The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development

Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions

Matt Andrews

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781107016330
• eBook ISBN: 9781139603478
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Development Economics
• Index: Economics

Developing countries commonly adopt reforms to improve their governments yet they usually fail to produce more functional and effective governments. Andrews argues that reforms often fail to make governments better because they are introduced as signals to gain short-term support. These signals introduce unrealistic best practices that do not fit developing country contexts and are not considered relevant by implementing agents. The result is a set of new forms that do not function. However, there are realistic solutions emerging from institutional reforms in some developing countries. Lessons from these experiences suggest that reform limits, although challenging to adopt, can be overcome by focusing change on problem solving through an incremental process that involves multiple agents.

Table of contents

• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Preface
• ONE Change Rules, Change Governments, and Develop?
• Two Deconstructing the Puzzling Evidence of Reform
• Three Overlooking the Change Context
• four Reforms as Overspecified and Oversimplified Solutions
• FIVE Limited Engagement, Limited Change
• Six Expecting Reform Limits in Development
• seven Problem-Driven Learning Sparks Institutional Change
• Eight Finding and Fitting Solutions That Work
• NINE Broad Engagement, Broader (and Deeper) Change
• Ten Reforming Rules of the Development Game Itself
• References
• Index