Against Knowledge Closure
About this book
Knowledge closure is the claim that, if an agent S knows P, recognizes that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is implied by P, then S knows Q. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. Against Knowledge Closure is the first book-length treatment of the issue and the most sustained argument for closure failure to date. Unlike most prior arguments for closure failure, Marc Alspector-Kelly's critique of closure does not presuppose any particular epistemological theory; his argument is, instead, intuitively compelling and applicable to a wide variety of epistemological views. His discussion ranges over much of the epistemological landscape, including skepticism, warrant, transmission and transmission failure, fallibilism, sensitivity, safety, evidentialism, reliabilism, contextualism, entitlement, circularity and bootstrapping, justification, and justification closure. As a result, the volume will be of interest to any epistemologist or student of epistemology and related subjects.
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Information
Table of contents
- Cover
- Half-title
- Title page
- Copyright information
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter 1 Motivation, Strategy, and Definition
- Chapter 2 Counterexamples
- Chapter 3 Denying Premise 1: Skepticism
- Chapter 4 Denying Premise 2: Warrant Transmission
- Chapter 5 Transmission, Skepticism, and Conditions of Warrant
- Chapter 6 Front-Loading
- Chapter 7 Denying Premise 3: Warrant for P as Warrant for Q
- Chapter 8 Denying Premise 4: Warrant by Background Information
- Chapter 9 Denying Premise 5: Warrant by Entitlement
- Chapter 10 Abominable Conjunctions, Contextualism, and the Spreading Problem
- Chapter 11 Bootstrapping, Epistemic Circularity, and Justification Closure
- References
- Index
