An Introduction to General Metaphysics

Gottfried Martin, Eva Schaper, Ivor Leclerc, Eva Schaper, Ivor Leclerc

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2022
• Edition: 1
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000626131
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

First published in 1961, An Introduction to General Metaphysics presents Gottfried Martin's careful study of many of the passages in Plato and Aristotle which deal with metaphysical problems and in particular with the Platonic Theory of Ideas. He has traced the development of the theory both in early works and in late works such as the Parmenides and the Sophistes; and with equal care he has studied the relative passages in Aristotle's Metaphysics. He has quoted many of these passages at length and has offered a careful account and analysis of the progress of Plato's thought. He has also discussed in a very interesting way the main passages relative to Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Theory of Ideas. This book is a must read for any student of Greek Philosophy and Philosophy in general.

CHAPTER II Unity as Idea

DOI: 10.4324/9781003307549-3

§5: THE THEORY OF IDEAS

Socrates inquires about the general. Plato answers with the theory of Ideas or Forms. What is bravery? What is that by virtue of which we call so many different people in so many different situations all in the same way brave? It is the Idea of bravery which, as that which is the same, underlies so many differences; it is basically present whenever I call a person brave, and to it I must refer whenever I want to know whether I can with justification call him brave. In the course of a critical assessment of the theory of Ideas, metaphysics develops in the hands of Plato and Aristotle. In order to demonstrate this, a short presentation of the theory of Ideas is requisite. It will be based on the Phaedo and the Republic. It was Plato himself who later, in the Parmenides and the Sophist, began the critical assessment of the theory of Ideas.

The approach to the theory of Ideas constitutes an old problem. Plato’s presentation combines well-nigh immediate intelligibility with well-nigh insurmountable difficulties. It is the splendour and depth of the Platonic dialogues that enthusiastic mythology and subtle logic are inseparably combined in them. Since we are considering Plato’s work from the standpoint of an introduction to metaphysics, we are concerned with only one side, but it should not be forgotten that both sides must be taken into account for a full understanding of Plato. We now proceed from two passages in the Phaedo¹:

¹ Phaedo, Vol. I of The Dialogues of Plato.

65d Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an absolute justice?

Assuredly there is.

And an absolute and absolute good?

Of course.

But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?

Certainly not.

Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?—and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and, in short, of the reality or true nature of everything. Is the truth

e of them ever perceived through the bodily organs? or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of each thing which he considers?

After this first introduction of the theory of Ideas Socrates returns to it again a little later:

74a Now consider this question. We affirm, do we not, that there is such a thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone or similar material thing with another, but that, over and above this, there is absolute equality? Shall we say so?

b Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the confidence in life.

And do we know the nature of this absolute existence?

To be sure, he said.

And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not see equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and conceive from them the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will acknowledge that there is a difference? Or look at the matter in another way:—Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear to one man equal, and to another unequal?

That is certain.

c But did pure equals ever appear to you unequal? or equality the same as inequality?

Never, Socrates.

Then these equal objects are not the same with the idea of equality?

I should say, clearly not, Socrates.

First of all one point is noteworthy: the theory of Ideas which, apart from a few remarks in the preceding dialogues, is here, in the Phaedo, propounded for the first time, nevertheless makes its appearance as something thoroughly known. It is not discussed whether there are Ideas or not; rather the existence of the Ideas is regarded as a generally recognized fact. Thus Socrates says in 65d: Do we say that justice itself is something or nothing? Simmias answers without hesitation: We certainly say it is something. In the same way Socrates says in 74a: Do we allow that there is such a thing as equality? Simmias again answers at once: We most assuredly do allow it. In 76d Socrates even speaks of the Ideas as something ‘we are continually talking about’. One is best able to understand this kind of introduction to the theory of Ideas if one assumes that Plato had already discussed the theory of Ideas with his friends and pupils for some time before he presented it to the public in the Phaedo.

These two passages manifest the two spheres out of which the theory of Ideas originally arose: on the one hand the ethical-aesthetic sphere, and on the other the logical-mathematical sphere. To the first belong the Ideas of the just, the good, and the beautiful; to the second, the Ideas of equality and size. Here we come up against a linguistic distinction which will turn out to be philosophically grounded. In presenting the theory of Ideas we usually employ nouns; we usually speak of ‘beauty’, ‘justice’, ‘equality’, ‘size’. Very often we reinforce this substantival expression by saying ‘the Idea of beauty’, ‘the Idea of justice’, ‘the Idea of equality’, ‘the Idea of size’. Plato, on the other hand, generally employs the adjective and almost always says: ‘the beautiful as such’, ‘the good as such’, ‘the equal as such’. In German, Schleiermacher as a rule translates das Schöne selbst, das Gute selbst, das Gleiche selbst (‘the beautiful in itself’, ‘the good in itself’, ‘the equal in itself’).¹ The substantival form of expression is very rarely used by Plato.

¹ B. Jowett and H. N. Fowler (Loeb ed.) translate ‘absolute beauty’, ‘absolute justice’, etc., or ‘equality in the abstract’ (Fowler).

The theory of Ideas distinguishes between the Ideas and individual things. Plato introduces this distinction in the following way:

78c Then now let us return to the previous discussion. d Is that. reality of whose being we give account in the dialectical process—whether equality, beauty, or anything else—are these realities, I say, liable at times to some degree of change? or are they each of them always what they are, having the same uniform self-existent and unchanging natures, not admitting of variation at all, or in or at time?

They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes.

And what would you say of the many beautiful, for instance, men or horses or garments or any other such things, or of the many equal, or generally of all the things which are named by the sanie names as the realities—are they the same always? May they not rather be described in exactly opposite terms, as almost always changing and hardly ever the same either with themselves or with one another?

The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of

779a And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the unchanging things you can only grasp with the mind—they are invisible and are not seen?

That is very true, he said.

Well then, added Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts of existences—one seen, the other unseen.

Let us suppose them.

The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging?

That may be also supposed.

Thus Plato distinguishes between the Ideas and the sensible things. On the one hand there is the beautiful as such, the Idea of beauty, and on the other there are the beautiful things, e.g. beautiful human beings, beautiful horses, beautiful garments. This enumeration, incidentally, is characteristic of Plato; it is noteworthy that beautiful human beings, beautiful horses, and beautiful garments are named, but that there is no mention of works of art as examples of beautiful things. When Plato begins to distinguish the Ideas from the sensible things, what first becomes manifest is that Ideas and sensible things are accessible in completely different ways. The sensible things —in our example, the beautiful things—are perceived with the senses; in particular the beautiful things are seen with the eyes. That is why beautiful things are characterized as ‘visible’. In contrast with this, the Ideas are invisible. Here Ideas are characterized negatively. But beautiful things can not only be seen; one can also feel them and perceive them with the other senses. So Plato characterizes them in general as perceptible by the senses—a characterization which we best represent by ‘sensible thing’. The ideas, on the other hand, are positively characterized as that which can only be experienced in pure thought. Plato proceeds here from the notion of νοῦς; thus he presupposes a special faculty for the recognition of the Ideas. In Latin this is usually called intellectus—for which, incidentally, there is no exact equivalent in German.

Thus the Ideas, accessible only to pure thought, stand in contrast to the sensible things, accessible only to sensory perception. In Latin this contrast is rendered by intelligibilia and sensibilia; in German there is no exact equivalent. In addition, Plato also frequently contrasts νοούμϵνaand φαινόμενα. In German these words have been adopted in the distinction drawn between Nooumene and Phänomene, as for example by Kant.

Plato then brings out a second distinction: the Ideas are immutable and permanent, while the sensible things are changeable and transient. The view has been put forward that in Greek thought the permanent and immutable as such is true being; according to this conception, therefore, one could say that in Greek thought being is permanent being. This, however, cannot be correct in every sense, for it ignores the great contrast between Parmenides and Heracleitus. Certainly the conception of being as permanent being is true for Parmenides. Parmenides denies that the transient is at all; for him being is indeed in its essence permanent being. But against this Heracleitus upholds the cause of change, the cause of movement. All that is, is in constant flux, in constant motion. Thus for Heracleitus only that which is in motion is true being; for him the unmoved is not-being. It has often been seen that, in the Phaedo, Plato is close to the fundamental conception of Parmenides. Later, in the Parmenides and in the Sophist, he was to struggle with this problem. But here in the Phaedo, the decisiveness of Parmenides prevails: the Ideas are eternal and immutable, and therewith they are the truly real, whilst the sensible things are in a constant coming-to-be and passing away, and they are therewith the not-real.

Once this distinction between the Ideas and the sensible things has been made, an epistemological significance and an ontological significance of the Ideas emerge. The epistemological considerations provide decisive reasons for the existence of Ideas. This train of thought is extraordinarily far-reaching; it always comes up whenever the existence of an ideal being in some sense or other is to be demonstrated. One could call it the Platonic argument. Plato expresses this argument in the myth of recollection, but it has long been seen that it can be completely separated from the myth. Every cognition, Plato says, means a recollection. If I am able to know something as equal, then I must already have learned to know equality as such. When I cognize equal pieces of wood as equal, this is a recollection. But this train of thought can be separated from the myth of recollection, for in fact I must, in order to be able to cognize something as equal, always already know what equal is.

Above all the argument is not bound to the specific structure of cognition as pure theoretical knowing. It is equally valid for the sense of sight. Plato says explicitly that anyone who sees Simmias may remember Cebes (the friend of Simmias).¹ One could express this equally well purely linguistically. To be able to call a person brave, I must already know what ‘brave’ means, and to be able to call two pieces of wood equal, I must already know what ‘equal’ means.

¹ Cf. 73d.

That the assumption of some such priority is in fact necessary is readily seen by means of a few examples. One is able to say of a field of grain that it is wheat only if one already knows what wheat is, i.e. if one is already acquainted with wheat. One is able to say of a passing motor-car that it is a Ford only if one already knows what a Ford is.

In pure theoretical knowledge this phenomenon is everywhere evident. Every cognition, in the general sense here considered, presupposes an ‘already known’. Thus the Platonic argument has immense implications; in particular, the conception of the a priori has developed from it. In the Phaedo the epistemological significance of the Idea has a double function. First, the Idea renders cognition possible, and conversely, the existence of the Idea can be derived, as it is done by Plato, from the necessity of the Idea for cognition.

Side by side with the epistemological significance of the Idea is its ontological significance. The Idea renders knowledge possible, but the Idea also above all makes being possible. It is only because there is the Idea of beauty that there are beautiful things; for the beautiful things become beautiful only through the Idea of beauty. Plato, it is true, admits that this connection is not easily understood. Is it a case of the presence of the Idea of beauty in the beautiful things, or is it a case of the participation of the beautiful things in the Idea of beauty, or is perhaps still another connection conceivable? This difficult problem is explicitly discussed by Plato in the Parmenides, but we can take it from the passages under consideration that already before the Pliaedo was written the problem was argued in the circle of Plato’s friends and pupils. But however this difficulty is to be solved, Plato insists that all beautiful things are beautiful only through the Idea of beauty.

The ontological difference which separates the Idea of beauty from the beautiful things is also the reason why it is so difficult to give really adequate examples illustrating the basic arguments of the...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Translators’ Note
• Foreword
• Table of Contents
• Introduction
• I. The Discovery of the General
• II. Unity as Idea
• III. Unity as Transcendental Determination
• Conclusion
• Index