This book views East Asia through the lens of triangles. While emerging in stages from the end of the Cold War, the forces of triangularity accelerated with the advent of both Chairman Xi Jinping, who keeps pressing countries to accept a Sinocentric region, and President Donald Trump, who was demanding that they bow to US leadership in order to block China’s strategy. In place of Trump, President Joe Biden accepted multilateralism, recognizing a role for triangles while doubling down on forging a strategy to counter China’s aggression. The result was rising bipolarity, intensified by the Ukraine war. In the early 2020s, triangularity in East Asia was finally losing ground after 30 years.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine both reflected the era of triangularity and altered its course. Assuming that China had its back and would endorse this rollback of the US-led world order, President Vladimir Putin boldly unleashed his invading forces. Welcomed in Asia by North Korea, he assumed the revival of the Cold War anti-American triangle. Yet, at the pivot of this triangle and that with China and the United States is China, which faces limits on how much it will allow Russia to set the course of international reordering. Also, it watched anxiously as Japan and South Korea, two recent drivers of triangular dynamics, were being swept into the US orbit against Russia with implications for China in their policies. On the one hand, Russia was bringing triangularity to the forefront. On the other, it was having the effect of undercutting triangularity in Asia at odds with China’s aims. Only by grasping the forces of triangularity will we clearly appreciate the impact of this transformative event in 2022 for the rapidly evolving regional environment in East Asia.
Unlike the Cold War era, when bilateralism prevailed (apart from the shift of China leading to triangular thinking), at least three conditions paved the way to widespread triangularity. One, economic interdependencies make it much more difficult for countries to stand squarely on one side or the other. Two, ideological rigidity has been replaced by more porous national identity gaps between pairs of countries. Three, the three-decade interregnum of rising hopes by other states of being able to play a balancing or even a mediating role in Sino-US relations continued to leave a strong imprint across East Asia.
The case for triangularity in East Asia rests on three conditions different from the bipolar Cold War: economic interdependencies with rival powers, national identity gaps between countries beyond a sharp ideological divide, and countries conditioned to expect a larger role than subordination in one camp or another. To the 2020s, paradoxically, intensified Sino-US bipolarity had proven to be fertile soil for rising triangularity, but that may end.
Amidst a debate on whether a new Cold War means a return to the bipolarity of the old Cold War or have we entered into an age of multipolarity, triangles have not received the attention they are due. By drawing attention to them, I acknowledge the predominance of the Sino-US confrontation, while accepting the voices of other parties, mostly reacting to Sino-US relations but also maneuvering under the US or Chinese umbrella to reshape the regional framework. Focus on triangles allows us to thread the needle between claims of all-consuming bipolarity and overblown license for third parties to pursue their own path of multilateralism. This leaves states just two options to maneuver: in a triangle with the United States and China or in a triangle with either the United States or China and a third country aware of the presence of the rival great power. Even states that had made their choice between the two rivals operated in one or more triangular contexts, maneuvering in ties to allies, as well as to adversaries. Such maneuvering grew more difficult in the atmosphere of 2022.
In light of the aforementioned, a new metaphor—the triangle—is needed to analyze geopolitics in East Asia. The dichotomy between multipolarity and bipolarity fails to capture regional dynamics. Talk of a hub and spokes is justifiably falling out of favor. Even the popular concept of a balance of power, famously applied to nineteenth-century Europe, implying either a collectivity of many strong nations or, later, countries lining up to take sides in a polarized environment, fails to explain well the current conditions of states seeking space for leverage between two dominant powers or for repositioning under one or the other power. Many East Asian states—some deemed great powers, others middle powers, and one a nuclear-armed rogue power—have the wherewithal to gain traction against China and the United States or to proceed somewhat on their own even if allied with one power. The need to look strategically in two directions at one time—sometimes varying one of the actors of concern—makes geopolitics a different game than what it has been. It puts a premium on taking security, economics, and national identities all into direct account.
This book is divided into three parts, exploring different forces critical to triangular development. Part I considers the legacy of socialism and China’s behavior in three contexts, each having significance for recreating the essence of that legacy. Part II postulates South Korea’s role as a swing country, debating whether to balance China and the United States, to promote a triangle with China and Japan, or to solidify the US alliance system with Japan. Finally, Part III examines Japan’s place in forging triangularity with the United States but also demonstrating a degree of autonomy. As an exception, it has pursued the Quad with Australia and India along with the United States. The United States figures in seven of the nine triangles/Quad considered, but this book avoids popular US-centric assumptions about how it is driving international relations, pointing to how others are taking the lead.
Chapters 1 and 11 explain the framework for international relations introduced here, arguing for the theoretical utility of strategic triangularity and the recent revival of bipolarity. Chapters 2–10 present analyses of the nine cases chosen here, seeking depth to make them worthy as studies. Finally, throughout this book can be found explanations of the driving forces in the evolution of East Asia, many different from those typically presented. In theory, case studies, and explanatory variables for change, the reader will find distinctive material for rethinking the post-Cold War decades in East Asia while being introduced to indicators for how these forces may be poised to shape forthcoming developments in the region.
Chronology of Post-Cold War Triangular Relations in East Asia
In retrospect, triangular relations among East Asian countries were inevitable after “new thinking” led Mikhail Gorbachev to end the Cold War and, at the same time, retreat from Asia, Deng Xiaoping flaunted clear international norms on June 4, 1989, and set China on a course leading to challenging the United States in Asia, and US “triumphalism” under a series of presidents reasserted the US role as the dominant power in East Asia. Beijing needed time before it could pose a serious challenge to US dominance. Washington lost its focus on the region by becoming bogged down in Southwest Asia from Afghanistan to Iraq. Other countries sought to fill the gaps left by these two giants, leading to images of regionalism and larger groupings than trilateralism. Yet, China’s inexorable rise and the strong reassertion of US regional power pressed other states to respond not just to one but to both, building momentum toward a series of triangular relations as the key framework beyond the Sino-US bilateral relationship. Not all of the most critical triangles involved the two giants in the region, but their presence left a strong imprint on each of the triads.
The United States’ hub-and-spokes image from the Cold War era when the two superpowers largely kept to their own camps has faded as countries maneuver between the United States and China. The aspirations for a Sinocentric order reviving China’s status as the “central kingdom” defy the reality of an enduring, powerful US presence widely welcomed in the region. Talk of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-centrism or an expanded Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) bloc jointly led by China and Russia obscures the primary dynamics of triangularity. When countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Russia look for leverage in their regional dealings, they operate largely within triangular frameworks, each involving both China and the United States or at least one of the two. The realization that triangles, as well as the Quad (the United States, Japan, Australia, India to be discussed as an exception in Chapter 10), played a substantial part in the reshaping of East Asia has spurred separate analyses in the nine chapters to follow.
Chinese leaders were biding their time under the dictum left by Deng Xiaoping, but they rejected alternatives to displacing the United States and reviving a Sinocentric order in East Asia. Japan appealed in 1991–95, again in 2001–03, and finally in 2009–10 for less China-centric regionalism through an East Asian Community, but it was thwarted by the dubious response of China and strong reminders of how much it needs the United States.
ASEAN offered a neutral partner, taking the lead in region-building endeavors, but China balked at a breakthrough on code of conduct talks, blocked any consensus on confidence building over the South China Sea, and despite acquiescing to the broader ASEAN + 6 and the East Asian Summit made sure to limit them to “talk shops.” The Six-Party Talks gave Beijing centrality on North Korean diplomacy before it squandered that by turning a blind eye to the North’s breakaway to full-scale nuclearization and outright aggression in 2009–10. Impatience with multilateralism not dominated by itself, China set East Asia on a course leading to triangularity, as it used its growing economic clout to pressure states.
US leaders vacillated on multilateralism, as Democrats were generally more supportive and Republicans more tempted by alternatives. As the hub-and-spokes approach proved inadequate, President Bill Clinton searched for complementary mechanisms, while critics blamed his weakness rather than acknowledging new realities in Asia. The succeeding Bush administration started by trying to set the clock back in East Asia policy, reaffirming unipolarity and doubling down on the US-Japan alliance, only after 9/11 diverting its energies elsewhere. The Six-Party Talks were a stopgap measure, less multilateralism than a way to get China to tackle the North Korean issue, keep Japan involved, and try to limit the damage of a widening Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) divide. By the late Bush years, the approach was changing to accepting triangularity in Sino-Taiwan-US relations, Sino-ASEAN-US relations, and even Sino-India-US relations. President Barack Obama went further on multilateralism with the leadership of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) economic initiative, cooperation to get China to agree to more sanctions on North Korea at the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and quiet diplomacy to calm Japan-ROK tensions as both explored ties to a great power out of step with US diplomacy. Trump doubled down on unilateralism to little objection from other Republicans, but he could not stem the tide of triangularity. Indeed, by vitiating various alternatives to it and pressing harder on China, he accelerated its advancement. In the subsequent Biden era, US Indo-Pacific strategy became the overwhelming focus as allies and partners were beseeched, one by one, to respond to China in a triangular framework. As the Sino-US divide grew wider, the forces of bipolarity finally gained momentum, notably in 2022, when states could not easily stay on the sidelines in a war scenario.
Regional multilateralism proved to be an unrealizable goal, only temporarily echoed in China for expedient reasons and inconsistently supported by the US as long as it was not excluded. A Sino-US condominium was beyond reach, given the sharp disparity in aims and the wariness of other countries. Rising Sino-US tensions fueled greater triangularity for an extended period until a Cold War atmosphere boosted a resurgence of bipolarity.
During the three decades from 1988 to 2019, East Asian players were emboldened to seek triangular leverage. Japan started the process at the end of the 1980s, anticipating the ties it could advance separate from its US alliance and, as Sino-US ties deteriorated, spotting an opening in what was viewed as the most significant triangle. South Korea was not far behind, talking of diplomatic diversification and with the Sunshine Policy pressing for a central role in the Sino-ROK-US triangle in dealing with North Korea instead of being left with a subordinate place in the ROK-US-Japan triangle. Russia did not take long to get into the act, assuming that its expanding ties with China would give it real clout in a revived Sino-Russian-US strategic triangle, where it could play the role of the pivot. If multipolarity for many represented something broader than triangles, these three states were thinking increasingly in triangular terms—albeit recalibrating their views of what a triangle could be as China’s rise intensified and US policy was being adjusted. Of course, their own frustrations and domestic shifts were important too in triangular aspirations. Of the three, Russia was most obsessive in driving for change.
Triangular dynamics were intensifying from the 1990s, as Japan and South Korea at last gained confidence that they could exert leverage at some distance from their continued alliance with the United States and China turned to “neighboring countries” after its ties to the United States had frayed. With the Soviet Union gone, there was a vacuum, as in the case of North Korea and India, that could encourage triangularity, although some time would be needed. In the 2000s, triangularity picked up steam, reflecting a more balanced Sino-US rivalry, more active South Korean diplomacy, and Russia asserting itself. The decade from 2008 to 2019 warrants showcasing as the heyday of full triangularity with Sino-US relations at the center. China grew more aggressive, the United States pushed back, and the other major players in East Asia jockeyed with these two states in mind. Xi reenergized China, while Barack Obama upped US intensity and Trump raised alarm.
Accelerated advance of triangularity awaited the unleashing of Trump in his second year in office, as well as the full unfolding of Xi’s less fettered agenda with the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China at the end of 2017. On the front lines were Russia, drawing closer to China; North Korea, switching to the diplomatic track; South Korea, seizing the initiative under Moon Jae-in; Japan, finally enabled to reengage in summitry with China while clinging closely to the United States; and India, active in ways not seen before in competition with China. Trump and Xi abandoned the multilateralism of TPP or a “harmonious world” in favor of naked bilateralism where they were able to throw their country’s weight around. That is what was clearly meant by “America First” and the “China Dream.” Newly pressured from both sides, countries now were obliged to think more directly about triangular dynamics, even if it was reassuring to overstate one’s potential clout as a unique driving force engaged with other states as well. Yet potential for bipolarity was rising too, which was brought to the fore in the Ukraine war of 2022. In the background, the response to Russia was seen as sending a message to China too.
The Biden administration championed both a grand strategy rooted in bilateralism versus China as well as the Quad (building on the US-Japan-Australia-India March 2021 virtual summit with efforts to draw others into an even broader form of multilateralism). On the surface, triangles were missing, but in actual practice, they were the building blocks for a coalition of democracies and a security cordon versus Chinese expansionism. A US grand strategy was gradually being rolled out, pursued one triangle at a time, whenever possible. On the other side, Sino-Russian relations drew closer, incorporating triangles in Central Asia but, most importantly, consciously coordinating in the face of a triangle with the United States and recognizing the strategic utility of coordination to draw North Korea into a triangle. Such maneuvering was complicated by renewed bipolarity in the 2020s.
East Asian Triangles
East Asians are conscious of their region’s past as the history of three kingdoms: China, fountainhead of tradition and dominant in influence; Korea, transmitter of tradition and testing grounds for ambitions at critical times; and Japan, leader in modernization but marred by a record of militarization. Under the spell of a long-popular Chinese novel, History of the Three Kingdoms, readers throughout the region regard triangular relations strategically as a challenge demanding diplomatic cunning, alliance building, military preparedness, and long-range tactics. After the Cold War, in stages, China and Japan had resumed their regional competition with the added twist that the United States and Russia, which had carved Korea in two, remain intent on playing a key role in shaping its destiny. This is a formidable environment for strategic thinking, situating Korea at the “hub.”
The East Asian core triangle of China, Japan, and Korea has changed significantly over history and again over the post-Cold War decades, but it retains a central regional role.
Observers have also been accustomed to identifying other triangles important to regional affairs. The Great Strategic Triangle, as Lowell Dittmer dubs it, comprised China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, and it is once again drawing attention with Russia’s revival. The Socialist Legacy Triangle of China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea may have seemed moribund after the end of the Cold War, but with enforcement of sanctions at stake as well as far-reaching diplomacy, its legacy survives with Russia. Increasingly, the focus over North Korea has turned less to the peninsula-centric triangles of the two Koreas and either China or the United States but to the Shadow of the Cold War Triangle of China, North Korea, and the United States. Together, these triangles serve as a clear reminder of the legacy of the Cold War, which shapes the quest for a new regional order. Russia came to welcome these divisive legacies, pressing China to give its full backing, which it seemed to do.
Another set of triangular international relations recognizes the role of South Korea as the fulcrum of change. It is on the front lines, searching for a major role in the transformation of triangles it cannot easily shape. Here, the South Korea-China-United States Triangle is seen as the Pivot of Regional Transformation, centering on tugging South Korea in one direction or the other. Privileged with what is supposed to be an annual summit, Sino-South Korea-Japan relations represent the Traditional East Asian Core Triangle. Likewise, the South has a determinative role in the East Asian Alliance Triangle of the United States-South Korea-Japan. All three of these triangles contribute to an essential framework for grasping how the regional order has been taking shape in Northeast Asia since 1990. In 2022, the Ukraine war introduced one more factor complicating South Korea’s efforts to bridge divides in Asia as Biden pressed for a strong, unified response. A new, conservative president in Seoul shifted policy more fully into the US camp.
Finally, we can conceptualize a third set of triangles/Quad as tests for Japan-US relations in managing ties to other Asian powers. The most conspicuous Japan-US Great Power Triangle is with China. Next, we turn to Russia for another great power triangle. Last in...
