The Federalist

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, J. R. Pole

• Publisher: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
• Year: 2005
• Print ISBN: 9780872207110
• eBook ISBN: 9781603842594
• Topic: Geschichte
• Subtopic: Frühe amerikanische Geschichte

No competing edition of The Federalist offers nearly as much help in grasping Publius' arguments in defense of the new but unratified United States Constitution of 1787 as this new annotated edition by J. R. Pole. Essay by essay--with ample cross-references and glosses on 18th-century linguistic usage--Pole's commentary lays bare the intellectual background and assumptions of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay; explicates and critiques The Federalist's central concepts, rhetorical strategies, and arguments; and points up the international, national, and local facts on the ground relevant to Confederation Era New Yorkers, the constituency to which The Federalist was originally addressed.

Pole's Introduction, a brief chronology of political events from 1688 to 1791, a brief overview of the themes of the essays, the text of the Constitution cross-referenced to The Federalist, and an index of proper names, concepts, and themes that also functions as a glossary further distinguish this edition.

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Editorial Note
• A Note on the Text and Annotations
• Introduction
• A Brief Chronology
• Themes
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
• 3. The Same Subject Continued
• 4. The Same Subject Continued
• 5. The Same Subject Continued
• 6. Concerning Dangers from War Between the States
• 7. The Subject Continued and Particular Causes Enumerated
• 8. The Effects of Internal War in Producing Standing Armies and Other Institutions Unfriendly to Liberty
• 9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
• 10. The Same Subject Continued
• 11. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commerce and a Navy
• 12. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Revenue
• 13. The Same Subject Continued with a View to Economy
• 14. An Objection Drawn from the Extent of Country Answered
• 15. Concerning the Defects of the Present Confederation in Relation to the Principle of Legislation for the States in Their Collective Capacities
• 16. The Same Subject Continued in Relation to the Same Principles
• 17. The Subject Continued, and Illustrated By Examples to Show the Tendency of Federal Governments, Rather to Anarchy Among the Members Than Tyranny in the Head
• 18. The Subject Continued, with Farther Examples
• 19. The Subject Continued, with Farther Examples
• 20. The Subject Continued, with Farther Examples
• 21. Further Defects of the Present Constitution
• 22. The Same Subject Continued and Concluded
• 23. The Necessity of a Government, at Least Equally Energetic with the One Proposed
• 24. The Subject Continued, with an Answer to an Objection Concerning Standing Armies
• 25. The Subject Continued with the Same View
• 26. The Subject Continued with the Same View
• 27. The Subject Continued with the Same View
• 28. The Same Subject Continued
• 29. Concerning the Militia
• 30. Concerning Taxation
• 31. The Same Subject Continued
• 32. The Same Subject Continued
• 33. The Same Subject Continued
• 34. The Same Subject Continued
• 35. The Same Subject Continued
• 36. The Same Subject Continued
• 37. Concerning the Difficulties Which the Convention Must Have Experienced in the Formation of a Proper Plan
• 38. The Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the Plan Exposed
• 39. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles: An Objection in Respect to the Powers of the Convention, Examined
• 40. The Same Objection Further Examined
• 41. General View of the Powers Proposed to Be Vested in the Union
• 42. The Same View Continued
• 43. The Same View Continued
• 44. The Same View Continued and Concluded
• 45. A Further Discussion of the Supposed Danger from the Powers of the Union, to the State Governments
• 46. The Subject of the Last Paper Resumed; with an Examination of the Comparative Means of Influence of the Federal and State Governments
• 47. The Meaning of the Maxim, Which Requires a Separation of the Departments of Power, Examined and Ascertained
• 48. The Same Subject Continued, with a View to the Means of Giving Efficacy in Practice to That Maxim
• 49. The Same Subject Continued with the Same View
• 50. The Same Subject Continued with the Same View
• 51. The Same Subject Continued with the Same View, and Concluded
• 52. Concerning the House of Representatives, with a View to the Qualifications of the Electors and Elected, and the Time of Service of the Members
• 53. The Same Subject Continued, with a View of the Term of Service of the Members
• 54. The Same Subject Continued with a View to the Ratio of Representation
• 55. The Same Subject Continued in Relation to the Total Number of the Body
• 56. The Same Subject Continued in Relation to the Same Point
• 57. The Same Subject Continued in Relation to the Supposed Tendency of the Plan of the Convention to Elevate the Few Above the Many
• 58. The Same Subject Continued in Relation to the Future Augmentation of the Members
• 59. Concerning the Regulation of Elections
• 60. The Same Subject Continued
• 61. The Same Subject Continued and Concluded
• 62. Concerning the Constitution of the Senate, with Regard to the Qualifications of the Members, the Manner of Appointing Them, the Equality of Representation, the Number of the Senators and the Duration of Their Appointments
• 63. A Further View of the Constitution of the Senate, in Regard to the Duration of Appointment of Its Members
• 64. A Further View of the Constitution of the Senate, in Regard to the Power of Making Treaties
• 65. A Further View of the Constitution of the Senate, in Relation to Its Capacity as a Court for the Trial of Impeachments
• 66. The Same Subject Continued
• 67. Concerning the Constitution of the President; A Gross Attempt to Misrepresent this Part of the Plan Detected
• 68. The View of the Constitution of the President Continued, in Relation to the Mode of Appointment
• 69. The Same View Continued, with a Comparison Between the President and the King of Great-Britain on the One Hand, and the Governor of New-York on the Other
• 70. The Same View Continued in Relation to the UNITY of the Executive, with an Examination of the Project of an Executive Council
• 71. The Same View Continued in Regard to the Duration of the Office
• 72. The Same View Continued in Regard to the Re-eligibility of the President
• 73. The Same View Continued, in Relation to the Provision Concerning Support, and the Power of the Negative
• 74. The Same View Continued, in Relation to the Command of the National Forces, and Power of Pardoning
• 75. The Same View Continued in Relation to the Power of Making Treaties
• 76. The Same View Continued, in Relation to the Appointment of the Officers of the Government
• 77. The View of the Constitution of the President Concluded, with a Further Consideration of the Power of Appointment, and a Concise Examination of His Remaining Powers
• 78. A View of the Constitution of the Judicial Department, in Relation to the Tenure of Good Behaviour
• 79. A Further View of the Judicial Department, in Relation to the Provisions for the Support and Responsibility of the Judges
• 80. A Further View of the Judicial Department, in Relation to the Extent of Its Powers
• 81. A Further View of the Judicial Department, in Relation to the Distribution of Its Authority
• 82. A Further View of the Judicial Department, in Reference to Some Miscellaneous Questions
• 83. A Further View of the Judicial Department, in Relation to the Trial By Jury
• 84. Concerning Several Miscellaneous Objections
• 85. Conclusion
• The Articles of Confederation
• The Constitution of the United States
• Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
• Back Cover