About this book
Constitutional political economy has emerged as an indispensable part of political economy. This book offers a concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to this topic. What effects – if any – do constitutions have within autocracies? Can small electoral districts help reduce corruption? Does a country's leadership affect the size of its government? Can direct democratic institutions increase politicians' accountability to citizens? Stefan Voigt, a pioneer in the field, explores these questions and more throughout the course of this cutting-edge primer. As the number of courses in constitutional economics continues to grow, this book fills an important gap in the literature. This highly original project maintains curiosity about the questions it generates, identifying potential new areas of research whilst successfully demonstrating the impact constitutional rules have on political economy.
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Information
Table of contents
- Cover
- Half-title
- Title page
- Copyright information
- Brief Contents
- Detailed Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Conceptual Foundations
- 2 Democracy vs. Autocracy
- 3 Positive Constitutional Economics
- 4 Conclusions and Possible Future Issues
- Appendix 1 Coding Countries according to Two Governance Scores
- Appendix 2 Empirical Results at a Glance: Constitutional Rules As Explanatory Variables and Cross-Country Results Unless Otherwise Noted
- References
- Index
