Property Possession as Identity

An Essay in Metaphysics

Patrick X. Monaghan

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9783110325089
• eBook ISBN: 9783110325744
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophical Metaphysics

In this essay, Monaghan argues for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. According to this account, for an entity to possess a property is for that entity and that property to be numerically identical to each other. To defend this view, he argues against two views he call Externalism and Internalism about property possession. Monaghan argues that it is impossible for one entity to possess a second entity as a property. He provides replies to variety of objections one might raise against his account.

Table of contents

• CHAPTER I
• INTRODUCTION
• 1. A long-neglected dispute between Plato and Aristotle.1
• 2. The account to be defended.
• 3. Some potential misconceptions about my account.
• 4. The highly metaphorical nature of other accounts.
• 5. An historical precedent for my account.
• 6. The plan.
• 7. Some methodological points about my account.
• 8. Some methodological points about the problem my account solves.
• 9. A theory of properties.
• AGAINST INTERNALISM
• 1. Introduction.
• 2. Against Paul’s view.
• 3. Against Denkel’s view.
• 4. The view of Aristotle.
• 5. Against Internalism in general.
• CHAPTER III
• AGAINST EXTERNALISM
• 1. Introduction.
• 2. Against Predicate Nominalism.
• 3. Against Concept Nominalism.
• 4. Against Class Nominalism.
• 5. Against Resemblance Nominalism.
• 6. Against Traditional Externalism.
• 7. Against Externalism in general.
• CHAPTER IV
• THE VIEW OF PLATO
• 1. Introduction.
• 2. Plato’s view for sensible things.
• 3. A novel interpretation of Plato’s theory of forms.
• 4. Plato on the self predication of the forms.
• 5. Plato and the third man.
• 6. Evaluation of Plato’s view.
• CHAPTER V
• AGAINST HYBRID VIEWS
• 1. Introduction.
• 2. Against the view of Armstrong.
• 3. Against the view of Zalta.
• 4. Against hybrid views in general.
• 5. Against Baxter’s view.
• CHAPTER VI
• PROPERTY POSSESSION AS IDENTITY
• 1. Introduction.
• 2. Premise one:
• 3. Premise two:
• 4. Premise three:
• 5. Premise four:
• CHAPTER VII
• OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
• 1. Introduction.
• 2. The nature of an entity.
• 3. N and its truth.
• 4. Objections and replies.
• 5. The substratum versus the bundle theories.
• 6. The problem of property-unification.
• 7. The problem of the principle of individuation.
• BIBLIOGRAPHY