CliffsNotes on Aristotle's Ethics

Cliff Notes

• Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
• ISBN:
  9780544179660
• Edition: 0
• Topic: Study Aids
• Subtopic: Study Guides

Book I: Chapter I

The Aim of All Action Is the Good

Summary

 

All human actions and choices aim at some good, which may be defined as the end or object of that action or choice. There are as many kinds of ends as there are kinds of activity and the ends may vary, depending on the particular activity being studied (e.g., the end of medical science is good health, the end of military science is victory). Some ends are subordinate to other ends, because the latter provide the motive for pursuing the former (e.g., the activity of bridle-making is subordinate to the more important activity of horsemanship, which is in turn subordinate to the activity of military science). The major ends for the sake of which minor ends are pursued are superior and ought to be preferred.

Book I: Chapter II

Politics Is the Study of the Good

Summary

 

If there should exist an end which is desirable for its own sake, which determines and motivates all other actions and choices, this end would be that which is absolutely good. Knowledge of this good would be of great value, for it would provide an aim for life and a standard by which to evaluate all other activities and thoughts.

 

Politics, the most comprehensive of the practical sciences, is the field of knowledge to which the study of this good belongs. It is the aim of politics to create the best possible conditions in which citizens can lead good lives. This can only be achieved by a knowledge of the good. Thus, the end of politics is human good. The study of ethics, which shares this aim, is a branch of politics.

 

It is possible that the good of the community and the good of the individual are identical, but even so the good of the community is a greater and more perfect moral goal toward which to work. To achieve the good of the individual is worthwhile, but the good of the community, which is composed of many individuals, has a higher, more divine quality.

Book I: Chapter III

Limitations on the Study of Politics and Ethics

Summary

 

The degree of precision and certainty that can be sought in the study of any subject is dependent on the nature of the particular subject. Some subjects allow more precision in the conclusions to be drawn than do other subjects. The questions of what is noble and what is just (the subjects of politics and ethics) present a good deal of varied opinion and divergence of opinion, and there is a similar fluctuation in discussions on the nature of the good.

 

In any examination of this subject, one must be satisfied with determining a rough outline of the truth, and must be content with broad, generalized conclusions. We must accept probabilities rather than absolute facts, for ethics is not like geometry or physics. It is the sign of an educated man that in every subject he studies, he seeks only that degree of precision which the nature of the subject permits (e.g., it is absurd to expect logic from a public speaker or probabilities from a mathematician).

 

It must also be remembered that men are competent judges only of that which they understand. A good judge in a specialized field must be a specialist in that field. A good judge in general is one who has a good general background of knowledge, culture, and experience. Thus, the immature and the young are not equipped to be students of politics and ethics, for they are not experienced in the general business of life which is the basis of these subjects. Also, the immature are easily swayed by emotions and cannot derive benefit from a study whose end is not knowing, but doing. This kind of immaturity is not always due to age; it may also be due to a defect of character present in a man of many years, for it comes about as a result of leading a life made up of undirected and unrelated emotional experiences. On the other hand, those whose approach is directed by reason will benefit greatly from the study of this subject.

Book I: Chapter IV

Varying Views of Happiness and the Good—More Discussion on Method

Summary

 

All knowledge, activity, and choice is directed toward some good. The aim of politics (i.e., the highest good attainable by action) is generally called “happiness.” All people agree on giving it this name, but there is much disagreement as to its definition. Even the same man may define happiness differently at different times (e.g., the sick man defines it as good health, the poor man defines it as prosperity). The mass of men think that happiness comes from sensual pleasure, material well-being, and honorable status. Philosophers of the Platonic school aver that there is an abstract, absolute good from which all of specific goods are derived, and that this is the source of happiness. There are many other views. A detailed examination of all opinions on the nature of happiness would be pointless, and we must concentrate our efforts on those which are most in evidence or most seem to be based on good sense.

 

In regard to the method of this examination, it is important to note the difference between arguments which proceed from fundamental principles (deductive arguments) and arguments which lead up to fundamental principles (inductive arguments). In the study of ethics we must use the inductive approach. We begin with that which is known, more specifically, that which is known to us, and proceed from this to more comprehensive statements and awareness of the fundamental principle, or good. Thus, to be a competent student of what is right and just—ethics—it is necessary to have a good moral upbringing. In ethics we begin with the fact. If there is sufficient reason to accept it as such, there is no need to determine why it must be so, for the basis of our understanding of ethics is relative, not absolute. Without proper moral training, it is impossible to grasp the first principles of ethics, the foundation of our study.

Book I: Chapter V

Varying Views of the Good Life

Summary

 

It is generally assumed that a man’s idea of happiness and the good is derived from the kind of life he leads. There are three main kinds of life:

1. The life led by the masses of men. in which happiness (the good) is identified with sensual pleasure. This is vulgar and reveals a slavish, bestial mentality, little better than that of the brute animals.
2. The life of the cultivated and men of affairs, in which happiness is identified with honor (achieved through political activity). This is too superficial a view, for honor is dependent on those who confer it, not on those who receive it, whereas the good is something personal that cannot be taken away or given. Furthermore, men seek to be honored for their virtue or excellence, and this makes it clear that virtue and excellence are superior to honor. Even excellence is an imperfect end, though, since such virtue is compatible with inactivity, suffering, and misfortune (e.g., one can have virtue while asleep, can possess it but not exercise it, can be virtuous but suffer bad luck or harsh treatment) and in any of these cases the possessor of virtue cannot be called happy.
3. There remains the contemplative life, which is the source of true happiness, but discussion of this will be reserved until later.

It should also be pointed out that the life of the businessman, devoted to seeking wealth, is limited by many constraints and that wealth, while useful, is not an end in itself. Properly used, wealth is a means to something else, and thus is not in itself the source of happiness.

Book I: Chapter VI

The Platonic View of the Good

Summary

 

One of the dominant theories in the study of ethics is Plato’s conception of the universal good, the doctrine of forms. He said that there exists an absolute good which is the source of all goodness of whatever form or kind in the universe. It is difficult to criticize the views of a beloved former teacher, but one must give his highest allegiance to truth.

 

First, contrary to Plato’s theory, there must be many kinds of good, not a single universal ideal, since the good seems to be relative to particular individuals, places, circumstances, and times. A single ideal cannot encompass both the absolute and the relative. Good has no single meaning common to all its applications.

 

Second, the idea of good is used in many different categories. There cannot be an ideal of the good at one time common to the concept of the good as such, the good as the essence of something, and the good as a relation between things. The things categorized under a single platonic form are things of a single science, discipline, or kind, yet there are different standards of the good in different fields, and even at times in the same field. There is no form of the good separate from its particular, finite manifestations.

 

This platonic concept of the good as an absolute value has no practical application and is of little value in everyday affairs (e.g., knowledge of the ideal is of little or no use to a carpenter or doctor, each seeking to attain the good appropriate to his particular function). In our study we must arrive at a formulation of the good that is within the reach of human perception. We recognize that the practical good varies in its applications.

Book I: Chapter VII

Definitions of the Good and Happiness

Summary

What then is the good? Its specific character seems to vary in different arts and different activities, yet in all it appears to be that for the sake of which everything else is done—the end or purpose of the particular activity in question (e.g., health in the case of medicine, a house in the case of building).

Since there are many different ends and we choose only some of these, as a means to something else, it is obvious that not all ends are final (i.e., chosen for their own sakes and not for the sake of something else). That which is pursued as an end in itself is more final than that which is pursued for the sake of something else. That which is never chosen as a means to something else is more final than that which is chosen both as an end in itself and as a means to something else. Thus, what is always chosen as an end in itself and never as a means to something else is called final in an unqualified sense. This description applies to happiness above all else, for happiness is always chosen as an end in itself and never for the sake of something else. Such things as honor, pleasure, intelligence, and virtue, are all chosen only partly for themselves, because while they are all goods, we assume that they lead to happiness. Conversely, no one chooses happiness for the sake of honor, pleasure, or anything else.

We are led to the same conclusion by another argument. It is generally accepted that the final good is self-sufficient (i.e., something which by itself makes life worth living, and which is not limited to the good of a man alone but also includes his family, friends, etc.). The final good cannot be defined by reference to self alone, for man is a social and political being and does not live in isolation. A self-sufficient thing is that which taken by itself makes life something desirable and not lacking in anything. Happiness fits this description, for happiness is the most desirable of all things and is not counted as one good among many. Thus, it can be said, in summing up, that happiness is the end toward which all conscious acts are directed; it is both final and self-sufficient.

To call happiness the highest good is a platitude, and a more clear account of it is still required. It will be easier to understand the nature of happiness if we can ascertain the proper function of a human being. This will give us another view of the end of human life, already referred to as a guide for defining happiness.

It is clear that the mere act of living is not a function peculiar to man for even vegetables and plants experience nurture and growth. A step higher than the vegetative life is the life that is confined to the experience of sensation, but this is shared with men by the brute animals. About the mode of life that remains, it is possible to make two statements; (a) that it belongs to the rational part of man, (b) that it finds expression in action.

Now, the rational part of man can be active or passive. It is passive in that it follows the dictates of reason. It is active in that it possesses and exercises the ability to reason. Similarly, since the reasonable element in rational life may be active or passive, we must make it clear that we are discussing a life determined by the use, as opposed to the mere possession, of the rational faculty.

Let us make certain assumptions and follow them to their conclusion.

1. That the proper function of a man is the activity of his soul in conformity with a rational principle or, at least, not divorced from it.
2. That the proper function of an individual and of a good individual of the same class (e.g., a harp player and a good harp player) are generically the same, except that the proper function of the latter (the good individual of the same class) requires superiority in accomplishment (i.e., the harp player’s function is to play the harp, the good harp player’s function is to play well).
3. That the function of man is thus a certain form of life in combination with a rational principle or reasonable ground of action (as shown above).
4. That the function of a good man is to enact that form of life well.
5. That a function is performed well when performed in accordance with the virtue or excellence appropriate to it. Thus, we have demonstrated that the good for men is an activity of the soul in accordance with excellence or virtue, or, if there should be more than one form of goodness, in accordance with its best and most complete form. This activity must be carried out over an entire lifetime, for happiness is more than a momentary state. A single day or brief period of felicity does not make a man entirely and perfectly happy.

This is only a brief outline of the good. The details must still be filled in. but the most difficult part of the study has been accomplished, for the foundation has been provided for the remainder of our analysis. It must be remembered, though, that ethics is not an exact science. Precise conclusions cannot be reached and we must be satisfied with approximations. Different subjects have different requirements and depend on different kinds of conclusions. A carpenter and a geometrician both seek right angles, but with different aims and needs, depending on the problems posed by their occupations.

Also, ethics is a practical science, and it is often not necessary to inquire after causes or to reason why something is what it is (i.e., to seek ...