in its entirety, the position of neutral individuals in their relations with the belligerents;

Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have, in consequence, appointed the following as their plenipotentiaries:

[Here follow the names of plenipotentiaries.]

Who, after having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Chapter I. The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers

Article 1. The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.

Article 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power. …

Article 4. Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents. …

Article 6. The responsibility of a neutral Power is not engaged by the fact of persons crossing the frontier separately to offer their services to one of the belligerents.

Article 7. A neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet. …

Article 9. Every measure of restriction or prohibition taken by a neutral Power in regard to the matters referred to in Articles 7 and 8 must be impartially applied by it to both belligerents.

A neutral Power must see to the same obligation being observed by companies or private individuals owning telegraph or telephone cables or wireless telegraphy apparatus.

Article 10. The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act. …

Chapter III. Neutral Persons

Article 16. The nationals of a State which is not taking part in the war are considered as neutrals.

Article 17. A neutral cannot avail himself of his neutrality:

• (a) If he commits hostile acts against a belligerent;
• (b) If he commits acts in favour of a belligerent, particularly if he voluntarily enlists in the ranks of the armed force of one of the parties.

In such a case, the neutral shall not be more severely treated by the belligerent as against whom he has abandoned his neutrality than a national of the other belligerent State could be for the same act.

Article 18. The following acts shall not be considered as committed in favour of one of the belligerents in the sense of Article 17, letter {b):

• (a) Supplies furnished or loans made to one of the belligerents, provided that the person who furnishes the supplies or who makes the loans lives neither in the territory of the other party nor in the territory occupied by him, and that the supplies do not come from these territories;
• (b) Services rendered in matters of police or civil administration….

Article 20. The provisions of the present Convention do not apply except between contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.

(b) Convention XIII concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war.

The High Contracting Parties … have agreed to observe the following common rules, which cannot, however, modify provisions laid down in existing general treaties, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, to wit:

[Here follow the names of plenipotentiaries.]

Who, after having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article 1. Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral Powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters, from any act which would, if knowingly permitted by any Power, constitute a violation of neutrality.

Article 2. Any act of hostility, including capture and the exercise of the right of search, committed by belligerent war-ships in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, constitutes a violation of neutrality and is strictly forbidden.

Articles 3. When a ship has been captured in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, this Power must employ, if the prize is still within its jurisdiction, the means at its disposal to release the prize with its officers and crew, and to intern the prize crew.

If the prize is not in the jurisdiction of the neutral Power, the captor Government, on the demand of that Power, must liberate the prize with its officers and crew….

Article 6. The supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power to a belligerent Power, of war-ships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever, is forbidden.

Article 7. A neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export or transit, for the use of either belligerent, of arms, ammunition, or, in general, of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet.

Article 8. A neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming within its jurisdiction of any vessel which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which that Government is at peace. It is also bound to display the same vigilance to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, which had been adapted entirely or partly within the said jurisdiction for use in war.

Article 9. A neutral Power must apply impartially to the two belligerents the conditions, restrictions, or prohibitions made by it in regard to the admission into its ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters, of belligerent war-ships or of their prizes.

Nevertheless, a neutral Power may forbid a belligerent vessel which has failed to conform to the orders and regulations made by it, or which has violated neutrality, to enter its ports or roadsteads.

Article 10. The neutrality of a Power is not affected by the mere passage through its territorial waters of war-ships or prizes belonging to belligerents.…

Article 12. In the absence of special provisions to the contrary in the legislation of a neutral Power, belligerent war-ships are not permitted to remain in the ports, roadsteads or territorial waters of the said Power for more than twenty-four hours, except in the cases covered by the present Convention….

Article 14. A belligerent war-ship may not prolong its stay in a neutral port beyond the permissible time except on account of damage or stress of weather. It must depart as soon as the cause of the delay is at an end.

The regulations as to the question of the length of time which these vessels may remain in neutral ports, roadsteads, or waters, do not apply to war-ships devoted exclusively to religious, scientific, or philanthropic purposes. …

Article 16. When war-ships belonging to both belligerents are present simultaneously in a neutral port or roadstead, a period of not less than twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of the ship belonging to one belligerent and the departure of the ship belonging to the other.

The order of departure is determined by the order of arrival, unless the ship which arrived first is so circumstanced that an extension of its stay is permissible.

A belligerent war-ship may not leave a neutral port or road-stead until twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship flying the flag of its adversary….

Article 28. The provisions of the present Convention do not apply except between contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.

Editor’s Note to Document 2

Convention V was signed and ratified by twenty-four states including Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Russia and the United States. Great Britain in signing the Convention made reservations to Articles 16, 17 and 18, and never ratified it.

Convention XIII was signed and ratified without reservation, by eighteen states, among them Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Russia. Germany signed and ratified it with reservations to Articles n, 12, 13 and 20. Great Britain signed with reservations to Articles 19 and 23, but again never ratified it. The United States did not sign, but eventually adhered, with reservations to Articles 3 and 23.

*

THE BELGIUM CASE. The next four documents focus on the case of one neutral, or more precisely neutralized, state, Belgium. The existence of Belgium as an independent state goes back only as far as the 1830s, when she broke free from Holland. After some delay, Belgian sovereignty was recognized by the Treaty of 1839, as a ‘perpetually Neutral State’, and guaranteed as such by the five great powers forming ‘the Concert of Europe’. Document 3 shows the context in which ‘the Belgian Question’ arose in the 1830s and the significance of the treaty which settled it. The next extract shows how Belgian neutrality survived its first major test, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1. In that war, British neutrality was conditional on Belgian neutrality being maintained. The British Government had made it clear that it would intervene against whichever belligerent violated Belgian neutrality. Later, as is shown by Documents 5 and 6, the British guarantee began to be thought of as applicable only to a German violation of Belgian neutrality. Document 5 shows that by 1908 there were two somewhat conflicting views of what British policy should be if Belgian neutrality were to be threatened in any other way than by Germany, unilaterally, in a war with France. Eyre Crowe emphasizes Britain’s legal and moral obligations, Hardinge the need for what today would be called ‘pragmatism’; Sir Edward Grey’s brief comment seems to endorse both positions. Just where the British Government stood on this question, however, is perhaps better indicated by the military conversations she had already initiated with Belgium as early as 1906. Document 6, a letter from the Belgian Chief of Staff to his own Minister of War, reports these conversations from the Belgian side. This was not, in fact, the first time that Britain’s attitude towards her commitment to preserve Belgian neutrality, by force if necessary, against attack from any quarter, had shown signs of hesitation. When Lord Salisbury was Prime Minister, he had refused to reaffirm this commitment at a time when there was some talk of a threat by Germany, with whom, at that time, British relations were cordial. Indeed Britain’s even-handed policy during the Franco-Prussian War was perhaps atypical; she happened not to have any strong feelings of partisanship in that war. But once Britain became aligned, in spirit if not in letter, with one of the two great military camps ...