
- English
- PDF
- Available on iOS & Android
About this book
In countries around the world, politicians distribute patronage jobs to supporters in exchange for a wide range of political services – such as helping with campaigns and electoral mobilization. Patronage employees (clients) engage in these political activities that support politicians (patrons) because their fates are tied to the political fate of their patrons. Although conventional wisdom holds that control of patronage significantly increases an incumbent's chance of staying in power, we actually know very little about how patronage works. Drawing on in-depth interviews, survey data, and survey experiments in Argentina, Virginia Oliveros details the specific mechanisms that explain the effect of patronage on political competition. This fascinating study is the first to provide a systematic analysis of the political activities of mid and low-level public employees in Latin America. It provides a novel explanation of the enforcement of patronage contracts that has wider implications for understanding the functioning of clientelist exchanges.
Frequently asked questions
- Essential is ideal for learners and professionals who enjoy exploring a wide range of subjects. Access the Essential Library with 800,000+ trusted titles and best-sellers across business, personal growth, and the humanities. Includes unlimited reading time and Standard Read Aloud voice.
- Complete: Perfect for advanced learners and researchers needing full, unrestricted access. Unlock 1.4M+ books across hundreds of subjects, including academic and specialized titles. The Complete Plan also includes advanced features like Premium Read Aloud and Research Assistant.
Please note we cannot support devices running on iOS 13 and Android 7 or earlier. Learn more about using the app.
Information
Table of contents
- Cover
- Half-title page
- Title page
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A Theory of Self-Enforcing Patronage
- 3 Getting the Job
- 4 Patronage Contracts and Political Services: Evidence from List Experiments
- 5 Patronage, Favors, and the Personalization of Public Administration
- 6 Self-Enforcing Patronage Contracts
- 7 Beyond the Argentine Case
- 8 Conclusions and Broader Implications
- Appendix
- References
- Index