
- English
- PDF
- Available on iOS & Android
Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue
About this book
An epistemic virtue is a personal quality conducive to the discovery of truth, the avoidance of error, or some other intellectually valuable goal. Current work in epistemology is increasingly value-driven, but this volume presents the first collection of essays to explore whether virtue epistemology can also be naturalistic, in the philosophical definition meaning 'methodologically continuous with science'. The essays examine the empirical research in psychology on cognitive abilities and personal dispositions, meta-epistemic semantic accounts of virtue theoretic norms, the role of emotion in knowledge, 'ought-implies can' constraints, empirically and metaphysically grounded accounts of 'proper functioning', and even applied virtue epistemology in relation to education. Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue addresses many core issues in contemporary epistemology, presents new opportunities for work on epistemic abilities, epistemic virtues and cognitive character, and will be of great interest to those studying virtue ethics and epistemology.
Frequently asked questions
- Essential is ideal for learners and professionals who enjoy exploring a wide range of subjects. Access the Essential Library with 800,000+ trusted titles and best-sellers across business, personal growth, and the humanities. Includes unlimited reading time and Standard Read Aloud voice.
- Complete: Perfect for advanced learners and researchers needing full, unrestricted access. Unlock 1.4M+ books across hundreds of subjects, including academic and specialized titles. The Complete Plan also includes advanced features like Premium Read Aloud and Research Assistant.
Please note we cannot support devices running on iOS 13 and Android 7 or earlier. Learn more about using the app.
Information
Table of contents
- Cover
- Half-title
- Title page
- Copyright information
- Table of contents
- Contributors
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 Warrant, functions, history
- Chapter 3 The epistemic “ought”
- Chapter 4 Naturalism and norms of inference
- Chapter 5 Indirect epistemic teleology explained and defended
- Chapter 6 Moral virtues, epistemic virtues, and the Big Five
- Chapter 7 Epistemic dexterity
- Chapter 8 Re-evaluating the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology
- Chapter 9 Stereotype threat and intellectual virtue
- Chapter 10 Acquiring epistemic virtue
- Chapter 11 Virtue and the fitting culturing of the human critter
- Chapter 12 Expressivism and convention-relativism about epistemic discourse
- Bibliography
- Index