Agenda Setting in the U.S. Senate

Costly Consideration and Majority Party Advantage

Chris Den Hartog, Nathan W. Monroe

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Year: 2011
• Print ISBN:
  9781107006461
• eBook ISBN:
  9781139066143
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: American Government
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Proposes a new theory of Senate agenda setting that reconciles a divide in literature between the conventional wisdom – in which party power is thought to be mostly undermined by Senate procedures and norms – and the apparent partisan bias in Senate decisions noted in recent empirical studies. Chris Den Hartog and Nathan W. Monroe's theory revolves around a 'costly consideration' framework for thinking about agenda setting, where moving proposals forward through the legislative process is seen as requiring scarce resources. To establish that the majority party pays lower agenda consideration costs through various procedural advantages, the book features a number of chapters examining partisan influence at several stages of the legislative process, including committee reports, filibusters and cloture, floor scheduling and floor amendments. Not only do the results support the book's theoretical assumption and key hypotheses, but they shed new light on virtually every major step in the Senate's legislative process.

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Tables and Figures
• Preface
• Part I: Costly Consideration
• Part II: Senate Procedure and Consideration Costs
• Part III: Testing the Costly-Consideration Theory
• Appendix A: Relaxing the Model’s Assumptions
• Appendix B: Last Actions and Coding Amendment Disposition
• Works Cited
• Index